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EDITOR’S PREFACE
EDITOR’SPREFACE
Resettled communities are ancient in human history. The
Babylonian Captivity, the Romans’ establishment of colonies in
conquered territories, and the more recent establishment of
reservations for Native Americans are three well-known ex-
amples of this time-honored practice. Despite the antiquity and
ubiquitousness of resettlement, Exiles and Migrants in Oceania
is, to my knowledge, the first attempt by anthropologists to
confront the practice in a comparative effort. The comparative
study of resettled communities was initiated largely through the
thinking, planning, and coordination of Homer G. Barnett, to
whom this volume is dedicated. The volume is, if anything, a
first fruit of Barnett’s vision and labor.
Like the other volumes of the ASAO Monograph Series, this
is a symposium volume. With but two exceptions, the authors
of the papers included here met at the University of Wash-
ington in 1970 to determine, through presentations and dis-
cussion, the significant issues raised by the study of resettled
communities. On the basis of these discussions, papers circu-
lated before the symposium convened were rewritten so that
each essay addressed the same issues. It was this sort of com-
parison that Barnett envisioned when he established the Pacific
Displaced Communities Project. This volume is, hopefully, a first
step toward that end.
Chapters 1 and 12 discuss the theoretical and comparative
issues inherent in the study of resettled communities. They are
concerned mainly with the generalizations that can be made
from comparing resettled communities and with how these
generalizations fit with the larger body of anthropological
knowledge. Chapters 2 to 11 present data on specific resettled
communities in Oceania. Although each of these chapters con-
xi
centrates primarily on a particular resettled community (often
in comparison with the home island), its comparative focus can
be seen in the presentation of the data.
I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Martin G.
Silverman to the organization and success of the symposium
that resulted in this volume. I also wish to emphasize the con-
tributions of Murray Chapman and David Schneider. The di-
rection which the symposium and the volume took was pro-
foundly shaped by Chapman’s masterful exposition of the re-
lation between local social units and the larger social systems
that are their contexts. David Schneider’s penetrating discus-
sions of the shape that culture must inevitably give to the way
a community regards its situation was equally determinative
of the theoretical and substantive direction of the volume. My
special thanks go to Sally Furecz and Emily Friedman for their
editorial assistance in preparing the manuscript. Vern Carroll,
the past editor, and Mac Marshall, the present editor of the
ASAO Monograph Series, provided continual encouragement
and advice during the long period of editing and reediting that
followed the symposium.
In addition to his other considerable contributions to the
symposium and this volume, Murray Chapman also directed the
preparations of the maps for this volume. To Robert Campbell,
the cartographer of these maps, goes my very special gratitude.
His careful reading of the manuscript and preparation of maps
on the basis of the often dense anthropological prose he had to
read was, in my estimation, a marvel. He contributed his time
and talent with patience, understanding, and consummate pro-
fessionalism.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge the generosity of the National
Institute of Mental Health for supporting the symposium and
much of the costs of preparing the volume (PHS 1 R13
MH18376–01). I also wish to thank the University of Washington
for support of the symposium and for a stipend that allowed me
to organize this volume during the summer of 1971.
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INTRODUCTION:
LOCATING RELOCATION IN
OCEANIA
Martin G. Silverman
Chapter1
In 1961, Homer G. Barnett of the University of Oregon, with a
number of collaborators, presented a proposal to the National
Science Foundation for a study of relocated communities in the
Pacific Islands. Through the fieldwork of students under the di-
rection of Barnett and others, the Barnett project revitalized the
study of many parts of Oceania. The project takes its place in
the history of anthropology beside those other coordinated en-
terprises that have inspired and enabled fieldwork of extraordi-
narily high quality.1
This volume contains chapters by members of the Barnett
project and others who have, at first hand, studied relocated Pa-
cific peoples. Most of the contributors participated in a 1970
conference which not only provoked a useful exchange of ideas
but also—and this is probably rare, as anthropological con-
ferences go—redefined for the conferees many aspects of the
nature of the problem itself.2 In retrospect, the emphases de-
veloped were faithful to the original objectives of the Barnett
project.
I shall not attempt to define relocation or devise a logical
set of categories into which the various cases can be sorted.
In each of our cases we find, at least, a number of culturally
homogeneous people living in a locale which is different from
the place they come from. Among the ten resettled groups de-
scribed here, we find considerable variation in the composition
of the moving group. There are groups who identify themselves
as complete societies, such as the Banabans and the Bikinians,
groups that begin as “satellites” of the home island, such as
the Kapingamarangi on Ponape and the Tikopia in the Russell
Islands, and groups consisting of people who had not previ-
ously lived together, such as the Southern Gilbertese and the
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Southwest Islanders on Palau. At the extreme end of this range
are individuals from a natal community who go to a single island
and, despite the opportunity to form a community there, choose
not to do so. The Nukuoro on Ponape represent this end of
the range. There is also much variation among these resettled
communities in the types of movement that resettlement consti-
tutes for them. For the Bikinians and Southwest Islanders, re-
location was a novel experience; for the Southeast Ambrymese
and Rotumans, resettlement was part of an ongoing history of
movement in the area.
In addition to comparative ethnography, much of our activity
at the conference was directed toward establishing contexts
within which Pacific relocation could be better understood. In
roughly increasing scope of generality from the Pacific area,
these contexts are colonialism, mobility structures, cultural de-
finitions and the relationships among them, forms of social
organization, and the conditions under which such cultural def-
initions and forms of social organization are developed.
COLONIALISM
The people being considered lived in colonial systems at the
time of research. The colonizer-colonized relation must
therefore figure prominently in any social account of them.
Speaking broadly, we may say that in these cases the colonizers,
who include administration, commercial, and mission establish-
ments, need something the colonized can yield and population
movement is deemed necessary or instrumental to getting it.
The colonizers may need the land of the colonized, as on
Bikini for atomic testing or on Ocean Island for phosphate
mining. The need for the labor of the colonized is common in
areas being exploited by the colonizers. This is exemplified by
the Tikopia in the Russell Islands and the Ambrymese on Efate
working copra and by the Kapingamarangi on Ponape initially
working for a Japanese company and later fishing commercially.
The colonizers may need production on the land of the colonized
such as copra (practically everywhere) and other crops. The col-
onizers may require behavior that is less explicitly tied to eco-
nomic interests—religious conversion, for example, in all these
territories.3
The colonizers may require of the colonized behavior to
sustain the colonizers’ definitions of “good administration” or
“public welfare” in general. Local mobility has been associated
Chapter 1
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with this requirement in, for example, the British practice of
forming “line villages.” The colonizers may also require of the
colonized behavior to sustain the colonizers’ definition of a
“crisis” deriving from natural disaster—volcanic eruptions in
Papua and the New Hebrides, a typhoon in the Southwest Island
dependencies of Palau, a wartime disaster such as the de-
struction of the Ocean Island villages during World War II, or
overpopulation in the Southern Gilberts. It may seem unusual to
link an administrative response to a perceived natural disaster
with a land grab. I do this not to impugn (or, for that matter,
endorse) the specific motives of administrators but rather to un-
derscore the asymmetric situation within which these acts are
carried out.
There is another side of the coin: The colonized usually need
something that the situation created by the presence of the col-
onizers can offer. Furthermore, the colonized sometimes define
their own needs and wants according to the colonizers’ defini-
tions.4 Cash and consumer goods are the universal examples,
followed by education, the bright lights of colonial centers, and
access to hospital care for the Southwest Islanders of Palau.
The colonized, of course, can manipulate the colonizers’
definitions of the situation to their own ends and for purposes
not envisaged by the colonizers themselves. Examples of this
are the Nukuoro on Ponape finding sanctuary away from kin
at home and the South Ambrymese finding sanctuary on Efate
away from sorcery at home.
It seems that an internationally familiar drama has been
played out in a number of island groups and is currently being
played out in others: As the colonized need more and more
diverse elements of what was generated by the colonial situ-
ation, the colonizers need less of what the colonized can yield.
Hanging onto the colony becomes an economic and political lia-
bility for the metropolitan power as its subject peoples’ depen-
dency on the colonial infrastructure has increased. In chapter 8
Kenneth Knudson reports that one reason why government ad-
ministrators may have favored relocation of the Gilbertese from
the Phoenix Islands to the Solomons was to cement relation-
ships between the two territories as a prelude to independence.
Attention is directed, then, to a system with a scale much
larger than that of the indigenous communities under direct
analysis. Attention is forced to what in the conference was
termed the “microsystem-macrosystem problem”—the articu-
lation of the local structures to the larger structures of which
they are part. The assemblage of individual cases of relocation
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documents how, in an orthodox functionalist interpretation,
moving people about is a rather conventional way of keeping
a colonial system going. In this regard the paucity of anthro-
pological studies of another variety of relocated people in the
Pacific is clearly underscored: We know very little of the col-
onizers themselves. Yet the converse is also true: Preventing
people from moving about might also be a conventional way
of keeping a colonial system going. Moreover, regulations even
beyond those specifically dealing with travel, immigration, and
emigration are related to the potential for mobility—regulations
on the registration, exchange, and sale of land being one ex-
ample.
This large-scale regulation of population mobility is not, of
course, distinctive only to colonial systems. Ancient states as
well as modern ones have been involved in moving communities
and segments of communities from one place to another. The
point is merely that the colonial context is an inescapable fact
of life for a certain phase of Pacific history, and attention to that
context allows one to place the several cases in a single per-
spective.
MOBILITY STRUCTURES
The big picture, however, does not do away with the local scene.
If we focus on patterns of mobility, then what are the other in-
stances of mobility in the populations under study? In the con-
ference, Murray Chapman, Sterling Robbins, and James Watson
emphasized this question. Chapman argued strongly that the
current view of tribal peoples is much too static. Mobility is
lurking out there if one looks for it, and it might make sense to
conceive of these areas as areas of people in circulation.5 And,
for parts of even precolonial New Guinea, at least, mobility was
necessary for the maintenance of the social system. Watson’s
description of the importance of refugees as clients for “strong
men” underscores the significance of the dialectic of mobility
and politics set within larger systems (Watson 1970).
Can we identify a mobility structure, as Chapman sug-
gested, which would comprehend, for example, postmarital res-
idence, visiting, short-term labor migration, and the more dra-
matic fact of relocation itself? Can these patterns be fitted into a
structure which points inward to the details of domestic life and
Chapter 1
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points outward to a whole region, with members of local units
picking themselves up (or being picked up or thrown out) and
moving somewhere else?
The attractions of such an approach are several. For ex-
ample, bodies of data that are often taken as discrete (relo-
cation, postmarital residence) could be brought together within
a single framework. The dimensions of the colonial transfor-
mation could be charted more precisely. Some hypotheses about
mobility in the postcolonial Pacific could be formulated. And,
as with invoking the colonial context, ways could be found for
linking our work to studies from other parts of the world.
CULTURAL DEFINITIONS, SOCIAL FORMS, AND
CONDITIONS
It is not unusual in the Pacific (or elsewhere) to encounter
people who trace their origins to some other place in recent,
remote, or mythological time. Does the folk history of mobility
contain a paradigm for dealing with new situations? Vern
Carroll, in chapter 4, raises this question directly. If such para-
digms operate among some people and not among others, how
can we understand that difference?
This brings us to culture, or “systems of meanings embodied
in symbols.” In raising the question of a mobility structure,
one wants to know what accounts for that structure, and one
must then move into the cultural meaning of spatial mobility.
In cultural (semiological, ideological, semantic—there are a
number of favorite words) terms, what can it mean to move
from one place to another? What can it mean not to move from
one place to another? What can it mean to live together and to
live apart? If these meanings have to do with land, what can
land mean? How can kinds of movement be defined and differ-
entiated, if indeed “movement” is a relevant cultural category?
How can different kinds of people be defined and differentiated?
What can a crisis be, and to whom? Erik Schwimmer speaks di-
rectly to this question in chapter 11. How can people define the
options open to them and the options closed to them, if indeed
they structure the world in this way? How can people define
their situation and what to do about it? David Schneider cat-
alyzed the discussion of these issues during the symposium.
A particularly important set of problems involving the
relationship between cultural and social forms concerns bound-
aries: How are boundaries defined, maintained, and changed
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as different groups interact (or do not interact) in particular
contexts in a particular setting? Three aspects of the cases
commend this line of investigation. First, the construction of
particularistic boundaries is an intrinsic part of colonial
practice, as is shown in Robert McKnight’s case from Palau
in chapter 2. Second, some of the relocated groups find them-
selves living next to populations they did not live next to
before—although they may have had images of them. Third, if
the relocated group is a satellite of the home group, the bound-
aries and relationships between the two become a significant
analytic problem for the observer and a significant concrete
problem for the groups themselves; this appears to be crucial
in the Kapinga, Ambrymese, and Tikopia situations. Some of the
ways in which these peoples define their new position, and have
their new position defined for them, seem similar to what in
other parts of the world is described under the rubric of “eth-
nicity.” There are many possibilities for extra-Oceanic compar-
ative work here.
In chapter 8, Knudson argues for the importance of studying
short-term change for the development of an ecological
perspective. Similarly, I would argue for the importance of
studying short-term change for the symbolic perspective, for
in these chapters we encounter real people struggling with
real and changing situations. We can observe at first hand how
meanings are transacted, how they become established through
real events, how differing symbolic constructions relate to the
action-dilemma of life in a changing environment. Schwimmer’s
contribution in chapter 11 and my own in chapter 6 are particu-
larly concerned with this kind of question.
Schwimmer articulates a fundamental issue when he asks:
“How should anthropologists study a nonrecurring event?” In
grappling with the resettlement studies, in trying to make some
comparative sense out of them, we of course want to know first
whether or not the forces precipitating a move—and the kind
of move itself—are recurring. Even if they seem unique in the
history of a single group, we might find them to be recurrent
as we enlarge the scale of analysis to a colonial system or a re-
gional mobility system.
The fundamental issue remains, however, and it is often ar-
ticulated as “the problem of structure and history” (see, for
example, Lévi-Strauss 1966). Indeed, parts of the chapters are
indistinguishable from history or the narration of current
events. History is not simply a background section to most of
the analyses. We find discussion of specific leaders, specific at-
Chapter 1
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tempts at community organization, specific volcanic eruptions
(the latter being “contingency in its purest form,” in Se-
hwimmer’s phrase).
Perhaps there is a tendency in anthropology to regard such
events as reflecting an underlying pattern, rather than as di-
recting a pattern for the future. When confronted with a period
in the history of a people when events seem to dominate and
the pattern is elusive, many of us tend to regard such a period
as transitional, the system grinding its gears while shifting from
one set of ratios to another.
Alternatively we can view these systems as always moving,
unevenly, with both internal dynamics and certain shifts of cir-
cumstance (that is, history) changing the nature of their con-
straints and thus changing the direction, or relative rates of
change, or relative structural dominance, of the unevenly
changing (see Mao Tse-tung 1965). From some of the chapters
one might note in particular the appearance of communal forms
of organization in early relocation periods. Is there a norm in
these cultures: When in crisis, communalize? Or perhaps a form
of organization that has been linked to one set of activities
vastly enlarges its contextual scope in a set of unanticipated cir-
cumstances. When do we find that such shifts are themselves
directed (or misdirected) through concrete events, such as dis-
cussions on land issues, strikes, political meetings—and the
forms of those events might also be highly contingent—which
force the issue?
Clifford Geertz described Indonesia as on the way to be-
coming a “permanently transitional” society (1965:152). That
term may be equally descriptive of the societies described in
this volume—societies in the most recent moments of a history
of resettlement that began, at least, with the settlement of the
Pacific islands. One wonders whether such a characterization
would not apply to a greater range of the human social expe-
rience than we generally believe. The ambiguous, the uncertain,
the unstable, the testing and revision of old and new forms
in new and old contexts, the rising to structural prominence
of features that may have been secondary under other condi-
tions—here may be the rule, not the exception.
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2
COMMAS IN MICROCOSM:
THE MOVEMENT OF
SOUTHWEST ISLANDERS
TO PALAU, MICRONESIA
Robert K. McKnight
Chapter2
INTRODUCTION
In order to create a model industrial nation in Micronesia it has
frequently been suggested that the small, outer-island popula-
tions should be relocated to reside on the few larger high is-
lands. This, it is argued, will provide the proper market and
labor conditions from which industrialization can emerge. A
concentration of Micronesia’s dispersed populations is a key
recommendation in one of the recent economic surveys of the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Nathan Report or,
more formally, the Eco nomic Development Plan for Micronesia
(Nathan 1966). Aside from the economic advantages of a labor
pool and an enhanced market, relocation is advocated as a
means to accomplish ethnocide and engineer Micronesian unity.
The following is a typical passage in which these social objec-
tives are associated with the economic advantage of relocation:
The economic development advantages of being able to pull to-
gether a labor force from throughout Micronesia … will also be of
benefit to the people—both those who move and those who stay
at home. This kind of mobility can facilitate the creation of a Mi-
cronesian unity to replace the present somewhat artificial asso-
ciation of a dozen or so somewhat similar nevertheless distinctly
different cultural, political and economic entities. Increased mo-
bility can speed the replacement of local particularism with a co-
hesive Micronesia. [Nathan 1966:100]
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Elsewhere the plan calls for the introduction of non-Mi-
cronesian labor, presumably Asian, and the continued long-term
supervision of the developmental process by American adminis-
trative and managerial personnel in increased numbers.
The Nathan Report, one learns from various sources in the
Trust Territory administration, is gathering dust, its specifics
largely ignored. Nonetheless current practice, planned or
adopted out of convenience, provides maximum public service
(hence assorted ancillary “urban” conditions) only at the six dis-
trict administrative centers in the Trust Territory, all but one
located on a high island. This practice closely resembles the re-
location tactic urged in the Nathan Report. The motives voiced
by advocates of relocation and concentrated public services are
also likely to be identical; aside from logistic convenience, the
concentration of the various populations in a few locations, it
is believed, will enhance Micronesian unity and, as the Nathan
Report suggests, speed the disappearance of “ancient customs
and traditions” (Nathan 1966: 100).
This model, whether it is a conscious adaptation from the
Nathan Report or not, embodies assumptions that are theo-
retically unsound and are contradicted by data in Micronesia
and elsewhere (for instance, the resettlement scheme for Toke-
lauans in New Zealand).
First, the notion that the association of Micronesian cultural,
political, and economic entities is “artificial” belies the his-
torical facts of colonial experience. Colonial systems, however
contrived and arbitrary they may once have been, are in fact
systems. As such they effect changes and realignments in
contact and communication among the various sociopolitical
systems they subsume.
Second, a well-recognized feature of colonial systems is that
they tend to maintain, by implicit or paralegal policies of
administration, indigenous sociopolitical units (tribes, clans, vil-
lages, castaways, or whatever) which might otherwise have
disappeared through violence, absorption, or assimilation by
dominant groups or as a result of their own internal processes.
In this sense, colonial systems might be thought of as artificial.
The colonial situation in Micronesia is not exceptional; rather
than homogenization, more sharply defined ethnic boundaries
are evident and may be expected to continue as a feature of pop-
ulation concentration.
Third, it follows therefore that it is difficult to assume that
ancient customs and traditions will disappear or that changes
in these customs and traditions will in fact somehow correlate
EXILES AND MIGRANTS IN OCEANIA
9
with the disappearance of “extra-legal restrictions to individual
mobility within the Trust Territory” (Nathan 1966:100). Such
restrictions on movement are normative and are the conse-
quence of ethnic boundaries regardless of the changing content
of such ethnic entities. Barth (1969) has demonstrated that the
maintenance of ethnic boundaries is quite independent of the
nature of the cultures, or the changes in the cultures, of the
ethnic groups involved. Furthermore, Leach (1954) has shown
that the maintenance of ethnic boundaries is independent of
the extent to which people regularly cross such boundaries,
even though the mobile ones may elect to “change” their ethnic
identity as they move between groups.
These three points are obviously closely related. Critical
to each is a recognition that colonial administrations inhibit
the emergence of various asymmetrical relations among inde-
pendent social units and impose another kind of asymmetry, the
subordination of all such units to the colonial administration
itself. By assuring peace and protecting the identity of each
social unit, not only is assimilation of one unit by another highly
improbable, but the former asymmetry among the various units
involved is diminished. Each group under the colonial umbrella
will be engaged in a process of relatively autonomous adap-
tation to the colonial administration and its policies, mirroring,
perhaps, the colonial power in some respects but also reflecting
its own cultural past. Ancient customs and traditions may or
may not disappear; certainly adaptive changes may be ex-
pected. However, ethnic boundaries will remain intact and the
anticipated ethnocide will not occur. It follows, then, that the
kind of happy homogenization portrayed in the Nathan Report
is, in fact, not possible in Micronesia as long as the colonial ad-
ministration maintains itself as a dominant system controlling
the social system it has created or, in the case of Micronesia, in-
herited.
This chapter demonstrates these theoretical formulations
through a study of the relations between Palauans and a re-
settled community of people from the islands southwest of
Palau, as these relationships have been mediated by the colonial
governments that have controlled Micronesia.
Chapter 2
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THE CULTURAL SETTING
In the sea to the southwest of the Pelews there are a number of
isolated small islands concerning which little is known. Their lack
of importance commercially and politically is indicated by the fact
that they have not even received a group name to characterize
them, and their positions upon the chart are only approximate.
Their individual names are North and South Sonsorol, Warren
Hastings, Current and Lord North Islands, with some alternative
names given them by different navigators who have sighted them.
[Hobbs 1923:105]
The five islands and an atoll south of Palau in the southwestern
corner of Micronesia remain almost as remote and nameless
today as they were when described by William Hobbs some fifty
years ago. As last known to the writer in 1965, the islands and
their populations were as follows, moving generally southward
from Palau: Fana, about 8; Sonsorol, about 70; Pulo Ana, about
10; Merir, uninhabited; Tobi, about 100; and Helen Reef,
uninhabited. (See map 1.) Populations change, as we shall see,
through the movement of people to and from Palau. Visits from
island to island among the Southwest Islanders are rare.
Yet the Southwest Islanders do share a sense of common-
ality. Though their languages differ in dialect, they can converse
with one another. Though there are evident physical differences
(Tobians tend to be short and slight, Sonsorolese are taller
and fleshier), they recognize a common ancestral origin.
Futhermore, they are very much aware that they are viewed as
a group by visiting Palauans and they can validate this view, in
many respects, by common contrasts with Palauan society.
Within the range of variation characterizing Micronesian
societies few boundaries are wider than that distinguishing
the social systems of Palau and the Southwest Islands. To put
the Southwest Islands on a more familiar cultural map, they
are linguistically and, for most purposes, culturally derivative
from Ulithi. Specifically, the differences between Palau and the
Southwest Islands may be highlighted as follows.
Palauan political organization, with elaborate dual organiza-
tions at all levels, from the ‘side-thighs’ of the resident clans to
the ‘side-heavens’ of the island groups, and with a host of spe-
cialized political functionaries, culminates in an arrangement
that approaches a semistate with numerous communities bound
loosely together under the dominance of certain ranking vil-
lages (see McKnight 1960). If the Palauan population, prior to
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Map 1. Movement of Southwest Islanders to Palau.
contact and decimation, numbered fifty thousand persons, then
rather tightly controlled village collectivities (three to seven or
more villages) comprehended as many as three to four thousand
persons, while wider and looser patterns of political domination
comprehended one-half or more of the total population.
Chapter 2
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The Southwest Island societies are best represented as
communities of lineages. Each lineage maintains considerable
autonomy in a network of inherited, lineage-based specializa-
tions and economic reciprocities. On each island the community
is bound together loosely through recognition of a tamol ‘head’
who bows to the consensus of lineage leadership. Populations
on any one island probably never exceeded three hundred
persons. In contrasting the political characteristics of Palau
and the Southwest Islands, spokesmen for the latter sometimes
refer to the political structure of a large ship as suitable for
the Southwest Islands. Debating the merits of an administered
program of political development calling for the election of mag-
istrates, a Sonsorolese spokesman pondered the propriety of
electing the captain of a ship.
Of structural importance in both Palau and the Southwest
Islands are matrilineal descent groups. However, Palauan matri-
liny extends to the inheritance of political titles while this is
generally not the case in the Southwest Islands. In condensed
terms, the dui ‘title’ in Palau passes from holder to sister’s son
and the authority of political office remains in the maternal
clan. Among the Southwest Islanders the island ‘head’ position
is inherited by the holder’s son; hence the authority of political
office moves from one matrilineage to another with each suc-
ceeding title generation. The Southwest Islanders have argued
that their political system is more democratic than the
American and Palauan systems, since the authority of a group
does not extend beyond the tenure of one ‘head’.
As the Western court system becomes institutionalized, with
community judges bound largely to Western law, comparisons
between the societies in terms of resolving civil disputes will
become more important. In Palau such disputes (now more
often handled by Western courts) were formerly adjudicated by
a special title-holder in large communities or, in the case of
small communities, by a council of titled elders. Elaborate pay-
ments of money (ceramic bracelet pieces or glass beads) were
called into play as part of the settlement when violence could be
avoided. In the Southwest Islands, individual disputes (adultery
is the usual context) are disposed of with considerable infor-
mality (no community judges have yet been installed). The of-
fended party is expected to attract community attention with
considerable noisemaking and shouted threats, gathering a host
of attention before he confronts the offender. Under these cir-
cumstances, a crowd gathers and the principals are restrained
until elders of the community, through the council of lineage
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leaders, arrive at some solution. Payment in red ocher may
occur in the resolution of disputes, but the use of red ocher is
far more specialized and restricted than is Palauan ceramic and
glass money.
Cross-cousin marriage, considered appropriate in the small
Southwest Island communities, may be outlawed as incestuous
in Palau. In one instance, Palauan courts ruled that a Pulo Ana
couple could live together as husband and wife on their native
island but must live separately when residing in Palau.
Marriage in Palau initiates an exchange of money and food
centered on the wife, who is successful in her role insofar as
she intrigues and seduces her husband and his clan into gen-
erous payments of money to her clan. A Palauan marriage to a
Southwest Islander precludes the emergence of the economic
cycle on which the success of the Palauan nuclear family de-
pends. Generally speaking, a marriage in Palau to a near rel-
ative, affinal or otherwise, tends to be viewed as economically
nonproductive and to a certain extent incestuous. Hence while
Palauans regard some Southwest Island marriages as inces-
tuous, Southwest Islanders view marriage in Palau as a rather
exploitive economic relationship.
In Palau, the division of labor between the sexes is more
specialized than in the Southwest Islands. In Palau, for example,
women are the agriculturists. Palauan men may enter the taro
gardens only with the consent of the women working there.
Male agricultural labor in Palau is restricted to major con-
struction or maintenance tasks associated with complex irri-
gation systems in the taro gardens. In sharp contrast, the man
in the Southwest Islands is a competent gardener and works
the crops by himself or in the company of his wife. This fact
contributes to the wide cultural gap between Palauans and
Southwest Islanders. Palauans do not believe that Southwest
Island men can match the agricultural competence of Palauan
women and consider them in general to be careless, primitive
agriculturists.
The contrast between the Palauan and Southwest Island
societies is most succinctly summarized as that of a large,
complex, and differentiated social system opposed to small and
relatively undifferentiated ones. The contrasts of scale and com-
plexity are clearly recognized by the Palauans and have become
the bases of the Palauan image of the Southwest Islanders.
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RELOCATION IN PALAU
The Southwest Islanders are not strangers to the idea of relo-
cation. Their creation myths are not tied to their present island
homes; rather, the folk histories of the present populations trace
various original navigator-founders back to Mogmog islet in
Ulithi Atoll and to Yap. Versions of the migration story differ
from island to island, though the overall impression received
from informal inquiries is of a single migration that split up
after arrival first at Sonsorol and subsequently at the southerly
islands. At Merir, for example, the narrative recalls a separation
of the founding party into one group that could not abide the
heavy mosquito population and another that remained. On Pulo
Ana the cult of the original navigator-founder has remained as
the essence of the native religion.1
In more recent times most (perhaps all) of the inhabitants of
Fana, Sonsorol, Pulo Ana, and Merir were brought to Palau by
the German colonial administration in about 1905 in the wake
of a typhoon that is said to have ravaged all four islands. The
typhoon, however, was probably not the whole reason for this
relocation. The islands lie scattered along a distance from Son-
sorol to Merir of about 70 miles, a rather wide swath for a
typhoon, particularly this far south in the western end of the
Pacific. The German administrators probably viewed logistics
and economy in terms similar to those of many contemporary
American administrators and used the typhoon as the decisive
argument for relocation. The islands are relatively flat, partic-
ularly Sonsorol and Tobi; they are small (one-half mile long at
most and a few hundred yards wide); they have a fringing reef
rather than a protective lagoon; thus they give the appearance
of great vulnerability to typhoon damage. Although Tobi Is-
landers did not figure in the original relocation, they, too, soon
appeared as individual migrants in the Palau community.
These islanders were granted land defined as public on
the southern coast of Babelthuap, the largest island of the
Palau group. What Palauans call chutem era buai ‘public land’
comprised almost the entire island except the built-up village
areas and cultivated gardens. It was viewed as belonging to the
ranking clans of the local villages, held as a reserve against un-
specified public and private needs. Thus, while lacking well-de-
fined boundaries, such land was not without local “ownership.”
All ‘public land’, however, was claimed by the colonial adminis-
tration for the German government.
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The location selected for the Southwest Islanders was in
what is now Aimeliik Municipality (map 2), where the coast is
deeply forested with mangrove. The soil, red clay with bauxite
and minimal pockets of alluvium, contrasts sharply with the
sandy and phosphate-rich soils of the Southwest Islands. In ad-
dition, the Aimeliik coast, with its dense mangrove fringe, was
“inside out,” for the islanders had lived close to the shore on
their home islands with the mangrove forests behind them in
the inland swamps. It would be hard to imagine two tropical
coastal environments with greater ecological differences. It ap-
pears, in fact, that adaptation to this new setting by the
Southwest Islanders was unsuccessful. In time, according to
Palauan sources, it was noted that the transplanted community
was dying. Another location was sought which would more
nearly resemble the home environment of the relocated is-
landers.
This new locus was Echol, also defined as ‘public land’, on
the western shore of Arakabesang Island, one of three inhabited
islands of what is now Koror Municipality in central Palau (map
2). This area is practically devoid of mangrove forest and has
sizable, intermittent beaches and some sandy soils. The beaches
face a lagoon fringed by a reef and are backed by rather steep
slopes with clay soils and volcanic rock outcrops. Ecologically,
the region would seem to allow a more familiar kind of adap-
tation, and indeed the community survived there until World
War I.
Repatriation to the Southwest Islands occurred early during
the Japanese mandate administration. However, a community of
Southwest Islanders remained in the Echol region until World
War II when, along with all native residents of the southerly is-
lands in the Palau group, they were dispersed by the Japanese
military to security encampments throughout Babelthuap.
After World War II, as the scattered populations of central
and southern Palau returned to their homes, the Southwest Is-
landers formed a community about a half mile from Echol, at
a place called E-ang. The new location was more attractive be-
cause of the survival of Japanese-constructed homes, a dock,
and a stream dam, but it has much the same general environ-
mental characteristics as Echol.
Some time following World War II, a second small com-
munity, comprised mainly of Tobi Islanders, formed in a new
location on Malakal Island (also within Koror Municipality). Al-
though the legal status of both communities is questionable,
the Malakal community has the more tenuous position of the
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Map 2. Southwest Islander settlements on Palau.
two. Since about 1963, the American administration has con-
sidered zoning the whole of Malakal Island nonresidential in an-
ticipation of industrial growth around the island’s deep harbor,
which services Koror Municipality. The Trust Territory’s largest
non-Micronesian commercial fishing operation is located on
Malakal not far from the Tobi community, as are the district’s
fisheries cooperative, boat-building association, and fisheries
training school facilities. Plans exist for developing a marine re-
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sources research institute on the same island. These facilities,
in time, would doubtless crowd out the Tobi community re-
gardless of zoning regulations.
Both of the Southwest Island communities in Palau are quite
small. The larger one, at E-ang on Arakabesang, comprises
about ten houses with a population varying between twenty and
thirty. The smaller one on Malakal consists of three houses with
fewer than ten residents.
The legal status of the present E-ang community is quite
complex. As with the prior locations, Echol and coastal Aimeliik,
the E-ang area appears to have been claimed by the German
colonial administration as public land. Such lands were appro-
priated, in turn, by the Japanese government and, at the end
of World War II, by the American government. Yet this appro-
priation of public lands has never been fully acknowledged by
Palauan leaders who, in their own view, can transfer only use
right in peaceful negotiation. Thus a conception of Palauan own-
ership persists through these various transfers from colonial
to mandate to Trust Territory administrators. Though there
has been no actual Trust Territory grant of use right to the
Southwest Islanders for E-ang, recognition of the community
by the American administration is fostered by contemporary
Palauan leaders who continue to honor the original agreement
made for the Southwest Islanders by the Germans. In Palauan
terms, the use-right agreement for Echol has been transferred
to E-ang.
Palauans realize that they have little real control over de-
cisions regarding the use of government land. They are not,
however, without some influence. In 1959, some residents from
Tobi and Merir tried to gain land through the Trust Territory
homestead program of government land in the region of Echol.
Had they succeeded, the Southwest Island community in Palau
would have achieved a permanency far beyond the present use-
right concept. From the Southwest Islanders’ point of view, they
would have begun the process of establishing a new and sep-
arate segment of their home societies in Palau, a colony. The
homesteading transaction was successfully opposed by local
Palauan leaders. The Palauan reasoning is clear enough if one
bears in mind the concept of clan ownership that precedes
the Trust Territory concept of government land. Homesteading
would alienate clan land and, in this instance, with Southwest
Islanders rather than Palauans becoming the owners, the alien-
ation would be total. Palauans are bonded to other Palauans by
a complex network of relations including far more than land
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rights alone. Palauans who gain individual property through
homesteading of government land can be relied on to conform
to various social and economic constraints retaining, in most
respects, their fit in Palauan society. No such constraints link
Southwest Islanders to their Palauan hosts. Southwest Islanders
in Palau are subordinated to neighboring villages by the fact
that they reside on land that, in the Palauan conception, is
owned by clans in the region. Hence the only formal control that
Palauans have over the E-ang community has to do with land.
No other significant structural feature mediates Southwest Is-
lander and Palauan.
In Palauan terms the E-ang community is a use-right grant
on clan land falling within the jurisdiction of the leadership of
Meungs, a Palauan village on the opposite side of Arakabesang
Island. The Palauan chief of Meungs village is recognized as the
ranking chief of Arakabesang, including the Southwest Island
community at E-ang. The Southwest Islanders contribute food
to feasts held at Meungs village and there appear to be some
individual patterns of food gifts from Southwest Islanders to
members of the Meungs community. This kind of gift, involving
garden produce, is in keeping with the ethic of reciprocity as
supported by both Palauans and Southwest Islanders and ex-
presses compensation for the use of Palauan land. Beyond this,
at least in Palauan political theory, the Southwest Islanders gain
representation and protection through the authority of the chief
of Meungs village in transactions with other Palauan commu-
nities. It should be emphasized that this is a form of political
representation that the Southwest Island minority in Palau does
not enjoy in the emerging Western political system.
In this context, if the Southwest Islanders were to acquire
land through the mechanism of homesteading (which is gaining
recognition in Palau as a form of individual ownership), the
Palauan capacity to control the Southwest Island community,
in a manner consistent with Palauan ideas about assimilation,
would become negligible.
The effect of all this is, of course, a general sense of tran-
sience that is not really satisfactory for either party but is
viable given the presence of the American administration. Ex-
cessive exploitation of the Southwest Islanders is inhibited and,
as long as Palauans exercise some control over homesteading,
the E-ang community is no particular threat. In the present
context, no final solution is readily apparent. The presence of
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the American administration diverts the migrants and hosts
from one another since each relates more to the American ad-
ministration. The status quo, such as it is, persists.
THE PLACE OF THE SOUTHWEST ISLANDERS IN
PALAU
Members of communities on Malakal and at E-ang return
periodically to the Southwest Islands or are temporary visitors
to Palau. The communities are not, therefore, fully detached
from their home islands. Southwest Islanders in Palau retain
the language and behavior relevant to their home communities,
despite adapting as necessary to the fact of their residence in
Palau.
E-ang and Malakal serve many purposes for the residents
and transients. Perhaps the most evident function of the com-
munity pertains to hospitalization. As in other parts of the Pa-
cific, patients from outer islands are seldom sent alone to the
hospital in Palau. An attendant or two from the home com-
munity accompany the lone patient, bring familiar foods to the
hospital, and provide necessary attention during the period
of recovery. After the patient is released from the hospital,
he (more often she) and the attendants stay in one or the
other Southwest Island community. Because of the considerable
period between field trips (as long as four or five months),
this stay in Palau can become quite extended. Both Southwest
Island communities provide a base for subsistence gardening
and fishing.
Pregnancies constitute a large proportion of hospitaliza-
tions. Pregnant women are generally accompanied by husbands
and other immediate dependents and must remain in Palau for
the three or four months between field trips. This may have
quite an effect on home island populations. In 1959, for ex-
ample, the community at Merir had a population of six—four el-
derly persons and one young married couple. When the young
wife became pregnant, the elders, unable to attend to their own
subsistence, accompanied the couple to Palau (completely de-
populating Merir). Their return depended on the young husband
who, up to the present, appears unwilling to leave Palau.
Schools in the Southwest Islands, always difficult to staff
with teachers, are conducted through grade six only. Interme-
diate and high school students must reside in Koror, in Palau,
during the school term or remain the year round since field
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trips are so widely spaced. Hence schoolchildren form another
component of the Southwest Island communities. The majority
(except those from Pulo Ana) attend the Catholic mission
schools. They are not formally segregated, but the Southwest
Island youths form a separate social group, walk to the schools
as a group apart from Palauans, and interact with Palauan
children mainly in conjunction with curriculum requirements
only. Separation appears to be reinforced by parental attitudes
in the home communities. In the Southwest Island communities
a passive, almost submissive, adaptation is fostered as appro-
priate to the role of outsider and guest. In turn, Palauans have
stereotypes of the Southwest Islanders as a subordinate mi-
nority group. It should be emphasized, however, that the social
separation of Palauan and Southwest Islander, even if it is mixed
with myth and untruth, is reinforced by and has the effect of
reinforcing real cultural differences which are maintained even
as both groups take on the appearance of westernization. While
they share roughly the same developmental goals (for instance,
a strong determination to provide their children with maximum
education), they approach these goals from their own cultural
perspectives and structures. In what is essentially a colonial
system of administration, development has mainly to do with
the administering authority; each group relates to that authority
separately and with a distinctive style.
Two of the Southwest Island communities, Tobi and Son-
sorol, were chartered as municipalities in about 1959, with
elected magistrates and with legislators seated in the Palau
Legislature. The E-ang community frequently hosts political
representatives from the home islands who must remain the
several months between field trips to attend a week or two of
legislative or committee meetings. The elected representatives
are usually middle-aged adult leaders in their communities and
typically express anxiety about the effect of prolonged absences
on various home island programs: the school, the chronic drive
to increase copra production, the pressure to succeed in culti-
vating newly introduced crops, and new opportunities in craft
production. It may be noted here that the role of these legis-
lators with respect to the E-ang and Malakal communities in
Palau is ambiguous. From the standpoint of cultural identity, the
Southwest Islanders in Palau are clearly constituencies of the
elected representatives from the Southwest Islands; however,
as we have seen, Palauan political practice tends to designate
the Southwest Islanders in Palau as wards of the Palauan chief
EXILES AND MIGRANTS IN OCEANIA
21
of neighboring Meungs village. In practice, in the emerging
Western political system the interests of these communities will
be, at best, underrepresented.
Field trip vessels serving the Southwest Islands bring with
them a small assortment of retail goods for sale via Koror-
based merchants, and both Sonsorol and Tobi have intermit-
tently maintained island-based retail stores. However, special
purchases or major buying (for example, lumber to build a
house) must be undertaken in person in Koror. Hence another
transient at E-ang is the buyer who must remain in Koror simply
to make some complicated or major purchase. One such person
was a Sonsorolese who resided in Koror, working odd jobs with
the Catholic mission long enough to purchase lumber from the
Koror mills and return to build a Japanese-style home on Son-
sorol.
Aside from hospitalization, school, legislation, and pur-
chasing, there are many other reasons for visits to the E-ang
community, including a sojourn with relatives who have re-
mained in Palau on a more permanent basis. One final category
will probably become more important in the future: cash em-
ployment. A pull toward economic opportunity in Koror reflects
the forecast of economic studies such as the Nathan Report.
What is perhaps less apparent is the characteristic structure
of this employment. Southwest Islanders are not readily em-
ployable in the private, Palauan sectors of the economy (for in-
stance, in the many wholesale and retail outlets for imported
goods), and their opportunities for employment in agencies con-
trolled by Palauans, whether private or public, are poor.
The Catholic mission, recognizing that the Southwest Is-
landers are generally Catholic, has made a special effort to
provide jobs for those who want to or must spend time in Palau,
but the potential is small and thus far limited largely to un-
skilled labor. Janitorial and yard work can sometimes be ob-
tained with the Trust Territory administration or with American
families. One islander has long been employed in the gov-
ernment hospital as a janitor and, when needed, as an inter-
preter. One or two others have found employment in other
sectors of government where they are disadvantaged by the
fact that their supervisors are most likely to be Palauan. As
long as governmental services continue to expand within the
context of American administration, however, the small number
of Southwest Islanders who are pursuing college degrees can
probably anticipate government employment on their return to
the Palau District. Recently, one man returned to Palau from
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medical training in Fiji and is apparently being accorded re-
spect as a medical practitioner in the highly westernized
context of the hospital program.
In the private sector, no more than one or two persons have
gained employment intermittently with the trading companies
that purchase copra from the outer islands. Significantly, in this
kind of work they find themselves in the difficult role of cultural
intermediary in frequent disputes arising between merchants
and the producers and exporters of copra on the field trip visits
to the islands. As employees, hence agents, of the trading com-
panies and as members of Southwest Island societies, they are
seldom able to maintain the trust of either side.
In E-ang itself some visitors and residents turn to handicraft,
using Palauan hardwoods, as a source of income. The rigid
ethnic boundary between Southwest Islanders and Palauans is
reflected even here in the distinctive products and craft styles.
In the main the Southwest Island artisans produce figures
known throughout much of the Pacific as “Tobi monkey men.”
They do not produce, or attempt to imitate, the popular Palauan
storyboard; conversely, Palauan artisans who occasionally
sculpt humanlike figures, or post figures in the Palauan style,
very seldom make monkey men.
In summary, the position of the Southwest Islanders’
community in Palau is ambiguous for several reasons. From
the point of view of the Trust Territory administration the legal
status of the community is at best informal; neither the E-ang
nor the Malakal settlement is formally recognized by lease, use
right, or any other enforceable claim. Yet, interestingly enough,
vis-à-vis Palauan society the legal status of E-ang is somewhat
more explicit, as the use right of clan lands under the suzerainty
of the chief of Meungs is at least recognizable within the context
of Palauan custom.
Politically, the situation of the community is even more am-
biguous. Given that the community is differentiated internally
by island of origin and that two of the islands are municipalities,
some community members may be said to be directly repre-
sented in the district legislature while others are not. This, of
course, depends on whether residents of E-ang identify them-
selves as members of the out-island or of the E-ang community,
a matter which is unclear even to the residents. At the same
time, the E-ang community is considered by both the residents
and the Palauans to be a political dependent of Meungs village
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and its chief, but whether this relation applies to temporary res-
idents as well as the more or less permanent residents is am-
biguous.
The transience which characterizes the E-ang population
creates a further source of ambiguity and instability with regard
to the Southwest Island populations themselves. On islands
such as Merir and Sonsorol which have or have had very small
populations, migration to Palau, even in small numbers, can se-
riously affect the home island either through total depopulation
(as on Merir) or through removal of a significant proportion of
residents. This depopulation is bound to affect educational, po-
litical, and economic development programs for the home is-
lands.2
The ambiguities of the situation of this relocated community
are inherent in the fact of a simultaneous involvement of the
community in two different systems of relations—a colonial
system and the indigenous Palauan system, neither of which is
totally independent of the other. Historical evidence indicates
that in the absence of a colonial system, the Southwest Island
commmunity could never have survived in Palau as a distinct
social entity. Moreover, although the appearance of outsiders
in a Palauan community was, before contact, occasional and
often unpredictable, the integration of outsiders into the com-
munity was a regular, predictable process (from a Palauan point
of view). In short, there is a Palauan model of assimilation of
outsiders, which, although its operation as a social strategy
has been curtailed by the colonial administration, continues to
influence relations between the relocated community and the
Palauans.
BOUNDARY DISSOLUTION VERSUS BOUNDARY
MAINTENANCE
Narratives of persons drifting in from “someplace else” are
abundant in the Pacific and, in Palau at least, a fairly specific
protocol for dealing with such strangers has been described by
older residents. Palauan practice demanded that such persons
be conducted, with no delay, to the nearest village chief. In
every region of Palau, villages are part of a collection or
coalition with one among them superordinate. The strangers
might therefore be conducted first to the local village chief
and then to the chief of the superordinate village of the col-
lection. Such collections were themselves ranked; hence the
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transaction might well go on another step, terminating in one or
another of the four or five historically elite villages throughout
Palau. In short, the transfer of the strangers up the steps of
village ranking would end when the leaders of a village were
in a political position powerful enough to detain them. Several
reasons can be given for this treatment of the immigrant in Pa-
lau. The factors involved demand some preliminary explanation
regarding the Palauan conception of the cosmos and Palauan so-
cial structure.
Public ideology in Palau had the end of the world placed
somewhere just beyond the horizon. Contradictory information
made public by newcomers would pose a threat to the social
order. The elite in Palau, particularly the historians of the
ranking lineages, were privy to a wider scale of geographic
knowledge that included information about the actual place of
origin of many lineages outside Palau. Such knowledge was,
however, maintained as private property among the trusted
elders of the lineage or clan. As the Palauan might put it, such
information was known only to those ‘for whom the doors had
been closed’ in secret sessions of instruction by elder historians.
There were only two possibilities for dealing with
strangers—they could be absorbed into the village community
and, eventually, into the clan structure, or they could be put to
death. Which alternative was chosen depended on the potential
usefulness or the potential nuisance the strangers represented.
In any case, no outsiders would be permitted to remain within
or near the community and maintain their ethnic and cultural
identity.
Becoming a true member of a Palauan community, with mini-
mum qualifications for gaining a title, involves passage through
three or four recognized grades of residency. The newly ar-
rived immigrant would be designated omengdaki (probably de-
rived from omengd ‘to lean against’ or ultechakl ‘driftwood’).
Whether conceived as one who ‘leans against’ an adopting
lineage or as ‘driftwood’, the status implication is that of
servant or slave. In time, the immigrants or their lineage de-
scendants would be designated beches el yars ‘new sails’, would
gain some access to land, and would begin to shed the stigma
and obligations of servitude. The next designation would be
muchut el yars ‘old sails’. Members of such lineages would be
considered long-term residents and would be eligible for lesser
offices such as the leadership of their clan within the village
club to which they were assigned. Finally would come the des-
ignation techel a miich ‘core of the tropical almond tree’. The
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tropical almond, with its brilliant red leaves and tasty nuts,
is an elite tree often prepared as a gift for elders. Persons
of lineages so designated would be given public recognition
as having an ancestry that reached back to the origin of the
community. Generally speaking, high titled positions in a com-
munity are granted only to persons in lineages of the ‘tropical
almond’ status of residency. Congruently, however, any indi-
vidual, regardless of residency status, who gains high office in
the community is publicly acknowledged to be of this elite res-
idency designation and, publicly at least, the person so titled
will carry others of the lineage to this highest residency status.
Within the present century, in view of the drastic depopulation
that occurred during the 1800s in Palau, upward mobility
through the residency ranks has often been accelerated for ca-
pable persons, and the historical facts of residency rank have
been questioned for many community leaders. But such ques-
tions are asked only in private. In public, to be elite is to be ‘the
core of the tropical almond tree’ or at least ‘old sails’.
In every Palauan community another formal ranking system
exists that is more nearly ascriptive in character. In ideal terms,
each Palauan community is composed of ten rank-ordered clans
that, with their several lineages, make up the entire community
population. The top-ranking four clans in a village constitute
the local elite—the ‘cornerpost’ clans. Again, in ideal terms, the
highest-ranking clan and four lesser clans form one house in a
political balance against the second-ranking clan and remaining
four village clans.3
Immigrants to Palau, as we have seen, are conducted to the
chief of the ranking clan of the ranking regional village. Such
individuals would be assigned to and, perhaps, adopted by the
clan of this chief. This clan, however, might be one of the four
clans allied within the village with that of the ranking clan. In
any event, the leadership of the ranking clan would have a hold
on the newcomers via clan membership or interclan bonds. An
essential feature of this aspect of assimilation is that the actual
history of migration, with whatever knowledge it might contain
about regions beyond the popular Palauan cosmos, would be re-
tained (if at all) in the archival memory of the historians of the
elite with a minimum impact on the ideology of the people. We
can refer to this as a cultural constraint maintaining a reduced
geographic scale. Newcomers and their offspring learned that
their security and status in the adopting community depended
on shedding, as rapidly as possible, the stigma of their non-
Palauan origin.
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The rate at which newcomers, and their lineages, progress
from ‘driftwood’ to ‘tropical almond’ is related to the com-
munity’s need for leadership and the ability or willingness of
lineage members to serve the community. The most important
factor, in the Palauan conception, is the loyal service to the
lineage, clan, and community—in short, recognized
achievement.
A congruent feature of this assimilation process is that the
immigrant, in whatever capacity he or she might prove useful,
would be immediately available to the village chief. If the immi-
grant had no apparent skills, the chief or a relevant clan would
gain some additional labor. If the immigrant turned out to be
hostile or a nuisance, the chief could arrange for disposal. If, on
the other hand, the immigrant had some skill of apparent value
to the community (such as medical knowledge), this skill would
be available to the chief and would be put to use through his
office.
In summary, the essential features of the Palauan model of
assimilation are (1) a constricted popular conception of the cos-
mos, maintained by a political elite, (2) appropriation of the
newcomer, either as laborer or as innovator, by the elite, ulti-
mately the chief of the adopting community, and (3) the incor-
poration of outsiders into the clan and community structure in
a series of steps based on their achievements within the com-
munity. Most important, the Palauan model of assimilation as-
sumes that the category of stranger or outsider or non-Palauan
is, within the Palauan social context, temporary. The pre-
scription of a specific mode of ethnic boundary dissolution
(through assimilation or death) implies a further as-
sumption—that ethnic boundaries within Palauan society do not
exist. Thus a permanent community maintaining a non-Palauan
ethnic identity is, at the outset, unreal from a Palauan point of
view.4 The nature of the threat that the relocated community
necessarily presented—a threat to the order of Palauan re-
ality—cannot be overemphasized, especially when we consider
the Palauan response to the relocated people.
The Palauans were presented with an administration
demand for land to domicile an ethnic group distinctly non-
Palauan and over whom they had no real control. Assimilation
according to the Palauan tradition was impossible within the
context of the relocation since the newcomers were under
German protection. Thus the newcomers were to be a per-
manent ethnic community in Palau and, as such, a challenge to
the Palauan order of reality by their very existence. The Palauan
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response was, predictably, stigmatization of the Southwest Is-
landers in Erving Goffman’s sense of the term (Goffman 1963).
By characterizing the Southwest Islanders as somehow sub-
human, the threat to the Palauan social order is minimized while
a symbolic asymmetry between the two groups is maintained. In
face-to-face relations with Southwest Islanders, Palauans man-
ifest the stigmatization by subtle condescension; in talking
about them, they express overt contempt.
The stigmatization takes several forms. First, although the
relocated community comprises people from several islands,
Palauans ignore these distinctions and characterize the
Southwest Islanders as a single group—Merir people. They
label Southwest Islanders as “primitive” and “backward” and
cite their “incestuous” marriage patterns, their informal po-
litical organization, and their scrupulous religiosity as evidence.
Palauan children who walk barefoot are teased for walking
“Merir style.” Palauan children do not mingle with Southwest
Island children at school, and the two groups do not speak when
walking to or from school, even when going in the same di-
rection.
In both cultures, sharing cooked food symbolizes social
closeness. In Palau, Palauans will accept cooked food proffered
as gifts by Southwest Islanders, but they will never eat it. After
the giver leaves, the food is thrown away. On field trips to
the Southwest Islands I observed that Palauans never accepted
cooked food offered to them on the islands, although they would
accept uncooked food such as coconut, crabs, or dried tuna. The
meaning of their refusal is obvious to both sides.
On serious reflection, the Palauan will intellectualize about
the differences between Palauan society and the Southwest
Island communities. The much smaller populations of the
Southwest Islands hardly necessitate the elaborate political and
economic institutions evident in Palau. Southwest Islanders are
respected as hard workers, apparently as an extension of the
male agriculturist role, and on the individual level, especially
between women members of the same (Catholic) church con-
gregation, close friendships may be formed. Certain skills and
characteristics are admired: Southwest Islanders are good fish-
ermen; their dried tuna is a favored food; their canoes are
readily sold in Palau; their children are recognized as quiet but
capable students.
Generally speaking, however, Palauans express the same
paternalistic, depreciative, and racially toned attitudes that
characterize much of Western interaction with Micronesian and
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other non-Western societies. Young Palauans familiar with
American racist stereotypes through college attendance in the
United States draw a direct parallel with the Palauan attitude
toward the Southwest Islander. On an individual basis, a
Southwest Islander may be accepted as competent and as a
friend; as a group they are viewed as childlike and naive with a
few specialized skills.
CONCLUSIONS
In greater or fewer numbers, people of the Southwest Islands
have resided in Palau in communities on Babelthuap, at Echol,
E-ang, and Malakal for over seventy years under the aegis
of German, Japanese, and American colonial regimes. Even
granting that assimilation to the dominant culture in Palau may
be limited by the fact that the Southwest Islanders return oc-
casionally to their home islands, the outstanding feature of
these communities in Palau has been separation and ethnic
boundary maintenance with respect to Palauan society. Rather
than adapting to a Palauan social environment according to
the Palauan model of assimilation, the relocated communities
have related primarily to the colonial administration and to the
Catholic mission, remaining separate from the Palauan social
structure. There is no evidence in this case study to suggest that
this separation will not continue at least as long as an outside
colonial administration persists. And considering that the two
societies have intermixed for over half a century, it seems rea-
sonable to argue that this separation will persist whether or not
the Southwest Islanders are permitted to maintain populations
on their home islands.
Without questioning the ability of competent economists to
imagine developmental models for Micronesia that resemble
the sort of high-density labor force market orientation that
characterizes the Western and industrialized states, this
chapter has explored, in a particular case study, the hypothesis
that Micronesia will persist as a cultural mosaic only as long
as the American administrative presence continues. A happy
fusion of Micronesian societies into a harmonious national unity
should not be the expected result of relocating the outer-island
populations on a few high islands.
The evidence of this study suggests that a cultural mosaic,
when constrained by limited space (as suggested by the eco-
nomic model), will produce results in human conditions quite
EXILES AND MIGRANTS IN OCEANIA
29
Map 3. Movement from Kapingamarangi to Ponape.
different from those suggested by economic models per se. Cul-
tural particularism and congestion with the emergence of rigid
ethnic-class structures and accelerated intergroup tension is
the more likely prognosis.
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THE PROCESSES OF
CHANGE IN TWO
KAPINGAMARANGI
COMMUNITIES
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INTRODUCTION
Kapingamarangi is the southernmost atoll in the Eastern Car-
oline Islands. Its thirty-three flat islets lie on the edge of an
egg-shaped reef and comprise a total land area of less than
half a square mile (Emory 1965:1). The Polynesian inhabitants
of the atoll (the Kapinga) have made their living by planting
and harvesting coconuts, breadfruit, pandanus fruit, and taro
and by exploiting fish resources of the lagoon and deep sea.
Ponape, a high island whose Micronesian inhabitants exploit a
wide variety of plant and animal resources, lies 485 miles north
of Kapingamarangi. (See map 3.) Ponape has been a center
for colonial commercial, missionary, and administrative activity
since the nineteenth century. Except for a very few men who mi-
grated to Ponape after the Japanese took control of Micronesia
in 1914, the Kapinga knew nothing of Ponape until two suc-
cessive disasters resulted in their establishing a resettled com-
munity there in 1919.
In 1916, a drought began which was to last for two years and
which would culminate in the deaths of over ninety people. As
the soil dried up and staple food plants became unproductive,
the threat of chaos and panic grew on the atoll. Theft of food
became common, sometimes resulting in violence. As food re-
sources dwindled, the inevitability of famine became apparent
to all. No Kapinga could remember a drought of these propor-
tions, and people were unprepared for the situation. A Japanese
teacher and government local affairs officer named Huria was
living on Kapingamarangi at the time. Having established a po-
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sition of authority on the atoll, he was under pressure by the
Kapinga to do something. Working through the atoll chief and
a council of men appointed by the chief through his urging,
Huria was able to institute a rationing program to conserve
drinking coconuts. This was done by controlling movement from
the major residential islets to coconut stands on the outer islets.
Men of the council, called ‘masters’, administered punishments
for violating these regulations. Huria also attempted to limit
population growth by placing a ban on premarital sexual rela-
tions and by prohibiting many marriages, again by decree of the
chief. The chief, by 1917, was a man appointed by Huria to re-
place the old chief, who was on his deathbed.
None of the emergency measures was able to stave off the
starvation and death which finally resulted from the prolonged
drought, nor were people and plants the only casualties. The an-
cient religion and its priesthood collapsed as years of debunking
by outsiders, a growing skepticism of some Kapinga, and the
obvious inability of the priesthood to alleviate the drought and
famine demoralized the population. When a missionary from
the neighboring atoll of Nukuoro appeared on a visiting ship
in 1917, and later returned with gifts of food and offers of
salvation from future disasters, the population was converted
wholesale to Christianity.
Late in 1918, Huria arranged to have ninety people moved
to Ponape to work for a Japanese trading company gathering
hibiscus fiber for hat making. This scheme would assure ad-
equate care for the emigrants while relieving population
pressure on the slowly recovering plant resources of the atoll.
The emigrants left early in 1919. Within less than a year, dis-
aster struck again as half the emigrants died in a dysentery
epidemic. The survivors were brought to the company’s dor-
mitories in Kolonia town, the administrative and commercial
center on Ponape. Huria petitioned the government for a grant
of land in the town for the survivors, and in September 1919 the
government allowed a party of Kapinga men to select a suitable
site for a village.1 The site chosen was Porakiet (‘rocky place’ in
Ponapean; map 4), an 18-acre tract. Half the site is a steep cliff
leading to an inlet which allows access to the lagoon and the
open sea.
Clearing of overgrown land, planting of coconut trees, and
construction of houses began almost immediately. As soon as
houses had been built, people moved from the company dor-
mitories into the village. The subsequent appointment of a
headman for the resident population marked the beginning of
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Map 4. Areas on Ponape that have been designated by colonial admin-
istrations for use by Kapingamarangi and Nukuoro settlers.
the Kapinga community on Ponape. It began as a colony of tran-
sients from the atoll, a place for Kapinga to stay while visiting
Ponape. Ultimate authority for making decisions for the com-
munity was the prerogative of the atoll chief.2
The population of Porakiet grew to eighty by the 1940s as
people came to Ponape to work for the government and local
Japanese commercial concerns or to engage in commercial deep
sea fishing, over which the Kapinga had a virtual monopoly on
Ponape. After World War II, the population of the village grad-
ually expanded to its present size of three hundred, some of
whom are permanent residents whose children have never seen
the atoll. By 1961, the atoll had renounced its claim to po-
litical authority over the resettled community. At present, all
the Kapinga recognize that Kapingamarangi Atoll and Porakiet
are two separate, politically independent, and in many ways
different communities. Both the atoll community and the com-
munity at Porakeit have changed in the years following reset-
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tlement, but the kinds of changes have been very different in
each community. It is the task of this chapter to describe and
account for these differences.
The traditional social system on Kapingamarangi, like those
of most atolls, was relatively undifferentiated. Economic, po-
litical, and kinship relations, for example, were highly inte-
grated rather than being clearly distinct subsystems as in
Western societies. This lack of differentiation was due to the
form of social relationships in the traditional atoll social system.
To be a person on Kapingamarangi Atoll was to be involved
in relationships with other persons. Social relationships tradi-
tionally were and to a great extent still are whole-person-to-
whole-person relationships. The whole person was presumed
to be involved in every relationship to which he or she was a
party. This does not mean that the Kapinga did not recognize
roles or that roles did not shape expectations of behavior. Age,
sex, the capacity to reproduce, and human mortality combined
in different ways to yield roles such as mother, friend, expert
artisan, priest, and the like. But roles formed only part of the
information that one person needed in order to interact with an-
other. More important in structuring social relationships was in-
formation about the biographies of persons. On a tiny atoll in
which each person has face-to-face relationships with everyone
else, where there is little privacy, and where gossip continually
supplements first-hand observation, each person brings to a re-
lationship the more or less total biography of the other. Thus
the information that comprises a social relationship includes not
only role expectations but also the habits, personal likes and
dislikes, personal histories, and personal styles of every par-
ticipant. Personal idiosyncracies and interpersonal variability
were every bit as important in the Kapinga social system as
were the attributes of style and behavior that people shared.
Change in the atoll social system has been in the form of
social relationships. Information about role expectations has
become more important in several kinds of social relationships
than information about biography. These
relationships—student-teacher, customer-clerk, magistrate-con-
stituent—are not part of the traditional social system. The result
of incorporating them into the atoll social system has been the
differentiation of the system into political, economic, religious,
and educational subsystems.
The Porakiet social system has not differentiated, although
Porakiet is located in an urban, polyethnic milieu. The forms of
social relationships and the organization of the community are
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still those of the traditional atoll system. What has changed in
Porakiet has been the life-styles of its residents. The activities in
which people engage, the time and resources expended in these
activities, and what people spend money on contrast with those
of the atoll in many ways. While the forms of social relation-
ships in Porakiet have not changed from traditional ones, their
content has changed.
Along with these changes in the social systems of the two
communities, there has been a change in the way the two
communities are perceived and talked about by the Kapinga.
Although Kapinga living in both communities recognize that
the atoll and Porakiet are politically independent and in many
ways different communities, they have come to regard both
as somehow constituting a single community. The idea of a
single community of people irrespective of locale represents
a change in the way the Kapinga define themselves. Corre-
sponding to this change is a change in the Kapinga view of
the larger world of which their community is a part, a universe
of persons and places with which the Kapinga contrast them-
selves. This larger world includes other island groups within a
colonial government structure, and many Kapinga realize that
what happens in Saipan, Washington, and New York can
somehow affect them.
How is it that an atoll which has less than twelve days
per year of direct contact with the outside world via ship can
undergo the kind of differentiation that Kapingamarangi has,
while Porakiet, situated in an urban milieu, has not? Is the
change in the way the Kapinga define themselves the inevitable
result of their living in two independent communities? Can the
changes in social organization and culture be explained in terms
of contact between the Kapinga and the colonial government?
These three questions constitute the problem this chapter will
address.
Although it is clear that the presence of a colonial regime
and contact with other ethnic groups are associated with
changes in Kapinga social organization and culture, the nature
of the association is problematic. To answer the three basic
questions, I begin by making two assumptions. First, the
colonial government, the other ethnic groups with whom the
Kapinga are in contact, and the particular islands on which
the Kapinga live constitute the environment of the two Kapinga
communities. Second, change and stability in the organization
of each Kapinga community are to be regarded as outcomes
of relationships betweeen the community and the natural and
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social systems that comprise its environment. By relationship I
mean a pattern of information, or messages, exchanged by two
or more systems (following Bateson 1972:275).
The central task of this chapter, then, is to identify and de-
scribe the relationships between each Kapinga community and
other systems in its environment that result in change in each
community. I shall begin with an analysis of change on the atoll,
specifying those relationships which have resulted in systemic
changes. Next I shall repeat the analytical process for Porakiet.
Then I shall take up the question of the relationship between
the two communities and how it has affected the Kapinga defi-
nitions of ‘community’ and ‘the Kapinga people’. Finally, I shall
draw out some of the implications of systemic change and the
definition of Kapinga ethnicity to explain certain kinds of con-
flict on the atoll.
CHANGE ON KAPINGAMARANGI
Systemic change on the atoll has been that of a shift from bio-
graphical information to role expectations in structuring social
relationships. The process has been a gradual one, occurring
in roughly two phases. The first phase was the establishment
of more or less permanent relationships with outsiders. The
second phase was that of a radical shift in the content of those
relationships after World War II.
Contact with Europeans began in the 1870s with European
and American fishing and trading vessels stopping at the atoll.
A few Europeans, Americans, Samoans, and Nukuoro left the
ships to reside on the atoll in the late 1870s (Emory
1965:12–15). These early contacts were characterized by vio-
lence on the part of the outsiders and, occasionally, on the part
of the Kapinga who were allied with them. The contacts also
included the introduction of imported goods and techniques of
production (such as carpentry) by the outsiders. The Kapinga
image of Euro-Americans and, subsequently, of the Japanese
has been one of powerful, knowledgeable, unpredictable, and
violent people. The Kapinga response to this image remains
ambivalent—fear of and attraction to relations with them. By
the mid-1880s the high priest and the secular chief (formerly
a secular functionary responsible for providing food for certain
ceremonies) had become aligned with the outsiders. People left
dealings with outsiders to them.
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The Kapinga regard Euro-American behavior as identical to
that of the ancient deities. The traditional gods were whim-
sical, awesome in their power to cause damage on the atoll and
to bestow abundance in the form of good weather, fruit, and
whales. It is not surprising, then, that the Kapinga established
a relationship with outsiders comparable to that they had with
their deities. This relationship was one of subordinate to su-
perordinate in which people showed deference to the deities,
watched for omens that bespoke their wishes, and made of-
ferings of food and services to them (see Emory 1965:228ff.).
In return, the deities would bestow favors on people or at
least would be appeased enough to cause them no harm. Or-
dinary people avoided contact with deities. They stayed away
from places that deities were known to frequent and would
employ brief but proper rituals when deities were presumed
to be present. Relationships between people and deities were
mediated through a high priest and his assistants. The priests
performed daily ritual, interpreted and acted on omens, and
directed community activity to satisfy the deities’ wishes and
protect people from their wrath. The high priest attained his
position of leadership because of his knowledge of deities and
omens and the ritual means for dealing with them. It was,
therefore, no mere coincidence that the relationship between
Kapinga and Euro-Americans was mediated by the high priest
and the secular chief. Both were specialists in a special rela-
tionship. Given the pattern of attributes common to deities and
Euro-Americans, relationships with both took the same form.
The relationship between priest and chief and the Euro-
Americans was that of subordinate to superordinate. The priest
and chief paid deference to the outsiders. They also provided
the resident aliens with housing, land, labor for household help
and copra cutting, and, sometimes, with wives (Emory
1965:17–18). In return, the outsiders traded copra for the priest
and chief and managed their relations with visiting ships, taking
a percentage of the copra money as a kind of agent’s fee. They
also provided the priest and chief with personal favors, such
as gifts of material goods, ensuring the good favor of visitors
to the atoll and, most important, identifying themselves with
the interests of the priest and chief. The atoll leaders gained a
good deal of material wealth from this relationship while other
Kapinga continued to avoid contact with the outsiders. By the
1890s, however, other Kapinga sought to establish a similar
relationship with the resident aliens. One group of men, for
example, formed a trading association, using a resident Eng-
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lishman as their agent with visiting copra vessels. The members
of this group were to become Huria’s ‘masters’ twenty-five
years later.
When the Japanese established colonial rule in Micronesia in
1914, the Kapinga developed the same sort of relationship with
them they had had with Euro-Americans. The Japanese wanted
four things from the atoll—copra, labor for government projects
and business enterprises on Ponape, a market for their goods,
and recognition of their authority by the atoll people. In return,
the Japanese provided a retail outlet for manufactured goods,
cheap transportation to Ponape, occasional medical services,
and, most important, support of the atoll leadership.
The breakdown of the ancient religion would have left an
authority vacuum on the atoll had there not been a change
before the collapse. By the early twentieth century, the secular
chief, whose authority had been limited to leadership of a men’s
house connected ritually with the cult house and to provisioning
major rituals, had become the recognized liaison between the
atoll and outsiders. One reason for the chief’s ascendancy in
affairs with outsiders was his long tenure of office—thirty-six
years. During the same period (up to 1917) there had been a
succession of men to the position of high priest, some of whom
were not familiar with the outsiders. That Huria aligned himself
with the chief in 1915 assured the latter’s position as liaison
and strengthened his internal authority in new ways. During the
drought Huria introduced several procedures that became per-
manently associated with the position of chief. Between 1915
and 1920, he introduced the promulgation of regulations and
their enforcement by appointed functionaries, public hearings
for violation of regulations, public meetings for discussion of
atoll affairs, and public hearings of land disputes settled by
judgment of the chief. The collapse of the priesthood left the
chief’s position and authority unchallenged, and they were en-
hanced even further after the introduction of Christianity. The
man who succeeded Huria’s appointed chief was also a deacon
and regular preacher in the church. The religious and secular
authority were thus united in one person until after World War
II.
One of the more powerful factors buttressing the chief’s
authority was the unquestioned belief of other Kapinga that the
government gave him its unqualified support. This belief had
been an essential part of the relationship between atoll leaders
and outsiders as it had developed from the 1880s onward. The
chief was able to operate autocratically because he had at his
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disposal the implicit threat that those who opposed him would
be sent to Ponape to be disciplined by the Japanese police,
a threat which occasionally was made explicit. The chief and
his assistants, one of whom was his half-brother, were able to
maintain this belief by carefully managing the visits of gov-
ernment officials. Officials were always in the company of the
chief or his assistants. The cordiality of their relationship with
officials was always publicly displayed. All official proclama-
tions, notices, and requests were relayed to the people through
the chief.
In point of fact, the Japanese administration was totally
unconcerned about atoll affairs and organization. Their in-
terests in the atoll were limited to commerce and labor re-
cruiting. The administration was content to deal with one man
as long as its needs were met. Administrators showed respect
to the chief and granted him personal favors such as material
goods and free transportation to Ponape. This lent credibility to
the idea of the unqualified favor of the administration for the
chief’s regime.
With the coming of the American colonial regime in 1946,
the form of the relationship between atoll leaders and colonial
rulers was maintained. The American administration is superor-
dinate, identifies with the atoll leadership, and is regarded as
granting favors to the atoll. The Kapinga are subordinate, defer-
ential to administrators, and supportive of the administration’s
policies. The content of the relationship, however, changed rad-
ically and abruptly. The new colonial rulers were unlike their
predecessors in that they were not primarily interested in ex-
tracting copra and labor or marketing their goods. Unlike the
Europeans and the Japanese, the Americans were intensely in-
terested in atoll affairs and social organization. Whereas the
Europeans and the Japanese saw Micronesia in terms of its
potential for supporting economic enterprises, the Americans
have thought of Micronesia primarily as a subject population
for their community development schemes. This became quickly
apparent on the atoll as the U.S. Naval Administration estab-
lished a school, a medical dispensary, a cooperative store, and
an elective chief magistrate position by 1947. It also became ap-
parent to the chief and his assistants that continued favor of the
administration depended not on what they could supply to the
administrators but on their willingness to cooperate in the de-
velopment of the administration’s programs on the atoll.
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Several young men were selected to go to Ponape for
training as teachers and nurses in 1947. By 1948, the atoll
had its own school. Children began to be sent to Ponape for
schooling in 1949, and by 1954 several boys had completed
high school on Truk. A new medical dispensary was built in
1950. The administration provided a stock of drugs and training
for two nurses. Although the copra market had not recovered
from its wartime collapse, the naval administration stimulated
a lively handicrafts trade. Residents were encouraged to or-
ganize a cooperative whose representatives parceled out orders
for handicrafts, sold them to the naval officers, bought surplus
goods from them, and sold these on the atoll at a small profit.
These early innovations were modified by the civilian admin-
istration after 1951. The atoll school was gradually expanded
from two grades to six as several young men finished their
education on Ponape and Truk and returned to the atoll to
teach. One of the teachers was appointed principal of the
school. It was his job to organize class schedules, supervise
teachers, and act as liaison to the Office of Education on
Ponape. The principal and teachers decided the organization
of the curriculum, management of resources, and scheduling
of classes, although American teacher trainers provided guide-
lines. Teachers were and still are taken to Ponape each summer
for training. By the 1960s newly recruited teachers were being
trained as specialists for certain grades.
The civilian administration began to encourage people to
start their own retail businesses in 1954, when the copra
market had recovered from its postwar slump. Entrepreneurs
bought their stock from a Ponape cooperative and from a family
of Belgian merchants that had been on Ponape since the nine-
teenth century. Goods were sold at the owners’ homes, usually
on credit against future copra receipts. There were several
of these ventures, all but two of which failed. Failure always
resulted from the owners’ fulfilling obligations to their kin,
who depleted the owners’ stock without paying or bought on
credit which was never redeemed. The two successful ventures
survived only because the owners locked up their goods, ex-
tended limited credit, and treated everyone in the store as a
customer regardless of their personal relationships. These two
businessmen avoided recriminations from their kin by making
periodic gifts of rice, cloth, and cigarettes from their stock.
When the Kapinga set up their cooperative as a branch of
the Ponape Federation of Cooperatives in 1964, the policy of
limited credit was applied. People working in the store were
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obligated to apply credit and prompt payment rules to everyone
equally. The clerk-customer relation has prevailed in the pri-
vately owned stores and in the co-op.
Political organization on the atoll also has undergone a
transformation since the advent of the American administration.
One of the first official acts of the naval administration was
to create the elective position of chief magistrate on the atoll.
The half-brother of the chief was unanimously elected. It was
the policy of the administration to deal directly with the chief
magistrate, relegating the chief’s position to that of maintaining
custom. The chief’s half-brother had been his assistant since the
1920s, and his major responsibility had been that of liaison be-
tween the chief and the administrators. Election to the position
of chief magistrate simply gave an official title to his normal
duties. When the chief died in 1949, his half-brother succeeded
him, holding both the chief and chief magistrate positions. Al-
though there was some vocal opposition from Kapinga to the
chief’s policies, he managed to maintain a more or less auto-
cratic leadership until his death in 1956.
The chief’s son, who at the time was twenty-five years of
age, was elected to succeed him to both offices. The young man
had been educated on Ponape and Truk, spoke fluent English,
and was a teacher on the atoll. His situation at the time of
his election was difficult for two reasons. First, he was under
pressure from the administration to create an American-style
tripartite political organization on the atoll. This model of or-
ganization had been part of his education, and it was part of
the curriculum in his own classroom. Second, the position of
chief presumed an authority to make unilateral decisions that
seemed likely to bring him into conflict with older people. Au-
thoritative decision making was the prerogative of older people,
who, having openly opposed the father on several issues, hardly
seemed likely to accept the son’s unilateral decisions. The
young man resolved the dilemma by refusing the position of
chief. Instead, he accepted the position of chief magistrate and
began to lobby for the election of a legislative council and a
local court judge. Several months of discussion in meetings
and, informally, in the men’s houses culminated in the establish-
ment of a legislative council in 1957 and a local court in 1960.
The young chief magistrate spent several months training the
council in legislative procedure, and by 1960 the atoll received
its charter as a municipality of the Ponape District of the U.S.
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.3
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In the first years of the council’s operation, its members
were older men who held responsible positions in the church.
Much of the early council legislation dealt with moral issues
with which the church was concerned. For example, the council
passed bills prohibiting the consumption of alcoholic beverages,
premarital sexual relations, and the like. It took the chief mag-
istrate over two years to induce the council to pass the enabling
legislation that was necessary to secure the atoll’s municipal
charter. Church-related issues have ceased to dominate leg-
islative concerns over the last eight years for two reasons.
First, older men have been gradually replaced on the council
by younger men who are literate in English and have a firmer
grasp of legislative procedure. Very few of these younger men
have been church members. Second, specific issues have pre-
cipitated an explicit divorce of legislative from religious activity.
One such issue concerned the request of church leaders to
use community-owned roofing materials for the church in 1965.
The chief magistrate and several councilors pointed out that
granting the request would violate a statute of the Trust Ter-
ritory Code prescribing the separation of church and state.
Of all the government programs introduced on the atoll, only
the schools and the medical dispensary were actually forced
on the people. The schools have been largely controlled by
the Kapinga since that time. The administration maintains su-
premacy in its relationship with the atoll in several ways. First,
the administration has been aggressive in presenting programs
to the Kapinga leadership. Second, the administration main-
tains control over the school program through teacher training
and over the medical program through periodic inspections.
The administration has the power to approve or veto legislation
emanating from the atoll and to grant or deny petitions for eco-
nomic aid and supplies. To maintain their position in the rela-
tionship, atoll leaders have accepted many, though not all, of the
administration’s programs. Acceptance of a program does not
imply the administration’s domination of the atoll’s social orga-
nization, however. The Kapinga run the programs themselves;
this is a crucial feature of the relationship from both the ad-
ministration’s and the Kapinga’s point of view. By running the
programs themselves, the Kapinga control their own internal
affairs—a constant feature of the Kapinga–colonial government
relationship from the outset. The Kapinga, for their part, have
not seemed hesitant to petition the administration for aid in
atoll projects, such as materials for bridge construction and for
a municipal office building.
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The outcome of the relationship between the atoll and the
American administration has been the establishment of several
contexts of activity that are organized very differently from
those of the traditional atoll system. These contexts include the
atoll school, the medical dispensary, the council, the court, and
retail business establishments. In these contexts the social rela-
tionships are categorical: people assume certain roles, and the
roles alone structure expectations. Biographies of the persons
involved in these contexts are irrelevant to the interaction. For
example, people expect that a teacher will not favor his rel-
atives in the classroom nor would a judge in the courtroom.
People get angry when these expectations are not met. Each of
these contexts is distinguished from the others and from tradi-
tional personal relationships. People recognize that roles appro-
priate to one setting, say the classroom, are not appropriate to
others. The content of these role relationships has been worked
out through trial and error. The forms, however, have clearly
resulted from maintaining the relationship between atoll and
colonial government in the form in which it originally developed
in the 1880s.
CHANGE IN PORAKIET
The Porakiet social system has replicated the major structural
features of the traditional atoll social system. Social bonds are
organized as whole-person-to-whole-person relationships by a
combination of role, setting, and biographies of the partici-
pants. Household structure is based on the atoll prototype of
a nuclear family plus relatives of either spouse. Subsistence
chores are still allocated largely by age and sex. Community
activity, such as work projects and feasts, is directed by a
headman. The headman is also responsible for maintaining
order, for the physical upkeep of the village, and for mediating
relationships between the community and outsiders. Like the
atoll chief, the headman has been a high-ranking member of
the Protestant church hierarchy,4 although he has never exer-
cised autocratic rule in the community.5 It is rather curious that
the Porakiet social system has not undergone differentiation.
The village, after all, is located in an urban center. Kapinga
children attend schools, and adults engage in wage labor and
commercial ventures. In brief, Porakiet residents assume all
the roles that are characteristic of a differentiated social
system—customer, clerk, student, teacher, nurse, employee,
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and the like. At the same time, the life-styles of the villagers are
quite different from those of atoll residents. The reasons that ac-
count for the lack of differentiation in the Porakiet system also
account for the differences in life-styles of villagers and people
on the atoll.
The relationships between the Porakiet social system and
its environment are qualitatively and quantitatively different
from those of the atoll system. Seldom is the entire village
party to a relationship with the outside. The only instances of
such relationships are occasional feasts honoring some non-
Kapinga dignitary, such as government officials or United Na-
tions observers, and periodic petitions to the district adminis-
trator by the headman. Relationships between Porakiet and its
environment involve mainly individual persons or small groups
of persons of the village with outsiders. Individual villagers,
for example, deal with other individuals, with business estab-
lishments, with church groups, with informal groups (such as
recreational groups), and with government agencies outside
the village. Small groups of villagers also have relationships
outside the village, though these are less frequent than those
involving individuals. The village choir, for example, sometimes
holds joint rehearsals with choirs from other villages. A Kapinga
family may go to visit a Ponapean family. Several Kapinga men
have formed an informal yam planting group with a Ponapean
neighbor. Several village men occasionally contribute labor to
the Roman Catholic mission in Kolonia in exchange for use of
the mission’s machinery.
The systemic level at which most of the relationships be-
tween Porakiet and its environment occur, then, is that of the in-
dividual person or small group of persons. The particular parts
of the environment to which villagers relate include parts of the
physical environment, such as the lagoon and deep sea, and a
varied range of social environments—individuals and families
of other ethnic groups, businesses, government agencies, class-
rooms, churches, cooperatives, and recreational organizations
such as baseball, track, and swimming teams. The systemic
level at which relations with the environment occur constitutes
a crucial difference between Porakiet and the atoll.
Kapingamarangi has been regarded as a polity by European
traders, resident aliens, and two colonial governments;
moreover, the atoll residents themselves have related to out-
siders as a polity. But Porakiet has never been considered to
be a polity by the colonial government or by other residents
on Ponape. The Japanese and American administrators have
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never recognized Porakiet as an autonomous political or admin-
istrative entity. In fact, Porakiet has no official status whatever
within the colonial system. The village has had some quasi-of-
ficial recognition as an ethnic community. American tourists are
regularly taken through Porakiet to see Ponape’s “Polynesian
village.” The administration has also had to deal with periodic
petitions from the chief for special considerations. The admin-
istration has been reluctant to deal with these petitions, espe-
cially since the chartering of Kolonia town, in which the village
is located, as a municipality. When the Porakiet headman re-
quested a quitclaim title or a lease for the village land in 1965
(the old lease had expired in 1961), his request was denied. The
denial was based on the grounds that part of Kolonia Munici-
pality’s program was the social and political integration of the
many ethnic groups living there. It would have been detrimental
to the municipality to create a politically autonomous ethnic
community by granting title to the land to the Kapinga.
Thus the kind of relationship which has resulted in
differentiation on the atoll does not exist for Porakiet. There
is no relationship between the colonial government and Po-
rakiet as a polity. There is, however, a relationship between the
colonial government and Kolonia Municipality that is coordinate
to that between the government and the atoll To the extent
that Kapinga reside in Kolonia, they participate in institutions
such as schools, businesses, and the like, almost all of which
are located outside the village. The roles that Kapinga assume
in these institutions are thus relevant to relationships outside
the village. The process of differentiation characteristic of the
atoll has occurred outside the boundaries of the Porakiet social
system. The settings in which roles structure interaction re-
gardless of the biographies of the persons involved have always
been settings of interethnic contact for Kapinga on Ponape.6 In-
formation about biography is replaced in these relationships by
information about characteristics of people’s ethnic groups.
In their roles with outsiders, the Kapinga have used Pon-
apean, English, and Japanese for the language of the trans-
action. Every situation of interethnic contact is marked, then,
by roles assumed for the interaction and by linguistic messages
of ethnicity. In this manner, the relationships that result in
differentiation within the atoll social system also define the
boundary of the Porakiet social system. These relationships, in
other words, contain information that exclude them by defin-
ition from the Porakiet social system. For this reason, the Po-
rakiet social system remains undifferentiated.
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The roles that Porakiet residents assume for purposes of
interethnic contact are largely irrelevant to their personal re-
lations with one another. One assumes the role of teacher,
student, patient, or nurse outside the village, almost never
within it. On the atoll, however, Kapinga assume these same
roles in order to interact with other Kapinga. Although the
Kapinga in Porakiet rarely assume such roles in interaction
with one another, the roles are crucial to the maintenance of
their personal relationships and of the community in two ways.
First, because the village is small, the Kapinga community has
never been self-sufficient. Porakiet residents have always de-
pended on resources outside the community such as fish, veg-
etables, pigs, fowl, construction materials, and tools. Access
to these resources has been necessarily through contacts with
non-Kapinga. The roles that Kapinga assume in order to interact
with non-Kapinga have made the interaction (and thus the flow
of resources) predictable. Second, the roles and relationships
that Kapinga have outside the village provide material and non-
material resources that are very relevant to their personal rela-
tionships within the village. What matters most to Kapinga in
their interpersonal relationships is the esteem in which they
are held. Deference accorded one in public, the achievement
of rank and responsibility (in the church, in a men’s house, in
a descent group), and the accumulation of dependents are all
expresssions of esteem.7 One’s esteem depends on the respon-
sibility one can assume for the welfare of others (see Lieber
1974). The resources that enable one to assume responsibility
are both material and nonmaterial—knowledge, skills, compe-
tence in making and implementing decisions.
On the atoll the crucial resources for the assumption of
responsibility are ownership of land, membership in a tradi-
tionally prominent family (of the chief or the former high
priests), and skill in canoe and house construction, carpentry,
and fishing. In Porakiet, relations with outsiders provide vil-
lagers with resources important to their relations with one
another—money, food, and construction materials. Important
nonmaterial resources have been technical expertise, such as
carpentry, boat building, masonry, plumbing, and mechanical
skills. Another important resource has been access to powerful
persons outside the community, such as the Ponape district
administrator and the chiefly hierarchy of the traditional Pon-
apean polity. The means by which these resources are acquired
are less important than the fact of whether or not one has them.
More important still is what one does with one’s resources.
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For example, one of the men in the village is a teacher with
a good reputation among his colleagues and the American ad-
ministrators. His reputation as a teacher is unimportant to vil-
lagers, few of whom are aware of it. This man’s esteem is
based on the fact that he has a steady income, supports a large
household, and has access to several important Americans from
whom favors might be gained.
An example of the importance of access to resources and
the prestige afforded by them is the contrast between the leg-
islative council on the atoll and its counterpart in Porakiet. The
atoll council developed as a response to change in political
organization. The intellectual skills necessary for its operation
eventually determined its membership: younger men with
schooling on Ponape and two older men who are prestigious
and capable. The younger men are elected solely on the basis of
their skills rather than other kinds of competence. The position
of councilman is not especially prestigious.
The council in Porakiet is a response to the internal growth
of the village after World War II and to the general lawlessness
in Kolonia and the village at the time. The village headman
faced two problems by 1952: the village population had more
than doubled since 1948, and maintaining order was difficult for
one man. Furthermore, with a larger population, a permanent
water supply and a men’s house for unmarried males to sleep
in were needed. In 1952, the headman demanded that villagers
elect a four-man council to serve as his assistants. The council’s
tasks were those of enacting legislation for the village, en-
forcing the legislation, and organizing major construction pro-
jects. The council functioned somewhat like the atoll chief’s
assistants.8
Council members have been elected annually since 1952,
and they have been older men who have been successful busi-
nessmen, well-paid workers, fishermen, and churchmen. All the
councilmen have demonstrated their ability to assume responsi-
bility by supporting large families, by supervising construction
projects in the village, by leadership of the men’s house, by
leadership in church activities, by success in business ven-
tures.9 All these pursuits have involved the men in relationships
with outsiders, especially with Micronesians in the colonial ad-
ministration and with Ponapean nobility. From Ponapean nobles,
the Kapinga have obtained such favors as taro land for Porakiet
villagers (see Lieber 1968b:84). The position of councilman in
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Porakiet has become a measure of interpersonal esteem. It is a
prestigious position because those elected to it are responsible
people.
While the kind of relationship from which prestige results
has not changed in Porakiet, some of the means for acquiring
resources to bring to these relationships have changed. This
fact has two implications. First, those whose aspirations for
prestige on the atoll are blocked by relative poverty of land-
holdings or, say, by lack of ties to traditionally prominent fam-
ilies have the alternative of fulfilling their aspirations in Po-
rakiet. Many migrants have remained in Porakiet for precisely
this reason. Second, the time and resources of individuals are
of necessity allocated differently in Porakiet than on the atoll.
In other words, the life-styles of individuals on Ponape are dif-
ferent from those of atoll residents.
The allocation of time and effort of both men and women
in Porakiet is shaped by their dependence on a cash economy
and on the relative scarcity of food, construction, and craft
resources in the village. As of 1966, one-third of the village
population over twenty-one years of age was engaged in wage
labor. This requires that they spend a minimum of eight hours
a day outside the village for at least five days a week. This
time is spent in Kolonia working with Americans, Belgians (who
own two large retail businesses), and Micronesians. More than
half the population under twenty-one spends six to eight hours
a day in Kolonia in schools with Micronesian children. Their
teachers are American and Micronesian and the languages of
instruction are Ponapean and English (Lieber 1968b: 198–207).
Ninety-five percent of those engaged in wage work are men.
Women also spend time outside the village—working in taro pits
6 miles from the village, buying groceries, visiting relatives in
the hospital or going to the outpatient clinic, selling handicrafts,
and participating in church activities. The maintenance of what
Sahlins (1965) calls trade friendships with Micronesians, in
which both men and women are involved, necessitates periodic
trips to other parts of the island (see Lieber 1968b:43–51).
Young men also spend evening hours and weekends in Kolonia
drinking beer at local taverns and playing pool. Even fishermen,
whose life-styles have been least affected by the Ponape envi-
ronment, must spend time in Kolonia selling fish, buying gear,
and attending meetings of the Ponape fishermen’s cooperative.
Adult women, most of whom remain in the village during
the day, allocate their time differently from atoll women. Except
for periodic trips to taro plots and coconut plantations on outer
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islets, atoll women spend almost all their time in their
household compounds cooking, cleaning, or doing craft work.
For Porakiet women, there is a good deal less work to do. Food
preparation takes less time since meals consist mostly of rice
and tinned food, except when breadfruit is in season. There
is less craft work to do, since materials for it, such as pan-
danus and coconut leaves, are not readily available. Porakiet
women can often be seen napping during the afternoon; this
is something that atoll women rarely have time to do. Porakiet
women also spend time visiting between households to talk. A
few women spend a good deal of time working at specialties,
such as sewing clothing or tending village retail stores (which
atoll women do only when they have spare time). Shopping trips
to Kolonia are usually organized by several women who go to-
gether, often taking a young man along to carry groceries.
Corresponding to the differences between time allocation on
the atoll and in Porakiet are differing patterns of resource al-
location. Kapinga on the atoll subsist almost entirely on locally
produced staples. Money earned from copra production is spent
on tools, utensils, cloth, thread, tobacco, rice, and some tinned
food. Imported food is used mainly for feasts. While dresses,
shirts, and slacks are necessary for church services and feasts,
few people own more than two such articles of clothing. In
Porakiet, staple foods must be bought. Dresses, shirts, and
slacks, both for work and for Sunday and feast dress, are worn
whenever one leaves the village. Such clothing is worn more
often, wears out sooner, and has to be replaced more often
than clothing on the atoll. Wage workers need several sets of
clothing, since washing is done only once a week. Villagers
spend more than half their incomes on such necessities, al-
though some villagers own radios, motorcycles, outboard en-
gines, and the like. There are relatively fewer fishermen in
Porakiet than on the atoll, partly because canoes are far more
expensive to build in the village. Trees for the hull and gunwales
must be bought. The custom of feeding the workers who help
construct it requires money, since the food must be bought. A
good deal of money is also spent on beer and liquor in Porakiet,
whereas these were illegal on the atoll until recently.
Maintenance of the Porakiet social system, then, has re-
quired that members of that system participate in relationships
outside the system. These relationships are contexts of in-
terethnic contact whose structure consists of the rules of role
performance. The Kapinga in Porakiet maintain their traditional
system of personal relationships in which these roles are ir-
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relevant. The roles do, however, constitute the means for ac-
quiring the material and technical resources that Kapinga bring
to their personal relationships with one another. To the extent
that the performance of these roles requires the allocation of
time, effort, and material resources outside Porakiet, the life-
styles of Porakiet villagers have changed considerably from
those of their fellows on the atoll. Maintaining the traditional
forms of social relationships within the Porakiet social system,
in other words, has required changes in the lifestyles of indi-
viduals within the system.
THE RELATION BETWEEN KAPINGAMARANGI
AND PORAKIET
The most obvious sort of relationship between the atoll and Po-
rakiet is that the Porakiet social system is a replication of the
traditional atoll system. Despite its obviousness, this relation
is of profound importance. The very existence of a community
on Ponape whose internal social relations are identifiable as
Kapinga in type has been crucial in shaping the postcontact
world view of Kapinga in both communities. Since 1919, the
Kapinga have had to deal conceptually with the fact that their
social order has an existence within a larger universe apart
from the atoll. The atoll is but one concrete manifestation of
the Kapinga social order and not simply identical to it. This
has become clear to the Kapinga through the process of having
to debate and resolve several controversies in which the re-
lationship between the atoll and Porakiet was a key issue (a
process comparable to that described by Martin Silverman in
chapter 6).
In 1930 and again in 1964, controversy was raised when
some residents wanted to divide Porakiet land into private
leaseholds (Lieber 1968b:78–79, 179). In both instances, the
majority of the residents decided that the land would be kept
intact to be used by ‘all the Kapinga people’. What ‘all the
Kapinga people’ meant in 1930, however, was different from
what it came to mean by 1964. In 1930, Porakiet was a com-
munity of transients, a place for atoll people to stay while
visiting Ponape. ‘All the Kapinga people’ meant residents of
Kapingamarangi Atoll.
By 1964, there was a core of families in Porakiet who con-
sidered themselves to be permanent residents, claiming Pon-
apean citizenship and paying head taxes to Kolonia Munici-
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pality. The majority included people who were either staying
temporarily in Porakiet and intending to return to the atoll or
people who had been in Porakiet for some time and had not de-
cided where they would reside permanently. Several household
heads who were permanent residents wanted to join a housing
cooperative in order to construct cement houses in the village.
Because the cooperative demanded land as collateral for
housing loans, these men were unable to join. Porakiet was
still public land. When one of the men proposed in a meeting
that the village land be divided into twenty leaseholds, a long
and at times bitter controversy followed. Permanent residents
argued that they were the only people who cared about the
village enough to maintain it. Thus the land should be theirs.
Others, including the headman, argued that the land had been
given to all the Kapinga people. It should be maintained for all,
not just for the permanent residents. The latter’s argument that
they were the major contributors of money and labor to village
upkeep was granted as valid by their opponents. The headman
added that all Kapinga who stayed in Porakiet were obligated to
maintain the village “just as if they lived there all the time.”
That Porakiet and the atoll were separate communities was
clear in the argument. That the population of Porakiet consisted
of permanent residents and transients was also made clear.
Moreover, it was clear that ‘all the Kapinga people’ meant all
the people who consider themselves to be of Kapinga ethnic
identity. In the argument, the category ‘Kapinga person’ in-
cluded people living on the atoll, on Nukuoro, Ngatik, Ponape,
Kusaie, Palau, Oroluk, and any other place where Kapinga might
reside. The ‘Kapinga people’ is now a category that transcends
place of residence and, for that matter, one’s commitment to
a particular locality. The concept of ‘Kapinga people’ has been
universalized in a manner not unlike the universalization of Je-
hovah and Jewishness during the relocation called the Baby-
lonian Captivity.
In 1966, a bitter debate over the relationship between Po-
rakiet and another relocated Kapinga community in the
southern part of Ponape was resolved by interpreting it in the
framework developed two years earlier.10 Members of the
southern community, who stayed in Porakiet while visiting
Kolonia town, had consistently refused to contribute money
toward the cost of renovating the village bathhouse. They rea-
soned that they had no responsibility in the matter, since they
lived and paid taxes in another municipality. In a meeting called
to vote on assessments for the project, some Porakiet residents
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(including the headman) denounced the refusal of the southern
villagers to help, disregarding their reasoning. In the heat of
debate, it was suggested that southern villagers who would not
contribute should be barred from Porakiet facilities or from Po-
rakiet altogether. The headman, once he had calmed down, re-
solved the argument. He reasoned that barring the southerners
from Porakiet contradicted the proposition that Porakiet was
for ‘all Kapinga people’. The southern villagers, he said, would
always be welcome in Porakiet because they were Kapinga
people. They ought to help their fellows in Porakiet, he said, but
it was up to them to decide what to do. By viewing the contro-
versy in terms of the universalized concept of ‘Kapinga people’,
not only was the controversy resolved but the relationship be-
tween the two villages was clarified.
The universalization of the concept of ‘community’ has
further clarified the relationship between the atoll and Porakiet.
‘Community’ is used by the Kapinga to denote all the people on
the island (or in the village), the organization of the people en-
gaged in some community project, those present and eligible to
vote in a community meeting, and, more generally, everybody.
A controversy mentioned previously concerning the use of
communal roofing materials for the atoll church raised the issue
of the application of the term ‘community’ in Porakiet in 1966.
After the chief magistrate and council refused to allow the
roofing materials to be used for the church, the atoll minister
wrote to the Porakiet headman requesting a contribution of
roofing sheets from the Porakiet community. He claimed that
he was writing on behalf of the chief magistrate. The letter
was read at a village meeting, and a debate quickly ensued.
It was agreed that the villagers ought to comply if in fact the
chief magistrate had made the request. Some people doubted
whether the chief magistrate even knew of the letter, since
church and state were legally separate. One old man replied
that in the day of the former chief, such a separation was not
an issue and should not be an issue now. The issue then became
one of what constituted a community issue and a community re-
sponsibility, and, most important, to what extent and for what
purposes Porakiet as a community was obligated to the atoll as
a whole or to groups within it.
The debate was resolved by an impassioned speech by a
councilman. He stated that whenever a major project was un-
dertaken on the atoll, it was conducted by the entire community.
Such was the ethic of ‘love’ for one another in the community.
Whether the project was a church or a courthouse made no dif-
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ference, he asserted. “We are all one community, and so we
must help each other. Let every man decide for himself what
is right, but if we are really members of the community, we
will do what he [the minister] asks us.” Community, in this
statement, meant the social order that includes all Kapinga
as its members. By universalizing ‘community’ and by iden-
tifying it concretely with the atoll project, his exhortation to
accede to the request connected the atoll and the village in a
single community. By saying that every person should “decide
for himself,” the councilman took the issue out of the context of
the meeting and placed responsibility on the shoulders of indi-
viduals as real members of the community. The majority of those
present voiced agreement with him. The impact of his speech
was enhanced by the fact that the church on Kapingamarangi is
Protestant whereas the councilman is a Roman Catholic.
The universalization of ‘the Kapinga people’ and ‘com-
munity’ represents an increase in the complexity of the Kapinga
concepts of themselves and of their social order. That the atoll
and Porakiet are separate, independent communities is recog-
nized. ‘Porakiet people’ and ‘atoll people’ are frequently used
phrases that denote the different communites. The fact that
‘Kapinga people’ and ‘community’ now denote Kapinga people
in general and the Kapinga social order in general indicates two
sorts of change. First, there has been an increase in the amount
of information encoded in these phrases. Second, there has
been a change in the organization of the information encoded
in these phrases: their meanings are more abstract than before.
Their present order of generality is new. The older meanings of
the phrases are only part of the new, more abstract meanings.
The increasing complexity of the Kapinga image of their
own society corresponds with an increase in the complexity
of their view of the larger world in which they live and the
relations they have in it. The Kapinga have learned a good
deal about officialdom and about other ethnic groups through
their experience on the atoll and through travel and schooling.
People on the atoll and Ponape know about the hierarchical
structure of the colonial government (the ‘office’), the con-
nection between the government and other island municipal-
ities, and the connection between the Trust Territory and the
United States and the United Nations. Children learn about
these relations in school, while adults in both communities
deal with the government as employees, councilmen, repre-
sentatives to the district legislature, or teachers. Kapinga liv-
ing on Ponape have continual contact with people of other
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ethnic groups—Ponapeans, Kusaieans, Mokilese, Pingelapese,
Ngatikese, Trukese, Mortlockese, and Palauans. Several
Kapinga in both communities have traveled to these islands, as
well as to Guam, the Marshall Islands, Japan, Hawaii, and is-
lands in the South Pacific. Information about all these groups
has come from face-to-face contact and reports of such contact
to others in the community. Owing to the continual movement
of people between the atoll and Porakiet, information about the
nature of officialdom and other islands and their inhabitants
seems to be generally shared in both communities.11 Thus, for
example, one who leaves the atoll for the first time to live on
Ponape already has most of the information about the island and
strategies for coping with life there that he needs. His expe-
rience then fills in the details.
The universalized concepts of ‘Kapinga people’ and Kapinga
social order and the larger world in which these concepts have
their reality are all part of a growing body of information that
Kapinga have about themselves. Their ideas about officialdom
and other ethnic groups, about the atoll and Porakiet and the
differences between them, are all part of the information that
comprises Kapinga culture. The processes that have led to
changes in their ideas about their world are processes of culture
change. The process consists in incorporating new information,
which serves to reorganize previous information in some ways
but is organized by previous information in yet other ways.
Some of the most important changes in Kapinga culture, such
as their definitions of themselves as a people, are the outcomes
of the increasingly complex relationship between the atoll and
Porakiet.
THE NATURE OF ETHNIC BOUNDARIES
At one time or another, most Kapinga have the experience of
living in two different communities, both of which are rec-
ognizably Kapinga communities and both of which are recog-
nizably different in many ways. The emigrant from the atoll has
a particularly profound experience in that he or she experiences
both a different kind of Kapinga community and continuous
contact with other ethnic groups. The emigrant’s experience is
an object lesson in what it means to be a Kapinga person. This
is quite a different experience from that of migrants to an island
where there is no migrant community. There may be contact be-
tween the home island and the island to which people have mi-
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grated, but there is not the kind of three-way contrast between
the home island, the resettled community, and other ethnic com-
munities that characterize the situation of the Kapinga and, say,
the Tikopia. It is the experience of this sort of contrast that re-
sults in the universalization of island group to ethnic category
and ethnic community characteristic of the Kapinga.
What is essential to the object lesson of Kapinga ethnicity
is each individual’s experience of very different contexts of
interaction—those characteristic of the Kapinga community (on
the atoll and at Porakiet) and those characteristic of relations
with non-Kapinga. The very differences in the life-style in the
two communities, moreover, highlight that which is common to
both: the structure of contexts of interaction referred to previ-
ously as whole-person-to-whole-person relations. It is these con-
texts of interaction that pose such a striking contrast to those of
interethnic relations.
The information a Kapinga needs to interact with other
Kapinga is different from that needed to interact with a non-
Kapinga. The rules that structure the information in Kapinga
relations with other Kapinga are different from the rules struc-
turing the information in an interethnic relationship. When a
Kapinga interacts with another Kapinga, he needs to know the
other’s biography and the setting of the interaction. He also
needs to know the roles that are being played, although these
are often of less importance than biography and setting. This
is the case because information about biography structures his
expectations about how the other will play his role. It is infor-
mation about biography that structures expectations of others
in most situations. Biography, in other words, is the dominant
information as regards setting and role. In interethnic relations,
biography is the least important information. A Kapinga can in-
teract with a Ponapean, for instance, without either knowing
anything of the other’s biography. All that is necessary for the
relationship is a knowledge of the setting and the roles appro-
priate to it. Furthermore, setting and role are in one-to-one cor-
respondence. Each role is confined to a specific setting. One
plays the role of customer in stores, that of employee at the
place of work, and so on. Setting and role are not in one-to-one
correspondence in intraethnic relations. One can play the role
of son, friend, steward, or chief in any number of different set-
tings. The rules by which information about the relationship is
put together are very different for relations among Kapinga and
for interethnic relations. This is why the minimal information
necessary for Kapinga to interact with one another is different
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from that needed for Kapinga to interact with non-Kapinga. It
is this difference that constitutes the ethnic boundary between
the Kapinga social system and all other social systems.
Relations among Kapinga and relations between Kapinga
and non-Kapinga constitute different contexts of interaction.
They are different because the rules for combining information
that structures the contexts are different. The intraethnic con-
texts are contexts of personal relations, relationships between
persons who are intimately involved in each other’s biographies
(cf. Hiller 1947). The interethnic contexts are those of cate-
gorical relations in which each person interacts with others in
terms of the role or ethnic category the others represent.
Defining ethnic boundaries in this manner for Kapinga vis-à-
vis others implies a contradiction in the atoll system with regard
to the change described previously. Although Kapinga ethnicity
is defined in terms of contexts of personal relations, the atoll
social system includes contexts whose structure is identical to
those of interethnic contexts. It is precisely this structure that
accounts for differentiation in the social system. The presence
of such contexts within an ethnic boundary whose definition ex-
cludes them constitutes a contradiction. Not only does this con-
tradiction exist in fact, but Kapinga on the atoll are aware of at
least some of its implications. The contradiction is manifested
in several ways, the clearest of which are intergenerational hos-
tility and an incipient church versus secularist factionalism.
Government-sponsored programs on the atoll have gen-
erated the categorical relations that have led to differentiation.
These programs have been aimed at and run by younger people.
Leadership and economic control, traditionally prerogatives of
elders, have to some extent passed into the hands of younger
people. In such settings as council meetings, retail stores, the
school, and the dispensary, expectations of behavior based on
personal relationships are continually being violated as role re-
quirements take precedence in these settings. Older people re-
spond by complaining about the incompetence, immorality, and
irresponsibility of younger people, claiming that they are unfit
for the positions of responsibility they hold. Older people decry
the lack of respect they are shown by their juniors and the
latter’s disregard of their experience. Yet younger people con-
tinue to be elected or appointed to these positions by their peers
and by their elders.
At the same time, younger people seem to be ambivalent
about their own positions. Many younger people, both men and
women, claim that the older people are right in their criticism
Chapter 3
56
of young people in responsible positions. Moreover, the esteem
that is normally accorded to people in responsible positions has
not been forthcoming to the young men who assume positions
on the council, in the co-op, and in the schools, regardless of
how hard they work. While the young men remain committed
to these activities, they are also committed to such traditional
activities as craft work, fishing, and land stewardship, in which
excellence brings esteem. Those who are most involved in the
council, co-op, and schools have the least time for the tradi-
tional activities. These people, mainly men in their twenties and
thirties, feel this ambivalence most keenly and are among those
most overtly hostile to their elders. Hostility is most often ex-
pressed in malicious gossip. A measure of just how serious the
situation had become by 1966 can be seen in the council’s con-
sideration of a bill to outlaw and establish criminal penalties for
malicious gossip.
The members of the Congregational church have become
a quasi-political group on the atoll, often voting as a bloc in
community meetings. Although ‘church people’ are thought of
as older people, almost a third of the church leadership—the
Christian Endeavor Society—are young people.
For about eight years, between 1957 and 1964, the island
council was dominated by church members.12 Many of the
issues in which the council was involved reflected the strong
ties of its members to the church. An early act of the council was
to prohibit the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages.
The council fired three schoolteachers for violating this law. An-
other teacher was fired for introducing social dancing into the
school curriculum and yet another for “illicit” sexual activity. A
close look at the implications of these positions makes it obvious
why church leadership is identified with older people. What
‘church people’ represent in atoll affairs is, symbolically, the
kind of integration typical of the traditional atoll social system.
Implied in the firing of the teachers for offences committed
outside the classroom is the belief that the school is not sep-
arate from the rest of the community. Similarly, the issue con-
cerning the use of communal roofing materials for the church
involves the same kind of premise—that religious activity is not
separate from other activities. It is a denial of the differentiation
implicit in the new categories of activity.
It is significant that even though the ‘church people’ even-
tually lost on the issues of firing the teachers and using
community-owned materials, they lost not by a community vote
but by the intervention of outside authority. The Office of Edu-
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cation on Ponape made it clear that hiring and firing teachers
was the responsibility of that office, not of the council. The
church was prohibited from using the roofing materials because
of regulations in the Trust Territory Code. Many people, old and
young, were unhappy about the decision, but they felt that there
was little they could do about it.
The contradiction in the atoll system thus manifests itself in
intergenerational hostility and some of the conditions for fac-
tionalism which everyone feels but cannot quite understand.
The commitment of people to very different and sometimes mu-
tually exclusive contexts has produced conflicts that are painful
and frustrating. They are frustrating inasmuch as no one can
really point to any well-defined culprit or, for that matter, to any
well-defined group as victim. Kapinga living on the atoll con-
tinue to define themselves in terms of traditional contexts of
interaction as the atoll system continues to differentiate. The
‘church people’ continue to take positions that embody inte-
gration rather than differentiation. Although no one wholly dis-
agrees with the church positions or their premises, the positions
continue to meet with defeat. The outcomes of this process
are hostility, frustration, and ambivalence—which are inevitable
whenever people commit themselves to both horns of a
dilemma.
CONCLUSION
We can conclude that the changes described for the atoll com-
munity and the community at Porakiet are the outcome of
contact between the Kapinga and the colonial system. This con-
clusion tells us very little, however, since the kinds of contact
are different for each community. Contact between the atoll and
the colonial system involves a relationship between the atoll as
a polity and the highest echelons of the district administration
on Ponape. It has been the maintenance of the form of that
relationship through historical changes in the administration
that has resulted in change in the atoll system. Contact be-
tween Porakiet and the colonial system involves a relationship
between individuals or small groups in the village and gov-
ernment agencies, businesses, groups, and individuals of other
ethnic groups outside the village. Maintaining traditional social
relationships within the village has required that its residents
participate in relations with individuals, groups, and agencies
outside the village. These relations require of villagers an allo-
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cation of time and resources which differs from that of atoll res-
idents. The outcome has been a change in life-styles of Porakiet
residents.
The changes in each community have occurred at different
systemic levels. Yet in both communities change has resulted
from the maintenance of certain relationships. These data
demonstrate the validity of Gregory Bateson’s hypothesis that
“the constancy and survival of some larger system is maintained
by changes in the constituent subsystems” (Bateson 1972:339).
Bateson has also posited that such systemic change generates
its own paradoxes (1972:339). This proposition also is demon-
strated by the contradiction that has arisen on the atoll between
traditional personal relationships and the categorical relations
that have emerged from the differentiation in the atoll social
system.
As the atoll community and the community at Porakiet have
undergone changes, the relationship between them has
changed. Porakiet is no longer a colony of the atoll. It is a
separate social system that is politically independent of the
atoll. The question remains whether the universalization of the
Kapinga concepts of ‘community’ and ‘Kapinga people’ was in-
evitable given the existence of these two politically independent
social systems. The answer is no: universalization of these con-
cepts was not inevitable. The process of universalization de-
pended on two historical contingencies: (1) the identification of
a significant minority of Porakiet residents with Ponapean cit-
izenship and (2) the raising of specific issues in the village by
this minority, which called into question concepts of ‘Kapinga
person’ and ‘community’. Given that the Kapinga continue to
think of ‘person’ in terms of relationships,13 one might posit that
the universalization of ‘community’ and ‘Kapinga people’ was
inevitable once the issues were raised. Otherwise, the concepts
could have been left safely ambiguous.
Finally, this chapter has dealt with the processes of social
and cultural change and stability in two Kapinga communities.
The processes of change have been viewed as changes in the
organization of social relationships and the organization of
ideas resulting from relationships between each community and
other social systems that constitute its environment. The focus
on relationships within which change occurs allows us not only
to identify the change we are dealing with but also to account
for it. The focus on relationships between social systems also
forces us to identify precisely the systemic level at which
change or stability is relevant.
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4
COMMUNITIES AND
NONCOMMUNITIES: THE
NUKUORO ON PONAPE
Vern Carroll
Chapter4
INTRODUCTION
Unlike some of the other groups reported on in this volume,
the Nukuoro have not formed a daughter community in some
other place. The opportunities available to them have been iden-
tical to those afforded the Kapinga people (chapter 3), but those
opportunities have been scorned: At present there is a Kapinga
village on Ponape (just as there is for each of the other out-
island ethnic groups in Ponape District), but one searches in
vain for a Nukuoro village. The Nukuoro on Ponape seem to
prefer not to live communally; they seem to have actually re-
sisted all efforts to push them in the direction of forming a com-
munity on Ponape such as other ethnic groups have formed.
This chapter is devoted to explaining this preference. The
chapter can also be read as a lesson: History is not always dealt
with most adequately by framing one’s analysis in historical
terms. I shall return to this point at the end of the chapter.
THE KAPINGA AND NUKUORO ON PONAPE
As Michael Lieber has pointed out (chapter 3), the Kapinga on
Ponape live mostly in a small village located on a tract of land
awarded them by the Japanese colonial administration in the
early 1920s. The village is organized into sections, with section
leaders under the village chief. All Kapinga who come to Ponape
are welcomed to this village and assigned living space. The
village engages in many communal activities and has become
a minor tourist attraction because of its authentic South Seas
charm.
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There are also a fair number of Nukuoro on Ponape (about
151 in 1965—see Carroll 1975b). To be sure, most of them live
in and around the port town of Kolonia (see map 4), the only
location on Ponape where non-Ponapeans can obtain land-use
rights without acquiring long-term commitments.1 But within
the precincts of Ponape the Nukuoro are widely scattered
among members of other ethnic groups. They do not have a
community organization—and all efforts to form one have failed.
Nukuoro on Ponape, excepting those in the same household,
appear not to interact with one another more frequently than
with non-Nukuoro, and most Nukuoro agree that the relation-
ships between Nukuoro on Ponape are something less than ideal
This state of affairs is surprising—when contrasted with the
Kapinga case—since the Nukuoro have had precisely the same
opportunities for community development as the Kapinga have
enjoyed and the two cultures—both Polynesian outliers—are as
similar, in most obvious respects, as two distinct cultures can
be. Moreover, the ecologies of their home atolls are very similar
(Kapinga being more subject to drought and somewhat less well
endowed with land suitable for taro excavation).2 The Kapinga
birth rate appears to have been somewhat higher in the first
half of the present century (judging from the rapid increase
in Kapinga population), but population dynamics can be safely
ruled out—along with ecology—as the main factor in the con-
temporary difference between the behavior of the two ethnic
groups on Ponape. What then accounts for this difference?
Historical investigation yields the following information. The
tract of land on which the Kapinga village on Ponape is
presently located was given to the Kapinga chief “on behalf of
the people.” A similar tract of land nearby was given, at about
the same time, to the Nukuoro chief “on behalf of the people.”
The Kapinga chief set about exercising his mandate in the
Kapinga fashion—with the results noted above. The Nukuoro
chief also exercised his mandate, but in a different manner: The
Nukuoro chief took possession “for the people” and during the
1920s and 1930s he brought groups of workers from Nukuoro
Atoll to clear the land, plant coconut trees, and build houses
for him and his family. The workers who came were housed
and fed generously, their incidental expenses were taken care
of, and many volunteered again and again for the work party
(which was rotated every six months or so). Nukuoro who came
to Ponape on other business, and there were very few, stayed
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at the chief’s house as his guests. As far as one can ascertain,
there were no complaints about the chief’s administration of
this public trust, which continued until his death in 1953.
Although the American administration after World War II
encouraged complaints against traditional leaders (and acted
on several complaints directed at the Nukuoro chief by dissi-
dents), there was—as far as we were able to ascertain—still no
outcry about the chief’s management of this land. Indeed, in the
mid-1950s, after the chief died, his eldest son—then resident on
Ponape—managed to obtain exclusive title to the land. He was
apparently unopposed in this endeavor, even though he made
no promises about his future use of it.
Today the tract lies overgrown and all but deserted; a couple
of ramshackle structures are sporadically occupied. The new
owner lives elsewhere.
HISTORY AND CULTURE
One might be tempted to explain the peculiar fate of the
Nukuoro on Ponape as resulting from nothing more than the be-
havior of an autocratic chief and his greedy son. But the lack of
public outcry even with governmental encouragement to com-
plain (and a demonstrated capacity on the part of the Nukuoro
for doing so) suggests that the chief was merely doing what
people wanted him to do. It appears, then, that the Nukuoro did
not want a community (of the Kapinga sort) on Ponape. But how
could this be?
A useful perspective on this problem is gained by looking
at the cultural context of Nukuoro emigration. The story begins
with the settlement of the atoll about five centuries ago.
Tradition records that a man in some far-off land (now
popularly thought to be Samoa) had a quarrel with his elder
brother who was a chief (or, in some versions, with a younger
brother who was their mother’s favorite). The man gathered his
affines and retainers together and did battle with the brother.
Losing the battle, he was obliged to flee. Taking his party in
a double canoe (or two double canoes) he sailed away. After
many vicissitudes the party arrived at Nukuoro, which was un-
inhabited (or nearly so), where they established a permanent
settlement. The leader of the party was now chief, and when his
son grew up there was bad feeling between them. The son went
off in a canoe one day and was never heard from again. But by
and by, a castaway came to the atoll. After the castaway had
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been nursed back to health, he visited frequently with the chief.
During these visits the chief noticed that the castaway was fas-
cinated by the chief’s tattoos, which covered the upper part of
his body in a pattern distinctive to his family. The castaway ex-
plained that he had seen the same tattoo pattern on the torso
of a man who was being roasted on a spit at an island he had
visited. The chief, realizing that only his son bore the same
markings, gathered a party together and embarked on a canoe
voyage to find out more about the circumstances of his son’s
death. The party sailed and sailed but they found themselves
eventually in the open sea with no prospects of a landfall. The
chief asked his wife to ask her father (a diviner) to determine
why they were unable to find land. The diviner, with consid-
erable reluctance, advised that they had been bewitched and
only the death of either the chief or the rest of his party would
break the spell. The chief volunteered to sacrifice himself, and
after leaving instructions to his party concerning their future
conduct, he was swallowed up by a whale. The party soon made
a landfall on Nukuoro, and after having followed the chief’s in-
structions, they saw again the whale that had swallowed him.
One notes in this story that in both cases of interpersonal
conflict, emigration was precipitated by a serious rupture—and
in neither case was the rupture mended: The Nukuoro chief was
a refugee from his home island; his son was lost to him forever;
and the chief lost his life in a futile effort to follow his son’s path.
In both cases the person leaving was in the wrong.
Nukuoro emigration today has much the same character.
Excluding those visiting on Ponape temporarily in connection
with schooling, medical visits, church business, and the like, all
the Nukuoro on Ponape are thought to have left home owing
to disturbances in their close interpersonal relationships (with
‘parents’, ‘siblings’, or ‘children’). Those who have emigrated
return home rarely, and they do not seem to identify with the
interests of their home community. Whereas the Kapinga com-
munity on Ponape has been active in advancing Kapinga in-
terests with the district administration, the Nukuoro who per-
manently reside on Ponape are thought to be particularly un-
helpful in this regard. If anything—it is said—they appear, as in-
dividuals, to work against the interests of the home community
and appear contemptuous of their kin at home.3 One index of
the alienation of emigrants is the fact that a large percentage
of married Nukuoro emigrants are married to non-Nukuoro (al-
though most of these had been married to a Nukuoro at some
time in the past).4
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It cannot be said that the life of Nukuoro emigrants on
Ponape is easy. Most do not have secure access to land and
steady employment. Few Nukuoro have achieved positions of in-
fluence in the district government, and few are comfortable fi-
nancially.5 Most are living a marginal economic existence—by
their own admission—in housing that is overcrowded with de-
pendent relatives. All admit that the conditions of life on the
home atoll are far superior to the circumstances in which they
live on Ponape. Why, then, do they emigrate?
By and large, they leave the atoll for the same reasons they
might leave their domicile on the atoll or move elsewhere in the
same village or (occasionally) to an islet of the atoll other than
the one on which the main village is located. The person moving
will always claim force majeure—a sick relative needs help
elsewhere. But although no one can criticize such a statement
(since to be a good kinsman is to be a good person on Nukuoro),
no one is deceived. Anyone will tell you that people leave home
because they are unhappy. Once upon a time, before the coming
of Europeans, one could not easily express one’s alienation in
this way (the Nukuoro, at contact, had no canoes suitable for
ocean voyaging and no long-distance navigation methods). Until
the 1960s, few Nukuoro had kin on Ponape with whom they
could stay, although many people on Nukuoro expressed an in-
terest in going there. Indeed, it seemed to me during the course
of my fieldwork that the Nukuoro village was bursting at the
seams—that many people felt trapped there and would be happy
to emigrate if given the opportunity.
As more Nukuoro became established on Ponape (map 5)
it became easier for others to find a place to stay. On 18 Sep-
tember 1973 the village population (245), according to an of-
ficial Trust Territory census (TTPI 1974), was actually less than
in 1965 (278), despite considerable growth in the total ethnic
population.
But the question of why or how Nukuoro emigrate is not
the same as the question of why they fail to form an emigrant
community on Ponape—despite the obvious advantages of doing
so. Here we must look closely at the sense of emigration on
Nukuoro, once again using Kapinga as the point of contrast.
Whereas the Kapinga seem to assume that disruptions of
close relationships can eventually, with patience and goodwill,
be mended, the Nukuoro tend to assume that a serious rupture
is irreversible. The Kapinga are quicker to explode whereas the
Nukuoro continue to act as though all were well long after it is
not; but when the climax is reached the Nukuoro incline to walk
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Map 5. Movement from Nukuoro to Ponape.
away from the situation and not look back. The first Nukuoro
emigrant in the postcontact period (probably in the 1870s) was
a middle-aged man who asked the captain of a visiting ship to
take him aboard as part of the ship’s crew. The man’s relatives
were aghast and pleaded with him not to go, bewailing the fact
that they might never see him again. The man replied that he
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was tired of sitting in the men’s house day after day munching
on a piece of dead coral while his mates ate the food prepared
by their devoted relatives. Despite all entreaties, the man left
his relatives behind. He never sent word back to them and was
never heard from again.
The Kapinga settlement story reflects a somewhat different
premise about the consequences of interpersonal blowups. Ac-
cording to Kapinga tradition (Elbert 1949), a man’s wife grew
angry with him for leaving her alone frequently while he strolled
on the lagoon shore, so she swam out to sea. When the man re-
turned home he noticed her absence and was extremely upset.
Ascertaining the reason, he caused a canoe to be built at top
speed. Though the canoe was imperfectly finished, the party set
out after her. They found her in the open sea, near death from
exhaustion, and lifted her into the canoe. After many days of
further voyaging, they arrived at a place hitherto unknown to
them—the atoll of Kapingamarangi. Although the husband tried
to feed his wife various delicacies, she was too weak from ex-
haustion and exposure and she died. As far as anyone knows,
the Kapinga people lived on in happiness in their newfound
land.
In this story the rupture is impetuous, not calculated. The
estranged person (who is in the right) manages to get away only
by stealth (since her husband would surely have prevented her
going had he known her intentions). The wrongdoer is immedi-
ately contrite and takes quick steps to make amends. The con-
sequences of the rupture are serious (the woman did eventually
die, after all) but a reconciliation is effected. The unhappy in-
cident does not entail a long series of similar misfortunes.
Although Kapinga may leave their home atoll today owing
to interpersonal difficulties, it is rarely with the suggestion that
they are leaving for good. Rather they seem to think more in
terms of a “cooling-off period” or an opportunity “to get away
(from certain people) for a while”—not to get away from the
whole community. And, in fact, most Kapinga return frequently
to their home atoll for visits (and in the absence of visits, they
send presents).
The differences noted between the Nukuoro and the
Kapinga premise structure can be related systematically to
other differences in premises about interpersonal relations, al-
though I shall not undertake to do so here. The differences may
seem slight in comparison with the obvious cultural similarities,
but the behavioral outcomes are enormously divergent. The
Kapinga regard themselves (in comparison with the Nukuoro)
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as more cooperative, more outgoing, quicker to criticize and
offer help, more good-natured, more lighthearted, more jovial,
and more industrious.6 Related to these differences are differ-
ences in childrearing, land tenure, and political organization.
Thus, although the Nukuoro and the Kapinga are very
similar “culturally” (in the ways cultural difference is usually
measured—language, customs, technology, and so forth), a
more incisive and therefore more useful notion of culture as
premise structure reveals significant cultural differences be-
tween the two communities. It is my contention that these
cultural differences are sufficient to account for the observed
differences in aggregate behavior and that other explanations
are not required.
ON HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The movements of individuals or whole communities from one
place to another present themselves to us (through our con-
ventions about these matters) as historical events—that is, as
events whose main feature is that they are located at some
definable place in the passage of time. Such events are pre-
ceded, of course, by antecedent events, which are thought to
bear directly on them, and are followed by consequent ones.
Historical events are perceived ordinarily as such because they
stand out—they are different in some interesting way from what
usually happens.
By convention, one looks for the explanation of a historical
event in what happened just before. A common temptation in
historical analysis is to seek the explanation of a historical
event not in all antecedent events but in those which are his-
toric—that is, in events which are novel. Analysis in terms of
antecedent “historical events” appears to make sense because,
without the appearance of some novel antecedent factor, we
feel, the status quo could not change sufficiently to provoke the
historical event in question.
But even if all the ordinary antecedent events are taken
into account in a historical analysis (as they always are in the
better sort of history), one usually tries (again, as a matter
of convention) to explain historical events mainly in terms of
their immediate antecedents. History operates from moment to
moment, it is thought, and the long arm of history does not
reach out of one point in time and grab at something much later
on.
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Thus the conventions of historical analysis foreshorten the
con text of an event. Factors that endure over long periods
of time tend, inevitably, to be given less weight in historical
analysis than events that are closer at hand and more dramatic.
My contention here is that historical analysis (of the sort
usual in anthropology, at least) is insufficiently sensitive to the
stable features of culture and character that lie within the
province of anthropological study. At best, “history” seems to
relegate those enduring propositions about the nature of the
world to the status of background information. At worst, they
are ignored altogether.
For as long as history is concerned mainly with what does
happen, there is no obvious problem with the ordinary sort of
historical analysis: A (a historical event) is caused by B (an an-
terior historical event) or by B, C, and D—or by all these acting
in concert, along with a few cultural regularities perhaps. But
when, as in the present case, we try to explain what does not
happen, there is an unexpected difficulty. If historical events are
caused by (antecedent) historical events, then what causes a
nonevent? Is it other events—or other nonevents—or is it the
nonoccurrence of other events?
The most adequate description of a complex system is in
terms of what will not happen (Bateson 1967). What actually
happens in history is only a minuscule fraction of the equally
plausible outcomes of anterior events. By focusing only on what
has happened, we miss what might have happened—and what
could not have happened. In a phrase, the ordinary sort of
historical analysis is suffused with the error of thinking that
post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Cultural analysis—dealing as it does
with the central precepts in peoples’ belief systems—attempts
to avoid this sort of error by seeking to explain history, to
the degree possible, as the ordinary functioning of a relatively
stable premise system.
In the case at hand I have shown that contemporary
Nukuoro emigration conveys the same meanings and is founded
on the same premises as the earliest cases of emigration
recorded in Nukuoro traditional history. Only in this way, I think,
can we understand why the Nukuoro on Ponape have created
something that, if it has any structure at all, is of the order of an
“anticommunity”—or at the very least a “noncommunity.”7
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Map 6. Relocation from Bikini and Eniwetok.
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THE RELOCATION OF THE
BIKINI MARSHALLESE
Robert C. Kiste
Chapter5
INTRODUCTION
In early 1946, the small community of islanders that inhabited
Bikini Atoll in the northern Marshall Islands was relocated when
its homeland was selected as a nuclear test site by the United
States. The Bikinians did not desire relocation; they had no real
alternative but to submit to the wishes of the Americans. Their
first resettlement was on Rongerik, another northern atoll. Its
resources were insufficient, and in less than two years the is-
landers suffered near starvation. Traditional forms of social or-
ganization were not effective in the crisis, and they were aban-
doned for a communal system in which the islanders exploited
and shared their resources as a single unit. The Bikinians were
evacuated from Rongerik and provided refuge at a military base
on Kwajalein Atoll. After eight months, they were resettled on
Kili, a small single island in the southern Marshalls. (See map
6.) After a few years, a novel system of landholding was imple-
mented. This innovation has had numerous repercussions and
has precipitated a major restructuring of their traditional social
organization.
In addition to changing their community’s internal organiza-
tion, the Bikinians’ response to relocation has also altered their
relations with people outside the community. The islanders have
terminated their subordinate status to the iroij lablab ‘para-
mount chief’, whose domain included Bikini. Concomitantly,
they have allied themselves with the United States government
and now depend on its agencies.
It is the task of this chapter to describe and account for
these changes. In so doing, I argue that the structural changes
in both the internal and external relationships of the community
can only be understood in terms of a crucial continuity in the
culture and society of Bikini in particular and the Marshall Is-
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lands in general. A fundamental premise by which people per-
ceive, evaluate, and respond to the universe of human relations
is that what really matters to people is their position with
regard to power and influence over others, privilege, and the
control of valued resources. It is, in short, the control of one’s
own destiny and the destinies of others that constitutes one of
the most valued goals of Marshallese life. Such control is re-
alized in certain social statuses in kinship groupings that form
the corporate units of Marshallese atoll societies. It is the at-
tainment of these statuses by which people measure their po-
sition in the social universe. These statuses are few relative
to the aspirants to them, and as a consequence, much of Mar-
shallese social life is an unending competition for statuses
which entail power, influence, privilege, and the control of
valued resources.
The competition has traditionally been focused on the
control of land. Land is conceived of as a scarce commodity nec-
essary for sustenance, and Marshallese, and perhaps all atoll
dwellers, consider it their most prized resource. Because rights
to land are held by kinship groups, competition has taken the
form of struggles over land rights between such groups and
struggles among individuals for leadership status within them
(see Alkire 1972; Mason 1954; Spoehr 1949; Tobin 1958). Such
competition has not only involved intracommunity struggles but
also interatoll warfare before the coming of foreign colonial ad-
ministrations. The advent of colonial powers has amplified the
dimensions of the competition with the introduction of the copra
trade, imported goods, and new political statuses, the acqui-
sition of which have become new prizes in familiar struggles.
The relocations of the Bikini community and its relationship
with the United States government, whose power and resources
Bikinians regard as unbounded, constitute a novel context
within which traditional concerns have been played out. As new
opportunities for people to acquire power, influence, and priv-
ilege have presented themselves, new strategies have been de-
vised to take advantage of them. The structure of the Bikini
community has changed in consequence. Furthermore, given
the Bikinians’ awareness of the power of the United States gov-
ernment over them, it is hardly surprising that they have sought
to alter their relationship with the government in order to in-
fluence its policy.
Thus the argument advanced in this chapter reflects certain
realities of Marshallese culture and behavior. It is in basic
agreement with the analytical stance of a number of anthro-
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pologists concerned with the dynamics of sociocultural change
who have adopted what David Schneider calls the “competitive
view” of society (Schneider 1970:1–6; see also Leach 1954, Mair
1965). This view assumes that people vie with one another to
attain goals they hold to be of value and that the pursuit of
power and influence is common to members of human groups
as ends in themselves or as means to yet other ends. It is not
posited here that the intensity of motivation to acquire power
and influence is the same for everyone or that all are equally
successful among Bikinians or in other societies. Nonetheless,
it is those who are the most successful and energetic in the
pursuit of such ends who chart the direction that a society
follows.
I begin the argument with a description of the Bikini commu-
nity’s historical and environmental setting. This is followed by
descriptions of the traditional social organization, the
reorganization of the community during its resettlements, and
the relations of the community with external authorities and
other Marshall Islanders. A concluding section reviews the
basic argument of the chapter, and an epilogue reports recent
events that will have far-reaching consequences on the lives and
futures of the Bikinians.
HISTORICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING
Bikini is the northernmost atoll in the Ralik (western) chain
of the Marshall Islands. It consists of twenty-six islets which
have a total land area of 2.32 square miles. Like other northern
atolls, Bikini lies within a comparatively dry zone (Wiens
1962:154) and has a poor soil cover. Only three subsistence
crops—coconut, pandanus, and arrowroot—thrive there. Like
other northern atoll communities, the Bikini population was
never large; it numbered only 170 at the time of relocation.1 In
contrast, the southern atolls are situated in a wetter climatic
zone, have richer soil deposits, and support a larger variety
of crops. The largest populations, some numbering over a
thousand, have always been located in the south.
In addition to its position in northern Ralik, Bikini is also
isolated from other atolls. In precontact times, sporadic inter-
course was carried on with the people of Rongelap Atoll, the
Bikinians’ closest neighbors 80 miles to the east, and a few mar-
riages occurred between the two communities. Bikinians had no
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regular contact with the peoples of other atolls, and they had
developed minor variations in speech and behavior that distin-
guished them from other Marshallese.
Bikini’s location had other consequences. Missionaries and
traders were first attracted to the more favorable environment
of the south, where they commenced their activities in the
1850s. The German (1885–1914) and the Japanese (1914–1943)
colonial governments were headquartered at the southern atoll
of Jaluit. Majuro Atoll, also in the south, was established as
the Marshall Islands District Administrative Center by the U.S.
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands not long after the end of
World War II.
Bikinians and other northern islanders were the last to be
affected by foreign influence, and they were always outside the
mainstream of events in the south. Missionaries and traders did
not penetrate the north until around the turn of this century,
and because of the remoteness of their atoll, Bikinians had even
less contact with outsiders than other northerners. German of-
ficials made few appearances at Bikini, and the mission effort
did not reach there until 1908. The frequency of the Bikinians’
contact with outsiders increased during the Japanese period. A
government vessel called at the northern atolls twice a year.
The copra trade which flourished in the south was poorly de-
veloped in the north, however, and the Bikinians’ participation
in it was minimal.
Few Bikinians had ventured away from home in German
times, but experiences abroad increased with the visits of the
Japanese vessel. Most Bikinians limited their travel to Rongelap
and other northern atolls. Two or three attended a Japanese
school, several traveled to Kwajalein Atoll for medical care,
and a few others also spent some time there as wage laborers
for the Japanese. About half a dozen had gone to Ailinglaplap
in southern Ralik to serve in one of the households of their
paramount chief. Others traveled purely for the adventure of it
(Mason 1954:27–33).
A small number of Bikinians acquired spouses from other
atolls during their ventures abroad, but most found their travels
to be unpleasant experiences. The more acculturated south-
erners considered them a backward people; they compared
them unfavorably with their own ancestors of pre-European
times and poked fun at the peculiarities of their speech. The
Bikinians accepted this unflattering image and held themselves
in low esteem. To some extent, they did not identify with other
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Marshallese but thought of themselves as “Bikinians,” a people
distinct and culturally inferior. Many were hesitant to journey
abroad and found it more comfortable to remain at home.
Not until the war years did foreigners come to reside at
Bikini: half a dozen Japanese soldiers established a weather
station there. Immediately after the war, the Marshalls were ad-
ministered by a naval military government, and the Bikinians re-
ceived more attention from the outside world than ever before.
A U.S. Navy vessel called at Bikini every third month. A modest
store, an elementary school, and a medical dispensary were
established on the atoll and staffed with Bikinians trained by
Americans. At the Americans’ urging, the eleven traditional
leaders of the community formed a council which functioned as
the governing body of the atoll. One of the eleven was the iroij
‘chief’ of the community; he, a man named Juda, served as the
magistrate at the head of the council and community.
The initial relocation of the Bikinians was swiftly accom-
plished. In late January 1946, it was announced that Bikini had
been selected as the site for Operation Crossroads, the code
name of the first tests in the program of nuclear experiments.
The military governor of the Marshalls obtained the consent of
the paramount chief to relocate the people. In early February,
the governor and paramount chief flew to Bikini to obtain the
people’s cooperation. It appears certain that the Bikinians felt
powerless to resist, and they have subsequently claimed that
they never wanted to abandon their ancestral homeland and un-
derstood their relocation was only a temporary measure if Bikini
were not destroyed or rendered unsafe for human habitation.
The eleven traditional leaders who formed the council chose
Rongerik as the site for resettlement (Meade 1946). Rongerik
was uninhabited and is only 18 miles from Rongelab and its
people, with whom the Bikinians had long been familiar. Ron-
gerik’s ten islets comprise only one-fourth of Bikini’s land area,
and the atoll had never supported a permanent population. It
was known from the outset that it would present problems of
economic self-sufficiency.
In the process of preparing for their departure in late
March, Bikinians witnessed the initial phase of the massive
preparations for Operation Crossroads and received a great
amount of attention from news media. The Bikinians were re-
portedly impressed at the technological achievements of the
Americans, and they were flattered that the representatives
of such a powerful nation felt them worthy of their attention
(Markwith 1946).
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Within two months of their resettlement, the Bikinians re-
ported that Rongerik’s resources were inadequate. By the
winter of 1946–1947, they experienced serious food shortages.
During 1947, other atolls were considered by the administration
as possible sites for another resettlement. As conditions on Ron-
gerik deteriorated, a communal system of work and food ra-
tioning was implemented and directed by Juda and the council.
All food resources were brought under the council’s control,
and the gathering of subsistence crops by individuals or tra-
ditional kin groups was prohibited. Somewhat belatedly, the
high commissioner of the Trust Territory ordered a study of the
Bikinians to determine “the underlying causes of their apparent
discontent” (Richards 1957: 525). Leonard Mason, an anthro-
pologist from the University of Hawaii, was engaged to conduct
the investigation. His arrival at Rongerik in January 1948 coin-
cided with the most severe food shortage experienced by the is-
landers. Emergency rations were provided and a decision was
made to evacuate the Bikinians to Kwajalein (Mason 1954:9).
The Bikinians were given refuge on the largest islet in Kwa-
jalein Atoll. From the debris of war, the Americans had created
a base complete with streets, electric lights, movie theaters,
planes, and other military equipment. The Bikinians were quar-
tered in a tent village adjacent to a camp of Marshallese la-
borers. They received meals in a common mess with the la-
borers; the fare was extravagant by Bikinian standards and
provided a sharp contrast with their Rongerik ordeal. When
they were physically able, many adults were employed and in-
tegrated into the labor force during working hours. With their
earnings, they bought new clothing and sampled widely from
the variety of goods available at the post exchange. Their
morale improved, and they reportedly were profoundly im-
pressed with the cultural accomplishments of the United States
(Richards 1957:528).
To help the Bikinians preserve the integrity of their own
community, they were provided with facilities to maintain their
own church, council, and school separate from those of the
other islanders. The Bikinians’ village was off limits to Amer-
icans other than a few officials. Inevitably, however, they had
more contact with outsiders than ever before, especially with
the Marshallese in the labor camp. Compared to the more accul-
turated laborers, they were unsophisticated with much to learn.
The administration began the search for another reset-
tlement site by consulting the paramount chief. The choice
was narrowed to Wotho, a small northern atoll which was in-
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habited and within the chief’s domain, and Kili Island, a com-
merical copra plantation before the war which was now un-
inhabited and outside the jurisdiction of any chief. The para-
mount chief wanted the Bikinians to settle on his atoll, and he,
American officials, Juda, and three other members of the Bikini
council visited Wotho. Afterward, Juda and ten other Bikini men
were taken to Kili, where they were left alone to survey the
island. Kili is a single island with a fringing reef shelf which
extends unbroken around its entire perimeter. It covers 0.36
square mile (230 acres), an area one-sixth that of Bikini. Be-
cause of its location in the heavy rainfall belt of the south, Kili
has a rich soil cover and great agricultural potential. Well-or-
dered rows of high-quality palms covered 95 percent of the
land. A large swampy depressed area in its center was ex-
cellent for taro cultivation. Some breadfruit trees, papayas, ba-
nanas, sweet potatoes, and taro remained from the plantation
days. The Bikinians were not familiar with the cultivation of
these crops, and none grew in sufficient quantity to support the
population.
Kili has great disadvantages. It lacks a lagoon and other
sheltered fishing areas. The long axis of the island runs almost
parallel to the prevailing direction of the strong northeast
trades which blow steadily from November to late spring of
each year, and the winds generate heavy surf which isolates
Kili except for infrequent calms. Fishing is curtailed, and ships
cannot land cargo. Gaining a subsistence on Kili in winter is
made even more difficult by seasonal variation in the yield of
breadfruit; the period of minimal yield coincides with the trade-
wind season.
No one fully appreciated the magnitude of the adjustments
the islanders would have to make if they were to resettle on Kili
successfully. Bikinians had always depended on the rich marine
resources of their lagoon and had never devoted much time
or effort to agriculture. Their attitude toward agricultural work
was in fact quite casual. The Americans assumed that with a
concentrated exploitation, Kili’s palm groves could yield a crop
far in excess of the Bikinians’ subsistence needs and that the
surplus could be converted into copra for the purchase of im-
ported foods. With efficient management of resources, it was
thought, food could be stored in advance of the lean winter
seasons.
The Bikini men who surveyed the island were favorably im-
pressed with its palm groves, but they were distressed over
its small size and lack of lagoon. They reported their observa-
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tions to other members of the community, and comparisons be-
tween the relative merits of Wotho and Kili were made. In a
plebiscite of all adults, Kili was chosen by a 54 to 22 margin
(Mason 1954:10).
The Bikinians were moved to Kili in November 1948. Kili’s
location in the southern Marshalls brought them into rather
close proximity to the Marshallese who had had the longest ex-
perience with foreigners. Within a 65-mile radius of Kili are the
three southernmost atolls of the Ralik chain (see map 6): Ebon,
Namorik, and Jaluit, the former capital of both the German and
Japanese governments which is only 30 miles northeast of Kili.
In contrast to Bikini’s geographical isolation, Kili is on the ship
route which originates at the government center at Majuro,
170 miles northeast of Kili, and services the southwestern Ralik
atolls.
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNITY
The communal system which had developed at Rongerik was ad-
vantageous during the initial months on Kili as a concentrated
effort was necessary for the construction of a village. In con-
trast to Bikini and Rongerik where houses were of thatch and
timber, dwellings and other buildings on Kili were built of im-
ported lumber and roofing materials supplied by the Americans.
During the islanders’ initial months on Kili, the first signs that a
realignment of power and influence was occurring in the com-
munity became manifest. To examine these changes, it is nec-
essary to consider the organization of the community before
relocation.
Of the 170 islanders comprising the community in 1946,
164 were divided among three exogamous matriclans, Ijjirik,
Makao-liej, and Rinamu.2 The other six belonged to clans from
other atolls. Thirty-five other Bikini clansmen lived on other
atolls (some since Japanese times). These were islanders and
their children living with non-Bikini spouses.
Each of the three clans was composed of two or more lin-
eages between which genealogical ties were known. An islander
belonged to the lineage of his or her mother and membership
was permanent. The lineage was a highly segmental structure.
The term for ‘lineage’ is bwij, and it refers to the entire lineage
or any segment of it.
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Lineage mates were ranked according to two principles:
chronological age and seniority of generation. Age was ex-
pressed in the relations among siblings, who were ranked from
eldest to youngest. As an extension of the same principle, the
lineages of a clan and the segments of a lineage were ranked
according to the birth order of the sisters who founded them.
The second principle was equally simple: members of ascending
generations were superior in rank to those of descending gen-
erations.
The senior ranking member of a clan, lineage, or lineage
segment was its alab ‘head’. When the senior in rank was
female, the senior ranking male usually assumed the title. As
implied above, the term alab was elastic in the same manner as
the term for lineage. The ranking member of a clan with its two
or more constituent lineages was head of the entire clan. The
senior ranking member of each lineage of a clan and the senior
ranking member of each lineage segment were heads of their
respective divisions of the clan. In the event that the head of a
senior ranking lineage belonged to a lower generation than the
head of a junior ranking lineage, there was a structural ambi-
guity in the system. The principles of relative age and seniority
of generation were in direct opposition, and there were no cul-
tural norms that specified one as being superior in rank over the
other.
The head of the Ijjirik clan was the traditional chief of the
community. Juda, the incumbent, was head of the senior ranking
Ijjirik lineage and had succeeded to the chieftainship only a
short time before the islanders’ relocation. He traced his line
of chiefly descent and succession to a legendary chief named
Larkelon who had purportedly conquered Bikini Atoll with a
group of followers in the distant past.
In large measure, the identity of Bikinians was derived from
the fact that they possessed rights to Bikini land, and they held
those rights because their ancestors had conquered the atoll.
The entire social order of their community was largely defined
and structured by land rights inherited from previous genera-
tions.
The lineage was one type of landholding corporation. The
typical unit of a lineage’s estate consisted of a strip of land
which traversed the width of an islet from lagoon beach to
ocean reef. In most instances, a lineage held as its estate a
number of such parcels on several islets in the atoll. The head of
a corporate lineage was an alab in brij ‘head of land’ as well as
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an alab in bwij ‘head of lineage’. A male who headed a segment
of a lineage that was only part of a larger landholding lineage
was simply ‘head of lineage (segment)’.
The rights and privileges of the lineage head distinguished
him from his lineage mates. He had authority over the use of the
land and oversaw the distribution of its resources. He alone was
privileged to a disproportionate share of money earned from
copra and usually retained one-fourth of the receipts. He used
some of the money for personal wants and theoretically allo-
cated some among his lineage mates when they were in need.
The headman represented the interests of his lineage in com-
munity affairs. Lineage members under his authority were ri-
jerbal ro ‘workers’. They had inalienable rights to their lineage’s
land; those rights may be referred to as ‘worker rights’, and
they entitled the lineage member to a share of resources de-
rived from the land and the prerogative of residing on it. The
spouses of lineage members and the children of lineage males
also had usufruct rights to the lineage’s land. They shared in
its products and could reside on it. Children often grew up on a
portion of their father’s lineage land. Later, as married adults,
they could and often did continue to exercise their usufruct.
The estate of a lineage was clearly distinguished from two
other categories of property: (1) land to which a set of siblings
had received both headman and worker rights from their father
and (2) land to which an individual had received all rights
in exchange for a service rendered. Ideally, only a headman
could make such a transfer of land rights. In the event that
a headman was the sole surviving member of his lineage, he
held the land with his own children, and his children inherited
both categories of rights to it. If the headman was the head
of a viable lineage, he supposedly obtained the consent of his
lineage mates before he could set aside land for himself and his
offspring. In either instance, a headman and his children who
held land together constituted a patricentered landholding cor-
poration.
The eldest male of a set of siblings who formed a corporation
with their father became the headman with authority over the
land upon the latter’s death. (Such a male was always alab in
brij ‘head of land’, but he was not necessarily alab in bwij ‘head
of lineage’ or a segment thereof.) His rights as headman were
equal to those of heads of the corporate lineages, and he rep-
resented the interests of his siblings in community affairs. The
siblings had three alternatives as to how they could manage
the land. They could hold the land as a matrilineage composed
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only of themselves and their matrilineal offspring (that is, the
children of the female members of the sibling set). Secondly, all
rights to the land could be given to the children of the males
who had first acquired it from their father; that is, once land
had been alienated from a lineage, headman and worker rights
could be inherited through males. Lastly, siblings could employ
a combination of the first two options. In any case, land that
siblings received from their father was theirs and theirs alone.
Neither the head of their own lineage nor other lineage mates
had claim to it.
The alternative forms of inheritance provided both a certain
flexibility in the land tenure system and a set of mechanisms
that were manipulated as islanders attempted to maximize the
amount of land to which they could claim some right. Children
who established themselves on land belonging to their father’s
lineage and remained after his death sometimes claimed that
they had inherited all rights to it. Such claims were challenged
by members of the father’s lineage, but such disputes were
seldom resolved.
Gifts of land in exchange for a service rendered were not
common. In pre-European times, chiefs rewarded allies who had
supported them in intracommunity conflicts with gifts of land.
In the decades immediately prior to relocation, only one land
parcel was given in such payment—for constructing a canoe for
a headman.
Of the eleven men, including chief Juda, who were headmen
at the time of relocation, four were the last surviving members
of their lineages and headed patricentered corporations com-
posed of themselves and their own children. Five others were
heads of corporate lineages. The tenth headman was the eldest
of a sibling set which had recently received land from their
father, and it was not yet discernible how they would manage
the future disposition of rights to it. The eleventh headman was
the recipient of the only parcel of gift land in recent years. The
eleven headmen were not of equal rank within the structure of
the several lineages, but nonetheless, having control over the
atoll’s land, they had power and influence and were the tradi-
tional leaders of the community who had formed the council at
the suggestion of the Americans.
In addition to disputes and grievances over land, the history
of the succession of Bikini chiefs before Juda’s incumbency
further reveals the intensity of the competition over land and
the traditional relationship between control of land and power,
influence, and privilege. In pre-European times, the senior Ijjirik
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lineage held a disproportionate share of Bikini’s land, and the
holdings provided a warrant for the chiefly status of its head.
Before the suppression of warfare by missionaries and the
German colonial government, Ijjirik males engaged in a con-
tinuous struggle for land and power. Younger brothers plotted
against elder brothers; nephews conspired against their ma-
ternal uncles. Genealogical evidence reveals that no fewer than
ten males were murdered in the three ascending Ijjirik genera-
tions above Juda. The last of the assassinations occurred around
the turn of this century when the eldest of Juda’s three ma-
ternal uncles came to power by the murder of his own mother’s
brother.
During the lifetimes of Juda’s maternal uncles, the senior
Ijjirik lineage began to decline in size, and it was evident that
it would become extinct. Juda’s maternal uncles had numerous
children in Makaoliej and Rinamu lineages, however, and they
transferred the bulk of their lineage’s land to them. As a conse-
quence, father to child inheritance of land rights was frequent
in the decades before relocation. By the time of Juda’s suc-
cession to office, the power and influence traditionally asso-
ciated with the chieftainship were greatly diminished because
much of what once was chiefly land had been alienated.
Nonetheless, the chieftainship remained a political prize,
and Juda’s right to succeed was challenged by males of a junior
Ijjirik lineage. The Ijjirik clan was composed of three lineages.
Juda, his aged mother, and his elder brother were the last sur-
viving members of the senior lineage. (Juda’s brother was quite
old when the last of their maternal uncles died, and he had vol-
untarily declined the office in favor of Juda.) The head of the
second ranking lineage was of the same Ijjirik generation as
Juda.
The third and junior lineage, however, was headed by a
male of the first ascending generation above that of Juda’s.
Given the structural ambiguity in the system of rank and suc-
cession, the head of the junior lineage was able to claim that he
was entitled to succeed Juda’s mother’s brother because they
were of the same generation and that seniority of generation
took precedence over seniority of lineage. He was supported
by his younger brother, who was the most vociferous and ag-
gressive in attempting to legitimize their claim. He argued that
his elder brother was not only the legitimate successor to the
chieftainship, but that the land once controlled by the chiefs
should never have been alienated and should revert to Ijjirik
and hence to his brother’s control.
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The head of the second ranking Ijjirik lineage supported
Juda’s succession. With Juda in office, he was to become Juda’s
heir presumptive and serve as his immediate subordinate, ex-
ecutive officer, and confidant. Other details pertaining to the
dispute are not known. It is certain that the majority of
headmen recognized Juda as the rightful successor to his
mother’s brother. Juda’s status as head of the community was
greatly enhanced when he was named magistrate by the other
headmen and was recognized as such by the Americans. Non-
traditional means of securing power and influence had been in-
troduced, and subsequent events indicate that Juda took full
advantage of American support and recognition to secure his
own position.
The domestic organization of the community also reflected
the traditional relationship between power, influence, privilege,
and control of land. The islanders were divided into eleven
extended family units which constituted “households” (Spoehr
1949:103). A household was a group which shared adjacent
dwellings clustered about a cookhouse. Each household was
headed by one of the headmen, and in all but two instances it
was situated on land controlled by him. Affairs of the household
were directed by its headman, and its members contributed
to a common larder and accomplished tasks associated with
everyday life.
Members of the eleven households occupied a total of
twenty-six dwellings, which were dispersed over adjacent land
parcels on the largest islet in the atoll. The households varied
considerably in size and composition. They ranged from seven
to twenty-five members with an average size of about fifteen.
Variability in household composition reflected the system of
land rights. As an individual had rights to the land of both his
or her father and mother, a married couple had the option of
residing with either set of parents; there were no prescribed
rules of postmarital residence. Smaller households were little
more than nuclear families with one or more attached relatives.
Larger units were either bilateral extended families (which in-
cluded some of the headman’s children of both sexes with their
spouses and children) or joint-sibling units formed by siblings
with their spouses and offspring. Also reflecting the latitude
provided by the system of land rights, the households were
flexible units which gained and lost members in a casual way
as young marrieds occasionally moved between parental house-
holds.
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The land parcels on which the households were situated
were divided into three districts. Each was composed of ad-
jacent parcels and was headed by one of its senior ranking
headmen who had authority over district affairs.
RELOCATION AND REORGANIZATION
The move to Rongerik precipitated little immediate change in
the organization of the community. The same number of
dwellings that had existed at Bikini were built at Rongerik,
and the composition of most households remained relatively un-
changed. Land was never divided at Rongerik, and thus the
households were no longer associated with landholdings.
Juda began to emerge as a figure of prominence and in-
fluence during the initial years of relocation. At Kwajalein he
played a key role in the community’s line of communication with
the administration. Other headmen, however, suffered some
eclipse of their power and influence as they no longer controlled
essential resources. Others were no longer dependent on them,
and employment meant an unprecedented degree of freedom
and economic independence for most adults.
The first clear indications that a redistribution of power, in-
fluence, and privilege was occurring in the community were
manifest when the islanders were resettled on Kili. Houses were
constructed in a compact area along a roadway which parallels
one of the island’s shores. A path intersects the roadway at mid-
point, and it became a boundary between two village districts.
Dwellings to the east of it became Jitaken (‘upwind’) and those
to the west became Jitoen (‘downwind’). A total of thirty-five
dwellings, nine more than at Bikini and Rongerik, were built. As
dwellings were completed, the council allotted them to family
units, and seventeen households were formed when several of
the former ones became divided.
In part, the increased number of households was a conse-
quence of the fact that a greater number of dwellings were
available and that the population had increased (through births
and individuals rejoining the community) to over 180. Other
factors, however, appear to have been more important in ac-
counting for the increase in households. The fission of some of
the former units reflected alterations in the spheres of influence
of some of the headmen. The newly created households were
headed by younger brothers or maternal nephews of lineage
heads, and that several of them established their own domestic
EXILES AND MIGRANTS IN OCEANIA
83
units on Kili was an early indication that they were acquiring
some degree of independence from the traditional figures of au-
thority.
Changes in residential alignments were also a factor in the
emergence of Juda’s subordinate, the head of the second
ranking Ijjirik lineage, to a position of greater prominence. At
Bikini, he had been subordinate to Juda for reasons of residence
as well as lineage rank. His and Juda’s households were in the
same Bikini village district, and he was second to Juda in dis-
trict affairs. At Rongerik, he had emerged as an imporant figure
overseeing part of the communal system. With the Kili reset-
tlement, he acquired more influence. During the construction
of the village, Juda took the first dwelling completed in Jitaken.
Later, Juda’s subordinate was established in Jitoen. As the
highest-ranking Ijjirik male in Jitoen and Juda’s executive of-
ficer, and on the strength of his own forceful personality, he was
soon recognized as its headman. Juda headed his own Jitaken
district and remained chief and magistrate of the entire com-
munity.
The tasks of clearing the overgrowth that had engulfed
the coconut groves during the years that Kili was uninhabited
and the planting of more subsistence crops were left to the
Bikinians. The communal system of labor and food allocation
that had emerged on Rongerik was initially maintained, but by
1950 it was clear that this stop-gap organization had become in-
effective. People were not motivated to improve land that was
communally held. Food shortages also posed critical problems.
The available food resources on Kili were consumed during the
first months of the settlement, and the inexperience of Bikinians
at agricultural tasks resulted in failure to establish an ade-
quate subsistence base. Moreover, rough seas frequently pre-
vented the sale of copra and the landing of cargo. By 1950, food
shortages were severe. The Bikinians became quite negative
about Kili and demoralized and disaffected with their leaders.
This situation continued through 1953, despite the adminis-
tration’s attempts to get Bikinians to abandon the communal
system and divide their land. Unknown to the administration,
the Bikinians had in fact been discussing such a possibility from
the outset. They had kept their deliberations to themselves,
however, because they did not want to make an overt com-
mitment to Kili—they wanted to be returned to Bikini or to be
resettled elsewhere (preferably on an atoll), and they wanted to
force the Americans to provide more support for them if they
had to remain on Kili.
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An even more serious stumbling block to a land division
was the problem of deciding how to divide the island. The
headmen had already suffered a decline in their authority as
Juda’s stature rose. They had a vested interest in reestablishing
their control over land, but all the old grievances over inequities
in landholdings came to the fore. Those who had controlled a
disproportionate share of land were intent on perpetuating the
disparity. Others demanded a larger share than they had pre-
viously enjoyed, and Kili’s small size exacerbated everyone’s
concern over land. Thus discussions of land division only re-
sulted in deadlock.
In their debates over land, the headmen gave little
consideration to what groups could be allotted land. Bikini land-
holding corporations could not have been reconstituted for the
division of Kili. Some individuals had belonged to both a cor-
porate lineage and a patricentered corporation whereas others
had only belonged to a corporate lineage. Individuals of the
latter category would not have agreed to a division of land
among the Bikini landholding corporations because such a
course of action would have allowed others to have membership
in two groups. For a land division to occur, discrete groups
of individuals had to be delineated, and reorganization of the
community was inevitable. That new groups had to be formed
probably became apparent to the Bikinians when eight of the
headmen’s younger brothers and maternal nephews made
known their ambitions to become headmen in their own right.
The majority of these were men who had established new house-
holds on Kili. They refused to have their subordinate status per-
petuated, and a few threatened to leave the community if their
ambitions were not realized.
Several events coincided in late 1953 and early 1954 to
precipitate an allocation of land. The communal effort had failed
completely; people wanted land of their own. The adminis-
tration explored the possibility of relocating the community
again, but the proposed site was rejected as unsuitable. To
salvage the Kili settlement, a community development program
was initiated to provide instruction in agricultural techniques,
increase copra production, and develop a cooperative to
manage trading operations. The inauguration of the project
made a return to Bikini appear highly unlikely.
At this critical juncture, chief Juda devised a land division
scheme. He proposed that each household be allotted land in
proportion to the number of its members. Land was to be as-
signed to each household as a unit; neither lineage membership
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nor Bikini landholding corporations were considered relevant.
Juda approached the headmen informally and individually to
argue that a division was necessary because of the people’s dis-
content with the communal system and the likelihood that they
would remain on Kili. Several were reluctant, but after some
persuasion Juda’s plan was accepted.
Juda and the headmen directed the land allotment, but it
was accomplished with considerable difficulty. Everyone wanted
land near the village; not all sections of the island were of
equal quality, and there were disagreements over who would re-
ceive what land. Juda negotiated a series of compromises, and
with the exception of the taro swamp and village area, Kili was
divided among nineteen groups. The term bamli ‘family’ was
adopted to refer to the new landholding units.
Not only did Juda’s scheme and the compromises negotiated
during its implementation accommodate the ambitions of the
eight males of junior status who demanded to become headmen
in their own right. It also solved the problem of delineating dis-
crete groupings of individuals for the purpose of dividing land.
The head of each family unit was recognized as ‘head of land’ as
well as head of his own family corporation. As in the past, each
headman had authority over his land and the people who had
rights to it. A clear distinction, however, was made between two
categories of headmen. The eleven headmen who had controlled
Bikini land were still thought of as Bikini headmen in contrast
to the eight who had become headmen by reason of the Kili land
division. The latter were referred to as Kili headmen.
Like Juda’s subordinate, the Jitoen headman, the eight Kili
headmen had seized the opportunity of relocation to achieve
positions of greater power and influence. The eight were
members of four of the five corporate matrilineages at Bikini,
and six of them were of high rank within the structure of the
lineages. The six ranked immediately below the heads of Bikini
corporate lineages; that is, they were either next or second to
next in rank and in the line of succession to lineage heads.3
Thus these six males had the advantage of occupying positions
of high rank and stature, and they had advanced their demands
to become headmen from positions of strength and influence
that were second only to the Bikini headmen in the traditional
structure of the community.
The remaining two males who became Kili headmen were
of more junior rank in the structure of the lineages, and they
achieved their new status by other means. They had been
absent from Bikini since Japanese times and were among the
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few expatriates who had returned to the community on Kili;
both had viable alternatives to remaining on Kili if their ambi-
tions were not realized, and as a consequence it appears that
they were more aggressive in their demands than other males of
comparable rank could have been. One of the two adamantly re-
jected any affiliation with the head of his lineage and threatened
to return to the home atoll of his non-Bikini spouse if his wishes
were denied. He had few close kinsmen to call on for support,
and his success appears to have been a consequence of his
own intransigence. The second male was of quite junior status,
but he had considerable experience as a wage laborer at Kwa-
jalein and felt no insecurity about returning there if his ambi-
tions were not realized. He was strongly supported by one of the
older men who became a headman on Kili. The two were allied
by a number of kin ties; further, and more important, the elder
male had been custodian of the Bikini land to which the younger
man held rights during the latter’s absence from the atoll, and
he had every reason to presume that the arrangement would be
perpetuated on Kili if the younger man eventually returned to
Kwajalein.4
As a consequence of the land division, a major redistribution
of power, influence, and privilege had occurred in the com-
munity. The heads of the former corporate lineages were
alienated from their younger brothers or sisters’ sons who had
been their immediate heirs and successors within the former
system of inheritance and succession, and the latter had
become headmen in their own right with control over land on
Kili.
The land division was to have other far-reaching conse-
quences, but its immediate results were exactly what the ad-
ministration had hoped for; each family corporation began to
clear its land and produce copra, and the development project
was launched on a positive course. By mid-1954, encouraging
progress had been made (Riesenberg 1954). The manager of
the Kili development project initiated an imaginative program
wherein Bikinians manufactured handicrafts and other items
for export. Profits from the export trade and copra were sub-
stantial. As capital was accumulated, the community’s small
store was reorganized as a cooperative. Part of the taro swamp
was cleared, and the plantings of taro and other crops were in-
creased. Some Bikinians were optimistic for the first time and
indicated a willingness to remain on Kili if all continued to go
well.
EXILES AND MIGRANTS IN OCEANIA
87
In 1956, a second phase of the project was begun. Land
was provided on nearby Jaluit to supplement Kill’s resources.
The project had some success before typhoons precipitated a
number of reversals in late 1957 and early 1958. Thereafter, the
Bikinians were little better off than they had been during the
early days of the settlement. The quantity of subsistence crops
was somewhat greater than before, but this gain was offset by a
continued increase in the population. Bikinians on Kili increased
in number from approximately 180 islanders in 1948 to over
240 in 1958. A high birth rate remained unchecked during the
next decade: by 1963–1964, the community had increased to
over 280 people; by 1969, the Bikinians on Kili numbered 300.
During the 1960s, the pressure of the expanding population
heightened the Bikinians’ concern over the small size of their
Kili landholdings. Images of Bikini’s twenty-six islets were often
evoked, and the islanders recalled the time when they had a
number of land parcels and not just a single plot. The Bikini
headmen were the most outspoken in their discontent with the
small land parcels. Some claimed that they had not received an
equitable share; others regretted ever having agreed to Juda’s
scheme. The eight men who became headmen as a consequence
of the Kili land division shared in the general discontent over
the small land parcels, but they were pleased with their re-
cently acquired status as headmen. As one of them expressed
it: “Here I have kajur [‘power’]. At Bikini, only the old headmen
had power, but now I have some land here and have power.”
After the land division, the Bikini headmen refused to accept
the eight new headmen as their equals, and they did not rec-
ognize them as legitimate members of the council. The Kili
headmen argued, however, that authority over land and people
had always been associated with the right of political repre-
sentation. Despite the wishes of the Bikini headmen, a few
of the more aggressive Kili headmen began to attend council
meetings. By the mid-1960s, all of them were regularly partici-
pating in its deliberations.
In addition to the creation of a new alignment of power
and influence, the land division resulted in major alterations
in the relations among kinsmen with reference to rights to
land. Rights had always been inherited and defined within the
structural framework of the matrilineages or patricentered cor-
porations. As the membership of the family corporations was
determined largely by household composition at a particular
point in time, and as households included various combinations
of consanguineal and affinal relatives, the former system of
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defining land rights no longer applied. With the exception of
the headman’s rights and privileges, the rights of individuals to
the land of their family corporation were undifferentiated at the
time of the land division. No thought had been given as to how
rights would be inherited or how membership in the family units
would be determined in the future.
Membership in the family corporations could have con-
tinued to be defined by household membership if the units
were altered every time changes in residence occurred because
of marriage, divorce, or reasons of personal preference. Since
the households were always in a state of flux, however, they
would not have been efficient criteria for determining land
rights over time (for further discussion of this point see Goode-
nough 1955:71).
The Bikinians have yet to devise a set of criteria for deter-
mining family membership or access to land rights over time.
They are uncertain as to whether an individual who has married
since the land division should become a member of his spouse’s
unit or have rights to its land. There is no general agreement as
to how children resulting from these recent marriages are to be
incorporated in the landholding units. Most Bikinians, however,
persist in notions derived from the former system of land tenure
and believe that spouses should continue to have access to one
another’s land and that children should have some right to the
land of both parents.
In the absence of norms defining membership of family
corporations, each headman has assumed the prerogative of
determining members himself. This prerogative has provided
the headmen with a new source of power, and they have used
it to manipulate others and extend their spheres of influence.
One headman extended membership in his corporation to his
daughter’s estranged husband on the condition that he return
to his wife, reside with the headman’s household, and con-
tribute to its labor force. In some instances, similar pressures
have been exerted on recently acquired spouses of members
of some family corporations as the headmen have attempted to
bring new affinal relatives under their influence. The headmen
differ, however, in their decisions about extending membership
in their respective units, and there is no overall consistency
among them. With each marriage since the land division, the
husband and wife have retained membership in their original
groups. In some instances these married couples and their
children are being counted as members of both the husband’s
and the wife’s units. In other instances, individuals married
EXILES AND MIGRANTS IN OCEANIA
89
since 1954 are not considered members of each other’s family
corporation, but in some cases their children are being included
as members of both.
Thus the family corporations are expanding in size and their
membership has begun to overlap. Another factor has con-
tributed to this growth and, to a lesser extent, to the overlap
of units. Bikinians who had long been absent from the com-
munity were not included in the family units for the purpose of
the land division. Subsequently, headmen have begun to list as
members of their units absent kinsmen and the latter’s relatives
on other atolls. While this practice has few immediate practical
consequences, it does expand the number of people over whom
headmen claim to have some influence.
It is not yet possible to ascertain what effect the overlap in
membership of family corporations will have. Young islanders
who belong to more than one are beginning to utilize their
potential land rights, and the Bikinians are much concerned
that the overlapping of family membership may create consid-
erable problems. If some criteria for defining membership in the
units are not developed, a large number of people could very
well claim membership in almost every unit within a few gener-
ations.
Initially, the Bikinians were uncertain as to how the rights
of headmen were to be inherited within the framework of the
family corporations. To them, the major issue was whether
members of a headman’s family corporation were his only po-
tential heirs or whether a headman’s matrilineal kin belonging
to other units were to have any claim on his rights. Decisions
have been made in establishing a rule for the inheritance of
headman rights and succession to the headship of most units.
Six headmen have died since the land division. In four cases,
the deceased headmen’s corporations included sons but no ma-
trilineal kin; in each case, the headman’s eldest son has in-
herited his father’s rights and succeeded him as head of the
family corporation. In the fifth case, the deceased headman’s
corporation included his sons and his sisters’ sons. The latter
were among those Bikinians who had been living elsewhere
since Japanese times, and the headman’s eldest son on Kili has
succeeded. (The matter may well be disputed by the deceased
headman’s maternal nephews in the future.) The particulars of
the sixth case are exceedingly complex and cannot be described
in limited space.5
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Of the remaining thirteen family corporations, eight include
none of the headmen’s matrilineal relatives and all include sons
of the headmen. The members of these eight units have decided
that “sons will follow their fathers on Kili”; that is, sons will in-
herit the rights of headmen from their fathers and succeed them
as heads of the family corporations.
Several factors seem to account for the adoption of a pa-
trilineal rule of succession and inheritance of headman rights
by these eight corporations. The precedent for father/son suc-
cession and inheritance had been well established at Bikini.
Further, the composition of these family units is incompatible
with the matrilineal transfer of land rights: headmen’s lineage
mates are not included as members of their family corporations.
Lastly, the precedent established by the family corporations of
deceased headmen undoubtedly influenced the decisions made
by these eight.
If sons succeed and inherit their fathers’ rights as headmen
over a number of generations in the family units described
above, each will probably evolve into a corporation which will
have at its core an agnatically related set of kinsmen who will
succeed to the headship of the unit and inherit headman rights.
It is not yet possible to discern what constellation of kinsmen
will eventually comprise the rest of the membership of each
unit. If the Bikinians persist in their notion that children should
have access to the land of both parents, it may be that children
will inherit membership in the family units of both their parents,
and those units thereby evolve into some variety of cognatic de-
scent units with succession to family headships and the inheri-
tance of headman rights being transmitted patrilineally. In any
event, precedents, and eventually rules, for delineating mem-
bership in the family corporations will probably evolve over
time as the members of each unit make decisions about who
they will and will not include.
The remaining five family units have not made decisions
about the future disposition of headman’s rights. Each includes
the headman’s siblings and a variety of other matrilineal rel-
atives, and all but one also includes one or more of the
headman’s sons. The designation of an heir presumptive in any
of these five corporations would result in disputes or ill feelings
between the headman’s sons and his lineage mates. For the
sake of maintaining harmony, all are avoiding the issue.
Despite these profound changes in the structure of the com-
munity’s landholding corporations, the traditional clan
structure and land tenure system remain important, as became
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clear when Juda died in 1968. Juda’s demise has rekindled the
earlier dispute over succession to the chieftainship. The former
head of the third and junior ranking Ijjirik lineage died before
Juda; his aggressive younger brother has succeeded as head
of the lineage and has vigorously renewed his earlier claims
that Juda was never the legitimate chief, that past injustices
should now be corrected, and that he should succeed because
he is of superior generational standing within the framework
of the Ijjirik clan. He has also renewed his earlier contention
that Bikini land once controlled by the Ijjirik chiefs should never
have been alienated from chiefly hands and should be con-
sidered under his control. Predictably, the head of the second
ranking lineage, who emerged as the head of the Jitoen village
district on Kili and is of the same Ijjirik generation as Juda, re-
jects such claims. As Juda before him, he contends that the head
of a senior ranking lineage is always superior in rank to males of
junior lineages and that he is thereby Juda’s rightful successor.
The Bikinians have elected neither of the claimants as
magistrate, and the offices of magistrate and chief became sep-
arated when they elected another man to the former position.
The new magistrate is the son of Juda’s elder brother and is
a Bikini headman in his own right. Neither contestant for the
chieftainship has supported him; both have their own coterie of
followers, and there is evidence that one of them is actively at-
tempting to undermine the magistrate’s authority as head of the
community.
The administration is either unaware or unconcerned about
the dispute over succession to the chieftainship. The new mag-
istrate, however, has the support of the Americans, and officials
are dealing with the community through him as they formerly
did through Juda. The magistrate is attempting to solidify his
own authority by drawing on his status as a Bikini headman,
the prestige of being the son of a male of chiefly status, and
the support he can garner from administration officials. The
community is divided into opposing political camps, and the
outcome of the contest over positions of power and influence at
the head of the community remains to be determined by the ma-
neuverings of the factions.
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EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Relocation ended the Bikinians’ isolation, and relationships with
three categories of outsiders since 1946 have emerged as dis-
tinct: relations with the paramount chief, with the United States
government, and with other Marshallese. The history of these
relationships is characterized by the Bikinians maneuvering to
sever their relation with the paramount chief while attempting
to make the Americans assume full responsibility for their
welfare. Their apparent success in this venture has affected the
Bikinians’ relations with other Marshallese.
In precontact times, most of the atolls in the Marshalls were
partitioned among the realms of several paramount chiefs. Each
was the head of a chiefly lineage; he, his lineage mates, and
other kinsmen constituted the top stratum of a privileged social
class (see Mason 1947). A paramount chief’s power depended
on the amount of land and the number of kajur ‘commoners’
under his authority.
As a consequence of its isolation and small population, Bikini
was of little interest to the paramount chiefs and remained
outside their domains until post-European times. About 1870, a
certain Kabua came into power and began to extend his domain
in the Ralik chain by conquest. Shortly thereafter, he sent a sub-
ordinate to Bikini with a force of men, and the Bikinians were
persuaded to acknowledge his sovereignty over them. There-
after, they were expected to render tribute; Kabua was expected
to reciprocate, and it was his obligation to protect them and
provide aid in times of disaster.
The German administration recognized the paramount
chiefs as the legal owners of the atolls within their respective
domains. Subsequently, and with the one exception noted below,
the Japanese and the American governments have respected
the arrangement. The rights and obligations of the paramount
chiefs were defined by the Germans and Japanese. They were
guaranteed a percentage of the copra from their lands and
were required to pay taxes levied on their subjects. Under the
Japanese, the chiefs were also responsible for medical expenses
incurred by their subjects. Toward the end of the Japanese era,
the contingent of soldiers who established a weather station at
Bikini informed the islanders that the rights of the paramount
chief had been preempted by the Japanese emperor and the
atoll was now his possession; this claim was later to gain some
significance. The United States, while recognizing the para-
mount chiefs as the legitimate owners of their domains, has
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pursued a laissez-faire policy pertaining to their relations with
their subjects. The chiefs have not been held responsible for
taxes, and the rights and obligations between chiefs and com-
moners have been considered a matter of custom and left to the
islanders.
Historically, Bikini was never very important to Kabua and
his successors. They had their residences at Ailinglablab and
other atolls to the south; Bikini’s distance from the south, the
paucity of its resources, and its small population made it of neg-
ligible value, and the chiefs seldom visited the atoll. With its
selection for Operation Crossroads, however, it became of in-
creased importance and concern.
The initial relocation of the Bikinians undermined the para-
mount chief’s authority over them, and soon after relocation
it became apparent that they were to seize the opportunity to
alter completely their relations with him and the Americans.
After the paramount chief consented to their relocation, he
urged that they be settled on either one of two other atolls
within his realm. Both were inhabited and both were rejected
by the Bikinians in favor of Rongerik. It fell within the domain
of another paramount chief; his permission to resettle the
Bikinians there was secured by the Americans, and no further
consideration was given to the future relationship between the
Bikinians and the two chiefs.
The Bikinians’ harrowing experience at Rongerik provided
them with the grounds for questioning their relations with their
paramount chief. They recalled that it was his responsibility to
aid them in time of need, yet they had received no assistance
from him. Some Bikinians believed that the Americans, particu-
larly the navy, should become their paramount chief because it
had assumed the chief’s traditional obligation of providing aid
in times of disaster.
Despite the fears of some Bikinians that the paramount chief
might respond to such a measure with sorcery, others were con-
vinced by the Americans’ display of power and wealth of the ad-
vantages of permanent alliance with them. The position of those
who wanted the United States to become a surrogate for the
chief was strengthened by their experience at Kwajalein. The
social milieu in which they found themselves at Kwajalein pro-
vided even more impressive evidence of the American’s power
and additional ideological grounds for challenging their tie with
the chief. Some of the Marshallese laborers, for example, ques-
tioned the entire traditional social system which divided people
into privileged and subservient classes. Such questioning of the
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paramount chief’s status was strengthened by naval officers
who encouraged the Bikinians to develop their council as a de-
mocratic institution. The islanders heard much about the con-
cepts of democracy and the rights of individuals, and some
Americans reportedly ridiculed the idea of hereditary chiefs.
Within this context, the paramount chief damaged his own in-
terests by behaving in a high-handed manner and demanding
that Bikinians serve as domestics in his household (Mason
1954:494). They resented his demands and learned from the la-
borers that few paramount chiefs dared to behave in the auto-
cratic manner of former times. They were advised to cast their
lot with the Americans and resolved to do so.
The Bikinians implemented their resolution both ideologi-
cally and strategically. They developed their rationale for sev-
ering ties with the chief by claiming that he had not conquered
their atoll by combat, he had not fulfilled his chiefly responsi-
bility for them before or after relocation, and his chieftainship
had been terminated when Bikini was claimed for the Japanese
emperor during World War IL The Bikinians’ selection of Kili
for resettlement, which was public land and outside any chief’s
domain, left the United States as the only agency with clear au-
thority over and responsibility for them.
The negative attitude toward Kili and lack of progress in
clearing the land in 1950 was in large part a consequence of the
Bikinians’ desire to become dependent on the United States and
return to Bikini. They reiterated that their understanding had
always been that if Bikini was not destroyed by the bomb tests,
then their relocation was to be only temporary. After their ex-
perience with the Americans, they knew that the United States
could easily provide for them. They claimed: “The Navy told
us we could live anywhere … even on a sand island. The Navy
would take care of us, we were told, until we went back to
Bikini” (Drucker 1950:11).
The Bikinians also had come to believe that they had suf-
fered a great injustice and that the United States was morally
obligated to them. They concluded that it would not only be ad-
vantageous but also morally proper that the Americans provide
for them. Their desire to be provided for contributed to their un-
willingness to adjust to Kili; their lack of effort contributed to
their discomfort; and their discomfort reinforced their negative
attitude toward Kili and their desire to receive aid from the
United States. In their dealings with Americans, the Bikinians
elaborated on the undesirable features of Kill and extolled the
virtues of Bikini; the atoll came to be remembered as “an
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oceanic land of milk and honey” where want and discomfort
were unknown (Drucker 1950). Because of the confinement im-
posed by the heavy surf during winter months, Kili came to be
referred to as a ‘calaboose’, and children were taught to repeat
Kili enana ‘Kili, it is bad’ for the benefit of all visitors.
Bikinians’ fears and their dissatisfaction with Kili were
exacerbated in 1951 as civilian personnel replaced naval ad-
ministrators in the transference of the Trust Territory from
the Navy Department to the Department of the Interior. They
were opposed to the new administrators’ attempts to persuade
them to develop Kili. Their refusal to divide the land was one
strategy for managing their relations with the Americans, espe-
cially while their relationship to the paramount chief remained
unresolved. The chief was trying to persuade the administration
to give him title to Kili as compensation for his loss of Bikini.
When an agreement to this effect was drawn up, the Bikinians
unanimously rejected it, countering with repeated requests for
formal severance of their relationship with the chief (Mason
1954:494). Moreover, when the community did divide the land,
the fact was concealed for as long as possible lest the adminis-
tration conclude that the people were committed to permanent
residence on Kili (Tobin 1954).
The eclipse of the paramount chief’s authority in the
community corresponded to an increase in Juda’s authority and
influence. Although he was unprepared for his leadership role
in the relocated community at the outset, his experience as
community spokesman on Rongerik, Kwajalein, and Kili and his
representation of the community in the Marshall Islands Con-
gress beginning in 1950 resulted in his personal maturation
and esteem from the community. As his initial indecision gave
way to skill and self-confidence, his influence in the community
and his influence with American administrators grew and rein-
forced one another. Evidence of his influence is seen in his suc-
cessful negotiation of the land division and the overwhelming
majority of votes he received in every election held on Kili. He
also played a crucial role in the administration’s development
project when it was implemented in 1954. He lent his support
to the program, coordinated the efforts of the project manager
with the council, and encouraged people to make a go of it
on Kili. The project’s initial success and the optimism it gen-
erated among some Bikinians were in large part a consequence
of Juda’s influence. Juda continued his support for the project
when it entered its second phase in 1956 and Japanese prewar
landholdings on nearby Jaluit Atoll were made available to the
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Bikinians. The administration planned that colonists from Kili
could develop the Jaluit lands and enlarge the community’s re-
source base. A sheltered anchorage was available at Jaluit, and
a 50-foot vessel was provided so the Bikinians could make the
short run to Kili during calms in the winter seas. The Bikinians
were enthusiastic about the vessel, but they did not view the
prospect of living next to the people of Jaluit with favor and did
not want to divide their community to form a colony. Further,
they feared that the Jaluit people would view it as an en-
croachment upon their territory.
The people’s attitude changed when an agreement over
Bikini, Kili, and the Jaluit lands was concluded. After much ne-
gotiation, the Bikinians granted the United States indefinite use
rights of Bikini in exchange for monetary compensation and full
and legal use rights to Kili and the Jaluit lands. Compensation
amounted to an initial $25,000 payment and a $300,000 trust
fund yielding semiannual interest payments of about $5,000.
The paramount chief was not included in the settlement, and
the Bikinians interpreted this as American confirmation of their
goal to terminate the chief’s claim on their allegiance and land.
In their view, a major objective had been achieved; their
strategy of dealing with the chief and the United States had
been successful. The administration attempted to conclude a
separate agreement with the chief, but he refused and has
never wavered in his claim that he has been unjustly deprived
of his land and subjects.
The Bikinians viewed the financial settlement as payment
for their Bikini land, and it was determined that every individual
who held land rights at Bikini was entitled to share in its distri-
bution by the council. Every Bikinian on Kili received an equal
sum, and those who were resident elsewhere were allotted
smaller shares. Bikinians who had left Bikini before the com-
munity’s relocation were counted among the absentees along
with their non-Bikini spouses and children. A similar pattern
of distribution was devised for the interest payments (Kiste
1968:335–343; Mason 1958).
Since the financial settlement was viewed as compensation
for their loss of Bikini land, it was further determined that Bikini
headmen were entitled to a larger share of the money than
others because they had always received a disproportionately
large share of copra receipts gained from the land. Accord-
ingly, every Bikinian gave a small portion of his share of both
the lump-sum payment and each interest payment to the head
of the corporate lineage to which he had belonged at Bikini.
EXILES AND MIGRANTS IN OCEANIA
97
Children born after relocation were counted as members of
their mother’s lineage, just as they would have been at Bikini,
and paid a share of their money to the lineage head. In addition,
siblings who had also held land with their own father separate
from the lineage land paid their father because he had been the
authority over their patricentered corporation. In short, every
Bikinian paid a portion of the money he received in the set-
tlement to the heads of the landholding corporations to which
he had belonged at Bikini.
The distribution of the financial settlement and the payment
of special shares to Bikini headmen were based on the system
of inheritance and succession which had prevailed at Bikini, not
on the new land tenure scheme and the patterns of inheritance
and succession that were emerging on Kili. The Bikinians were
clearly working with two systems of land rights—the family
system devised on Kili and the traditional one at Bikini. The fi-
nancial settlement had come to represent Bikini land; its distri-
bution, including the payments to Bikini headmen, symbolized
those networks of social relations and groups which had been
delineated by the traditional system (see chapter 6).
The agreement with the United States also had a positive
effect on the Bikinians’ morale and attitude. The council se-
lected colonists for the Jaluit lands who were rotated between
Kili and Jaluit. Colonists varied in number from twenty to
twenty-five at any one time. Development of the Jaluit lands
began under the supervision of the project manager. Bikini men
manned their vessel under the direction of an experienced Mar-
shallese captain hired by the administration. The vessel sailed
between the Jaluit colony and Kili, and occasional voyages were
made to Majuro and other atolls. The overall progress of the
entire project caused optimism among all observers, and it
appeared that the Bikinians might adjust to their new envi-
ronment.
The optimism ended with the typhoons of late 1957 and
early 1958. Both the colony and the vessel were destroyed.
Trees were severely damaged on Kili, the cooperative suffered
heavy losses, seawater washed into the taro swamp, and most
other agricultural development was undone. What gains had
been made in increasing the quantity of subsistence crops were
offset by the ever-expanding population.
The project was abandoned by the administration as its ef-
forts were diverted to atolls which had suffered even greater
devastation from the storms. Relief foods were given the
Bikinians immediately after the disaster, but supplies still ran
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short or could not be gotten ashore because of rough seas. In
mid-1958, the Bikinians were placed on a relief food program,
and when cargo could be landed, they were provided with sub-
stantial quantities of rice and flour at three-month intervals over
the next year and a half. The resources of their once flourishing
cooperative were largely depleted, however, and it began to fail.
By 1961, most of Kill’s trees had recovered, but no sub-
stantial effort had been made to reestablish other crops. The
Bikinians had clearly come to prefer food subsidies over ex-
pending their energies on agricultural endeavors; from their
experiences, they were quite certain that the Americans could
provide for their every want if they could only be persuaded to
do so.
Efforts at creating a dependency relationship upon the
United States were renewed. Dwellings on Kili were in very
bad repair by the early 1960s. Islanders had repaired their
homes with thatch, but they made repeated requests to be sup-
plied with more durable imported building materials. The ad-
ministration encouraged them to make their own purchases
with their interest payments. The Bikinians countered that the
money was compensation for their loss of Bikini and it was
unfair to ask them to spend it on the necessities of life on Kili.
They argued that it was the responsibility of the United States
to provide housing on Kili because it was responsible for their
relocation.
The administration once again considered moving the
Bikinians from Kili, and the possibility was discussed with them
more than once. On one occasion, Juda quite eloquently stated
the political stance the Bikinians had evolved over the years.
He made it clear that they wished to remain free of the para-
mount chief and in their opinion the United States was morally
obligated to assume responsibility for their welfare:6
I would like to give you some history of Kili Island. We were
moved here by the government 10 years ago. It was not the place
we wanted to go to but the government decided that we should
live here. In all these years we have tried to live here but there
are many things that have come up which make it very difficult
for us to make a living here. Today is a good example of what has
happened in the past 10 years; it is too rough to work copra, so we
are unable to sell our copra and buy food. It doesn’t matter how
long a ship waits off of Kili, if it is rough it is rough and we cannot
get our copra to the ship or bring in food. Our group of people
here is getting larger every year and is increasing every year. It
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is difficult to take care of these people and the island is too small
for them to live on. In a little while there will not be enough copra
on the island to feed all the people.
The relocation of the Kili people is up to the Government. We
would like to return to Bikini which is our home but realize that
we cannot do this as the Atomic Energy Commission is using it
for exploding of bombs. We also know that Bikini plays a big part
in world affairs and we realize this importance. The government
moved us and not our paramount chief. If the paramount chief had
moved us then it would be up to him to find another place for us.
We want to move to government land and will not move to lands
owned by the paramount chief.
Bikini is larger than Kili and we had plenty of land and a
big lagoon. The government moved us; therefore, it is up to the
government to find us a new place which is larger than Kili and
better for the people.
Now the government knows our condition, it is therefore up
to the government to find us a place.
No adequate site was found, and within the year the Bikinians
were told that they would remain on Kili.
The 1960s brought no relief from the discomforts the is-
landers have always known on Kili. The unchecked birth rate
only exacerbated matters. Even before relocation, few indi-
viduals would journey to Kwajalein to spend short periods as
wage laborers, but as the Bikinians grew more discouraged with
their lot on Kili, people were motivated to leave the island in
increasing numbers to find employment at Kwajalein. Some re-
mained but a few months; others spent much more time at the
military base. Some traveled to Majuro to complain, and their
frequent appearances at the district offices became known as
the “usual Kili recreation.”
Those working on Kwajalein, which had become an elab-
orate missile research installation, observed not only American
technology but also an affluent American life-style. Bikinians
saw the Americans’ stores, buildings, gadgetry, swimming
pools, golf courses, and, for those working as domestics, their
home life. These experiences profoundly reinforced Bikinians’
thinking and political strategy. The range of imported goods and
the Bikinians’ taste for them was broadened. Their belief that
the Americans could easily provide for them was strengthened.
This served to deepen discontent over their situation on Kili
and to enhance their belief that they had been done a great in-
justice. These beliefs were intensified by developments related
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to their interest payments, which they used mainly to buy trade
goods. First, as their population increased, individual shares of
the interest payments decreased. Second, the people of Kwa-
jalein received $750,000 for a lease on land occupied by the mil-
itary. A sum of $950,000 was paid to the people of Rongelab as
compensation for damages to health and discomfort caused by
radioactive fallout from one of the Bikini tests. The Bikinians
compared these cash settlements with their own and became
further convinced of the injustice of their own treatment by the
government. Their position—that the United States was respon-
sible for their situation and its remedies—was made concrete
in continued demands for additional financial compensation and
their removal from Kili.
By 1968, the Bikinians’ strategies appeared to have borne
fruit. In response to continued pressure, the administration had
Bikini evaluated for possible human habitation by the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC). In August 1968, the president of
the United States announced that with the exception of a few
small islets, most of Bikini Atoll was judged safe for human oc-
cupation and Bikinians would be returned (U.S. Department of
State 1968:304).
The Bikinians once again received the attention of the world
news media, and reporters traveled to Kili and Bikini to gather
materials that appeared in magazines and newspapers around
the globe.7 In 1969, a rehabilitation program for Bikini was
begun at an eventual cost of over $3 million. Scrub vegetation
which had overgrown Bikini’s islets, and massive amounts of
debris from nuclear tests, were cleared by the AEC and military
agencies. A party of about thirty Bikini men was employed to
begin replanting the atoll under the supervision of American
agriculturists. After its initial cleanup phase, the project was
turned over to the Trust Territory. The main body of the com-
munity remained on Kili, however, because the newly planted
palms would require eight or more years to mature. As an
interim measure to alleviate the islanders’ discomfort, funds
amounting to about $100,000 were provided for new housing
materials on Kili.
The Bikinians responded to their apparent successes by
pressing claims for further concessions. They rejected the ad-
ministration’s assumption that they would provide the labor
for the housing project on Kili. The Bikinians demanded to
be paid for their labor, and the administration agreed. In De-
cember 1969, the community petitioned the high commissioner
of the Trust Territory, albeit unsuccessfully, for compensation
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for damages to Bikini and for discomforts suffered in the
amount of $ 100 million. During the summer of 1970, Bikinians
contacted a law firm on Guam to explore the advantages of legal
counsel. At the same time, Bikinians working on Bikini went on
strike, claiming inadequate working conditions and an inade-
quate job of clearing debris by the AEC. The strike was settled,
but the details are not available. Meanwhile, having failed to es-
tablish a working relationship with the Guam law firm, Bikinians
obtained the assistance of the Micronesian Legal Services Cor-
poration, an agency funded by the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity, in order to press their claims for compensation and to
expedite work on Bikini.
Predictably, once it appeared that the Bikinians would be
returning home, the paramount chief tried to reassert his au-
thority over them. He gathered supporters among Bikinians
living on other atolls. These were almost entirely people (and
their descendants) who had been absent from the community
since before its initial relocation, and many were the offspring
of Bikinians who had gone to serve in the paramount chief’s
residence at Ailinglablab decades ago. As Bikinians on Kili re-
mained adamant vis-à-vis the chief, further confrontations ap-
peared inevitable.
The Bikinians also began to reevaluate Kili. Some talked of
remaining on Kili to exploit the coconut groves; others, espe-
cially young people, were questioning the desirability of life on a
remote atoll. The entire community, however, believed that they
should retain Kili and the Jaluit lands as well as having Bikini
returned to them.
The Bikinians’ experiences since relocation have resulted in
substantial changes in their relations with other Marshallese.
Their negative self-image as backward, unsophisticated people
before relocation was reinforced by their early contacts on Kwa-
jalein and Jaluit and by their desire to maintain the integrity
and isolation of their community. This influenced their selection
of both Rongerik and Kili as relocation sites; as both were
uninhabited, they eliminated the necessity of extensive inter-
action with other Marshallese, among whom the Bikinians were
stigmatized and made to feel uncomfortable. An example of the
stigmatization of Bikinians was an incident on Kwajalein when
two Marshallese laborers involved with Bikini women were ad-
vised by their fellows not to marry such backward people. By
the late 1960s, however, Bikinians’ own self-image had
changed, as had the regard in which they came to be held by
other Marshallese.
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The change in the Bikinians’ relations with other Mar-
shallese is due in large part to the opportunities for acquiring
experience on other islands during their relocations and reset-
tlement on Kili. As early as the 1950s, and in addition to the
few Bikinians who traveled to Kwajalein to work as laborers,
some went to Majuro for medical treatment and meetings of the
Marshall Islands Congress and the Association of Marshallese
Churches. Bikinians who worked as colonists on Jaluit in the
late 1950s had frequent contact with the islanders of that atoll.
By the 1960s, the increased flow of Bikinians to Kwajalein gave
them even more experience with others, and many Bikinians
became less hesitant to leave Kili to find work, attend meetings,
and seek medical care and schooling. Since a few Bikini families
had established residences on Majuro and Kwajalein, migrants
had the security of kin and friends with whom to stay or gather.
The Bikinians’ success in dealing with the paramount chief
and the Americans has also been important in the change in
their relations with other Marshallese. Establishing their inde-
pendence from the paramount chief has won them the admi-
ration of other islanders. The success of the Bikinians’ dealings
with the American administration has vastly increased their
own self-confidence and sophistication and has also earned
them the respect of other Marshallese. Thus the present ease
with which Bikinians interact with other Marshallese is in part
an outcome of their relations with the paramount chief and the
administration.
Indicative of the changing quality of Bikinians’ relations
with other Marshallese is the increasing frequency of intermar-
riage between them. Before relocation, nine of the Bikinians
living on other atolls had non-Bikini spouses. By the mid-1960s,
this number had risen to twenty-four. The number of in-married
spouses on Kili had increased over pre-relocation times, but
only slightly, since Kili was no more attractive to other Mar-
shallese than it was to Bikinians. Furthermore, non-Bikini
spouses came from a larger number of atolls than in former
times.
Another indication of the Bikinians’ changing relations with
others is the nature of recent immigration to Kili. Given the
prospect of a return to Bikini, the possibility of retaining Kili
and the Jaluit lands, and the Bikinians’ present reputation,
Bikini clansmen from other atolls have begun to join the com-
munity on Kili. The island’s population increased from three
hundred to four hundred between 1969 and 1972 as long-lost
kinsmen, their non-Bikini spouses, and their children and grand-
EXILES AND MIGRANTS IN OCEANIA
103
children “returned” to the community. Because of the potential
advantages involved, islanders who had formerly defined them-
selves as members of other atoll communities are now calling
themselves Bikinians.
CONCLUSIONS
As the foregoing analysis reveals, the modifications of the social
organization of the Bikini community and its altered relations
with the Americans and the paramount chief may be attributed
to competition over the distribution of power, influence, priv-
ilege, and control of valued resources. The motivations to gain
advantage in the pursuit of these goals were traditionally fo-
cused on land and were not new with relocation. Rather, they
are an integral facet of Marshallese culture and society and ac-
count for certain events of the past: intracommunity conflicts at
Bikini and interatoll warfare in the Marshalls.
For the Bikinians, relocation was just another set of circum-
stances, albeit unique and extraordinary, that could be em-
ployed in the pursuit of traditional ends. In reference to the
internal organization of the community, the necessity of reestab-
lishing residences and allocating land on a new island provided
certain males with a new opportunity. Those who occupied po-
sitions of advantage within the traditional structure of the com-
munity or were able to advance their ambitions by other means
were now able to challenge the traditional authority structure
and precipitate an allocation of land which restructured the
entire community. The adoption of a patrilineal rule for de-
termining the inheritance of the land rights of headmen and
succession to the status of head of the majority of the family
corporations on Kili represents the transformation of what was
formerly an alternative to matriliny into a prevailing norm.
This transformation may largely be attributed to the incompati-
bility of matrilineal principles with the bilateral structure of the
family corporations. Moreover, adoption of the patrilineal rule
was undoubtedly facilitated by the precedent set by the high in-
cidence of father to son inheritance and succession before re-
location. In any event, patrilineal inheritance and succession
for headmen and the headmen’s assumption of the prerogative
to determine the membership of their family corporations rep-
resent a conscious rejection of the matrilineal principles upon
which the traditional organization of the community was largely
based.
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The status of magistrate as head of the community and the
recognition and support that Americans have given the occu-
pants of that office have created a new form of political au-
thority that is employed in the competition over power and
influence. Both Juda and his successor have used the office to
strengthen their own position in the community. The office has
become established as a political prize. It and the status of tra-
ditional chief have become separated, and it seems certain that
the office of magistrate will emerge as the more powerful and
thus more sought after position in the community.
While the organization of the community on Kili differs from
that of Bikini, the traditional lineage organization and its
authority structure remain a viable part of the Bikinians’ culture
and is given tangible expression twice annually with the dis-
tribution of the income realized from the trust fund. As a con-
sequence, the Bikinians have two conflicting models for deter-
mining relations among kinsmen and the organization of their
community. While there is some conflict of interest between the
Bikini and Kili headmen, islanders compartmentalize and rel-
egate each of the models to separate spheres of reality; the new
social order determines affairs on Kili, and the traditional one
pertains to Bikini.
With regard to relations with figures of power outside their
community, the Bikinians realized from the outset of their
relocations that their subordinate status to the paramount chief
offered few. if any, advantages. They recognized that they could
only achieve their objectives—returning to Bikini and gratifying
the wants they had acquired since relocation—by having the
Americans assume responsibility for their welfare. This re-
quired severing relations with the paramount chief and manip-
ulating the Americans into becoming his surrogate. In essence,
relations between the Bikinians and the Americans have con-
sisted of a long series of negotiations, and the Bikinians have
used continual complaints of irreparable discomfort, neglect,
and injustice and a reinterpretation of their own history as
tactics to justify their actions and desires. These complaints
have established the remedies they insist Americans must
provide. Their history has been reworked to justify their re-
jection of the paramount chief. Portions of their revised history
as well as certain undeniable facts regarding their relocations
have served to place the moral responsibility for their plight
firmly upon the shoulders of the Americans. By determining the
locus of responsibility for their situation, the Bikinians’ total
history has become a political ideology that defines both them-
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selves as victims and their current relations with their former
chief and the colonial power in a single interpretive framework.
The very formulation of this framework, and the fact that it has
been at least partially accepted by the administration, reflects
the increased sophistication of the Bikinians in their dealings
with Americans. Their recent actions—the firm stances taken
vis-à-vis the administration, the workers’ strike at Bikini, the
acquisition of legal counsel—attest that they have shed their
reputation as a backward people. And the changes in their rela-
tions with other Marshallese over the past quarter century are
further evidence of their growing self-confidence and sophisti-
cation in dealing with the world outside their own community.
EPILOGUE
As this volume goes to press, another tragic episode in the
history of the Bikinians is beginning to unfold. It now appears
that the radiological survey conducted at Bikini in the late
1960s, which resulted in the American decision to rehabilitate
the atoll for its former inhabitants, was far from adequate. In
August 1975, a bulletin issued by the Energy Research and
Development Administration (an agency succeeding the AEC)
reported that a recent survey of Bikini has determined that radi-
ation levels on some islets, including the largest one scheduled
for resettlement, are much higher than previously indicated.
A population residing on those islets for any length of time
would be exposed to radiation levels higher than U.S. federal
standards permit (Micronesian Indepen dent 1975a). The advis-
ability of resettling the atoll is now very much in doubt, and
its actual condition is far from certain. In October 1975, the
Bikinians, through their legal counsels, filed a complaint in the
Federal District Court in Honolulu requesting a thorough radi-
ological investigation of Bikini and medical examinations for all
those who have worked on the atoll over the last several years
(Micronesian Independent 1975b).
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MAKING SENSE: A STUDY
OF A BANABAN MEETING
Martin G. Silverman
Chapter6
What we want is not terms that avoid am-
biguity, but terms that clearly reveal the
strategic spots at which ambiguities neces-
sarily arise.
—Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives
INTRODUCTION
The dialectic of action is the dialectic of form and content.
This is, as I understand it, one of the central messages of The
Savage Mind (Lévi-Strauss 1966). The engaging thing about
form and content is how they can shift position and thus become
transformed—form becoming content for other form (e.g., the
“structure of a kinship system” is shown to be a special case
of the “general structure of systems,” or some aspects of the
“structure of a kinship system” are shown to be harmonious
with the “general structure of systems,” or the “structure of a
kinship system” is shown to be impossible given the “general
structure of systems”), content becoming form to other content
(e.g., the “special case” is used to interpret another “subspecial
case,” which interpretation might not, incidentally, fit, pre-
senting people with all sorts of problems to work out). And on it
goes, not randomly but not completely predictably either since,
among other things, form can both order and open a door to
content (some of it uninvited) and content (to mix the metaphor)
can twist form around itself. One man’s form can be another
man’s content and thus they literally “talk past one another.”
Form and content, structuring and becoming structured—most
of our basic theoretical problems are implicit in the pair.
But not only our theoretical problems.
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Even the firmest believer in the untrammeled freedom of
the human intellect would probably concede that being in a sit-
uation of resettlement is something that a people, somehow,
cannot fail to note. Precisely how they note it we are not in a
position to predict; and we are not in a position to predict pre-
cisely how those things that we take to be problematic are or
are not problematic to the local community. There are new faces
and new places, perhaps new subordinations and new equal-
ities; there is new work to be done and new food to eat.
If we are not in a position to predict how a resettled com-
munity might note its situation, neither are those being re-
settled. Not even with the most careful planning, site surveys,
political and economic arrangements made with governments
and future neighbors can people predict what vagaries of en-
vironment, of colonial governments, of neighboring peoples, or,
for that matter, of their own social relationships might confront
them.
We do, however, find that a resettled community may con-
front the unpredictable as a community. It happens often
enough to be significant that these people encounter problems,
events, or situations that demand decisive action as a com-
munity and that integral to the decisions is the necessity of clar-
ifying for themselves who they are in order to determine their
position. The very unpredictabilities inherent in resettlement
(but not, of course, only in resettlement) make such decisions
and their implications for identity likely, if not inevitable. Such
decisions may be as mundane as that of determining how land
clearing will be organized by the Gilbertese resettled on Sidney
Island (see chapter 8) or as dramatic as the bitter debate over
whether the Kapinga relocated on Ponape should divide their
village land for quitclaim to a few families or maintain it for ‘all
Kapinga people’, the definition of which was necessarily at issue
(see chapter 3). In such cases, the definition of the situation,
prerequisite to deciding on a course of action, demands a more
or less conscious attempt at some point to define who and what
the actors and their relations to each other are, have been, and
might be.
It is not only in my own ethnographic case, then, that one
finds events in which people are trying to unscramble some of
the things which have happened and are happening to them
and to chart courses for future action. I am not suggesting that
people necessarily sit down and say to one another that they
will do this, but rather that doing this is known to happen. There
is an attempt to get some important things together in order to
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clarify the dimensions of action. To use Kenneth Burke’s terms,
definitions of the situation and strategies toward the situation
are constructed (Burke 1957).1 And this is an event not (or at
least not primarily) of the recesses of the individual mind but of
the processes of social action.
Clifford Geertz addresses some of these problems in The
Social History of an Indonesian Town, which has been a major
inspiration for the present effort. Speaking of Modjokuto, he
says (1965:5):
Especially the years after the Revolution (that is, after 1940),
when the whirl of innovation engulfed the entire scene, were
marked by an increasing ambiguity of cultural categories coupled
with a growing irregularity of social behavior. And from this
double observation comes the central theoretical argument, also
double, of our study: namely, (1) that ordered social change in-
volves the attainment by the members of the population con-
cerned of novel conceptions of the sorts of individuals and the
sorts of groups (and the nature of the relations among such indi-
viduals and groups) that comprise their immediate social world;
and (2) that such an attainment of conceptual form depends in
turn upon the emergence of institutions through whose very op-
eration the necessary categorizations can be developed and stabi-
lized.
Later on, writing of an election in Modjokuto, Geertz states
(1965:205):
Seen as a crystallizing field, rather than as a collection of func-
tionally interrelated roles, the election involved a clash of clas-
sificatory principles, of categories, embodied in individuals and
in factions, and its outcome was an adjustment, as much con-
ceptual as political, of those principles and categories to one
another in a given case. In one of its aspects (though in one
only) the election was a symbolic, even an intellectual process. It
gave specific meaning to general ideas by filling them with con-
crete persons, groups, institutions, issues, and events. Despite
the tension it caused, the election was considered by even those
who lost to have been a good thing. As they said, it ‘pulled things
taut, put them in straight lines (kentjeng).’ Selecting from a set of
abstract “grammatical” possibilities by means of concrete “pho-
netic” process, it made potential order actual.
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In this chapter I present some aspects of the analysis of an
event which, as it was occurring, became a symbol for a set of
conceptions. The event occurred on Rambi Island, Fiji (map 7).
Since 1945, Rambi has been the home of the people of Ocean
Island, which is part of the British Gilbert and Ellice Islands
Colony. The indigenous name of Ocean Island is Banaba, and
thus its people are known as Banabans. Ocean Island is a “phos-
phate island.” Mining activities since 1900 have progressively
converted the island into a kind of mining settlement, and the
Banabans into a minority in their homeland. Their lands were
literally being exported away for the benefit of others. During
World War II the British government purchased Rambi with in-
vested Banaban phosphate royalties. When the war ended, the
Banabas agreed to go to Rambi on a trial basis and in 1947
decided to stay, while maintaining their rights to Ocean Island
lands on which the mining of phosphate continues to this day.
The population of Rambi is now about two thousand.
The event which is my major concern was a ten-hour
community meeting in November 1964 during which, among
other things, the Banabans were trying to make sense out of
their past and present and give direction to their future. This
chapter is an exploration of how they did it, although only a
minute portion of the meeting can be analyzed in detail. I hope
to demonstrate that a significant part of this “how” consisted
in the setting up of levels of form-content relations among (1)
various actors and actions; (2) the delineation of the terms and
relations of a problematic situation, which included the problem
of how to transform that situation; (3) the building of a structure
for that situation; (4) certain symbols; and (5) the course of
action taken by the meeting.
The event with which I am concerned differs from Geertz’s
Indonesian election in several respects. But there is a signif-
icant class of dramatic events distinguished (for present pur-
poses) by the combination of the following related character-
istics: one of the businesses of the day is the coordinating of
cultural categories; an action outcome is envisaged; the cul-
tural terrain being covered is wide and its categories are multi-
tudinous; many relationships (of a number of orders) are prob-
lematic; the levels of form-content articulations are several and
complex; the process is a social process which may have a form
of its own, or a form may be under construction.
Geertz (1965:203) makes a related point when he speaks of
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Map 7. Relocation from Ocean Island to Rambi.
the paradox of the role of culture—or, if you will, systems of
ideas—in social activity. No actual event (or sequence of events)
can be predicted from them, and no actual event (or sequence of
events) can be explained without them…. Culture orders action
not by determining it but by providing the forms in terms of which
it determines itself.
EXILES AND MIGRANTS IN OCEANIA
111
This chapter is concerned, then, with a concrete process
that may be typical of resettled communities. It is a process
whereby people order knowledge, hopes, experiences, and
feelings and make sense out of them. By making sense out of
them, they are giving form to them, and it is through their cul-
tural categories that form is created. Thus, in giving form, the
Rambi Islanders are using their categories in a social action and
pointing toward a social action; and in so doing they are cre-
ating forms that are not quite the same as before.
The analysis begins with the historical background of the
problems with which the Rambi Islanders had to deal in the
meeting. This discussion is followed by a presentation of the
methodology used to analyze the meeting; then part of the
meeting is described and analyzed. The chapter concludes with
an analysis of the meeting itself as a symbol.
HISTORICAL PROLOGUE
My recent book on the Banabans (Silverman 1971) details many
aspects of their history and culture. Here I shall mention again
some things which are most relevant to the meeting.2
One of the Banabans’ major public concerns is getting a
just recognition of their rights to the Ocean Island phosphate
and the great financial consequences of that recognition. The
phosphate is mined by the British Phosphate Commissioners
(BPC), which has a mining monopoly, the interests of which are
held by the British, Australian, and New Zealand governments.
Speaking in the ethnographic present, the Banabans have no
rights to determine how much phosphate is mined, what the
price per ton (which is well below market price) should be, or
what amount of money they or anyone else should get from
the whole enterprise. In the early phosphate days, the mining
company (a private predecessor of the BPC) dealt with indi-
vidual landowners, but later it began to negotiate with the
Banabans on a collective basis over the leasing of land. This
was important in the development of the people’s political con-
sciousness.3 In a dispute during 1927–1931, the BPC wanted
more land but the Banabans refused its offer. In 1928 the British
colonial government passed an ordinance enabling itself, in
effect, to force mining on lands and to arbitrate compensation
when necessary “in the public interest.” This it did, and the
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Banabans lost even more control over their land—and Ocean
Island land has been and still is, among other things, one of the
most powerful symbols in Banaban culture.
The Ocean Island phosphate is a critical factor in the
economy of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony in a variety
of ways—through royalties, taxes, and wages, for example. Re-
cently the BPC was paying out about ten times as much money
to Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony revenue as it did to the Ba-
nabans. The Banabans bitterly resent this. By the Banaban ad-
viser’s estimate, half the Banabans’ cash income in 1964 was
coming from the phosphate in one form or another; the other
half was coming mainly from copra production. Pertinent both
for the Banabans and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony is the
fact that the phosphate is a dwindling resource. Local estimates
varied on when mining and thus the money from royalties to the
Banabans would cease; some spoke of about twenty years. Un-
certainty as to when phosphate operations would end may ex-
plain why there is no real sense of urgency on Rambi regarding
the economic development urged by government officials. Un-
certainty is one of the dominant qualities of the day.
On Rambi an island council was set up as the instrument
of local government. It has eight members, two elected by
each of the four villages, which are named for those on Ocean
Island. The councillors elect their own chairman.4 According to
a system agreed to by the Banabans in 1947, yearly estimates
of the expenditure of various island funds for the next year
are prepared and sent to the Fiji government for approval. The
council nominates five of its members to the Banaban Funds
Trust Board, which is charged with preparing the estimates.
The estimates must then be approved by the council as a whole
and then by the government. The Banaban adviser, a European,
is chairman of the trust board.
The position of the Banaban adviser is a difficult one. Al-
though he is responsible to the Fiji government, he is paid indi-
rectly from Banaban funds and the council is consulted on his
appointment. The original government conception of the office
was probably something of a combination of district officer
and development officer. The Banabans, however, have come to
define his role as that of their advocate. He is in the classic po-
sition of the man in the middle.
The advocacy is for the related issues of securing just rights
to the phosphate and the recognition of the autonomy of Rambi.
Collective political action vis-à-vis the phosphate has its
chronological roots in confrontations with the phosphate
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company and the government while the people were still on
Ocean Island. It has its cultural roots in the centrality of land
in the Banaban symbolic system. As far as one can tell, political
action on Ocean Island was designed more to achieve recog-
nition of individual rights (to land and thus to money) than to
achieve something material for the collectivity as a collectivity.
The situation on Rambi crystallized the individual/collectivity
contrast into a dilemma for which the Banabans were culturally
unprepared. The reasons why they were unprepared and why it
was a dilemma are interlocked.
On Ocean Island the government and the BPC had provided
equipment and services the Banabans valued.5 These things
were part of what modern life means and what Rambi lacked.
If they wanted to recreate the accoutrements of modern life
on Rambi, the Banabans had to do it for themselves. Since
these conveniences had been provided on Ocean Island, the is-
landers had not had to contemplate the institutionalization of
their newly developed values. Rambi, an undeveloped island,
was a new situation. Individual action could not provide trans-
portation, electricity, and new buildings; some kind of collective
action was necessary. This articulated the “individual/collec-
tivity problem.”
In the Banaban view, the financial proceeds from the phos-
phate are the output of Banaban lands, and Banaban lands are
owned individually, not collectively. The right and proper fate
of the money is thus to go to individuals. The money equals
land equation is shared by the government, which (not uncom-
monly in colonial structures) put itself in the position of arbiter
of Banaban custom. The government for a long time insisted
that from the payments for surface rights individuals should re-
ceive only the interest from the invested capital, since the lands
had to be maintained for future generations and could not be
alienated by an individual’s own will. Since the government as-
serted that there was no real indigenous custom regarding the
ownership of undersurface mining rights, whatever money the
people derive from undersurface mining should be paid to the
community as a community, ideally to be used for community
purposes. Whether the people have a right to such proceeds
or whether they are given by the grace of the crown is am-
biguous. There was also the usual asserted fear that individuals
would fritter away large sums of money if they got them and
that the continuity of large individual payments would reduce
the people’s industriousness and make them dependent on the
BPC. Hence most of the income the Banabans receive from the
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phosphate is not in the form of individual payments but pay-
ments to the Banaban community (which, on Rambi, includes
resident non-Banabans).
The Banabans have drawn on information from Nauru to
form their own case. Nauru, to the west of Ocean Island, is
now independent, but at the time of my research it was an
Australian-administered trusteeship. Nauru is also a phosphate
island; for a long time it was worked by the same phosphate
company that worked Ocean Island. The Nauruans are reported
to receive large individual phosphate returns and to live a com-
fortable modernized life—and they organized a successful cam-
paign of confrontation with the Australian government. The
Banabans see their own basic situation as similar to that of the
Nauruans, compare what they get with what the Nauruans get,
and have been taking action on the Nauruan model.
The individual/collectivity problem is thus situated in the
way the Banabans’ returns from the phosphate are paid out.
Another closely related dimension of the problem is that while
the people recognize that some form of collective action is nec-
essary to get their due, the island council has had a hard time
establishing its legitimacy as a decision-making entity.6 Fur-
thermore, the “development” activities conducted by local au-
thorities are considered far from adequate by local people.
Since most proposals for developing Rambi involve money,
and since the Banabans believe they are being cheated out
of money that is rightfully theirs but could be obtained if the
right course of action were found,7 a number of issues are in-
extricably intertwined for most people: the phosphate issue in
general; what to do with the funds in hand; how to get more
of the money which belongs to the people; how to organize
and govern the new island and secure its autonomy. The money
from Ocean Island lands—all of it—already belongs to the Ban-
abans but is being fraudulently held and used by others, given
the premise that money equals land. It follows that Rambi is
properly autonomous because it was purchased with invested
phosphate royalties, which derive from Ocean Island lands,
which are owned by Banabans. Given these cultural premises,
each issue logically implies the others. All the issues involve
Ocean Island, which by the same logic is a symbol that can
give form to the individual’s sense of himself, his kinsmen (past,
present, and future), village and community, morality, wealth,
and the relationship of the community to the outside world.
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To take one aspect salient to the meeting: a person is a
Banaban by having Banaban blood or being adopted by a Ba-
naban. Being adopted by a Banaban entails receiving some
Ocean Island land from him. When the two are contrasted,
blood symbolizes kinship identity and land symbolizes kinship
code for conduct (see Schneider 1968). Blood and land
structure both kinship and nationality. In the kinds of political
discourse most closely related to the matters we are consid-
ering here, “Banabans” and “landowners” are used inter-
changeably.8
All these issues were articulated during the meeting to be
analyzed. Three matters were frequently cited as central to the
meeting: whether certain individual money payments should be
made; whether the Banaban adviser should be retained or dis-
missed; and the alleged unequal treatment (by the Banaban ad-
viser among others) of employees who had damaged certain
facilities. The third issue merged into others which developed.
In 1937, while still on Ocean Island, the Banabans were
granted annuities of £8 per adult and £4 per child and a yearly
individual bonus based on size of landholdings (up to a certain
limit).9 In the 1947 agreement, when the Banabans voted to stay
on Rambi, the continuation of this system was mentioned. The
Rambi Island Council, however, for some years decided not to
distribute either the annuity or the bonus, but rather to use the
money for building cement block houses and other projects.
The question of distributing the annuity and bonus was
part of the controversy which culminated in the calling of the
meeting by the council. The meeting was a maungatabu, a com-
munity meeting the decisions of which were binding. Those who
were instrumental in calling it, operating through Methodist
church channels, wanted the annuity and bonus reinstated. The
adviser had said that this was not a wise course. His position
was that additional grants—for example, matching contribu-
tions for building roads and houses—had been given by the BPC
after their officials had seen that money was being used for de-
velopment and after the Banabans had agreed it would not be
distributed. The land on Rambi, the adviser and others argued,
was poorly developed and money should be used for improve-
ments before that money stopped. The trust board prepared
the 1965 estimates without the individual distribution. The full
council refused to approve the estimates and said the annuity
should be included. The adviser said the full council had no au-
thority to amend the estimates. An impasse had been reached.
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The council had recently approved the renewal of the ad-
viser’s contract, but various people remained dissatisfied with
him, not only because of his opposition to the distribution of
the annuity. Some councillors and others had circulated reports
that he was acting in a high-handed manner by ordering rather
than advising and by not showing proper respect for the council.
Favoritism was also alleged in his relations with employees.
Moreover, he had incurred the ire of a number of influential
Methodists because of his attempts to disentangle the use of
trust board money and paid time for activities which seemed
to be more in the service of the Methodist church (which has
the largest membership) and the supporters of the council
chairman than of the community as a whole. There were those
who at times saw the whole matter as a contest between the
adviser and the chairman. The chairman had suggested that of
the money the Banabans received collectively from the phos-
phate, two-thirds should be distributed among the people and
one-third kept for public projects. Matters had recently come to
a head betweeen the two over a specific issue which many be-
lieved was behind the machinations leading to the meeting.
The chairman is an important figure in the church and has
been the most prominent Banaban leader since before the reset-
tlement. He has impressive religious, descent, kinship, political,
economic, and age credentials. He also has what one might
term reality credentials through his involvement in various dis-
putes with the government and the BPC at least since the
1927–1931 affair. He is generally assumed to know more about
the intricacies and deceits of the phosphate history than anyone
else. Some question his knowledge, and some are also opposed
to him precisely because of his credentials. But for many, the
chairman’s information on crucial political and economic
matters is nearly all the information they have. He has the au-
thenticity of one who can say “I was there.” He also has im-
portant rhetorical credentials. This analysis will try to specify
some of them.
I cannot give the details of how the positions of various
people on the issues of the money and the adviser were inter-
preted by others before and after the meeting. Often—and this
is certainly not a pattern unique to the Banabans—a person
claims to be motivated by principle and accuses the opposition
of being motivated by kinship, descent, religion, village,
friendship, self-interest, personal grudges, factional alliances,
backroom deals, or ignorance.
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A brief discussion is in order on Rambi’s employment
pattern, since it was deeply involved in what came up in the
meeting. A preliminary analysis of 1965 census figures shows
that over 80 percent of the full-time or part-time salary or wage
earners on the island are males between eighteen and sixty
years of age. Of males between eighteen and sixty, roughly 32
percent hold full-time jobs, 21 percent hold alternate-week jobs,
and 46 percent are copra cutters, gardeners, and fishermen
only, except a few who are small-scale entrepreneurs or mission
personnel. The number of households directly affected by the
salary and wage pattern is greater than these figures might in-
dicate. In roughly one-third of the census households there is no
regularly resident member with such employment. Two-thirds
of the remaining census households have at least one person on
alternate-week employment but no person employed full-time.10
The largest employer on the island is the combination of
the Rambi Island Council and the trust board. The cooperative
society and the Fiji government account for most of the rest of
the jobs. The alternate-week pattern spreads wage labor around
more widely than would be the case if all jobs were full-time.
Most of the council and board jobs with which I am familiar
have to do with public works and public services: house and
road construction, equipment operation and maintenance (in-
cluding transportation), and office work. All the board members
have relatively high-paying jobs. Many of the other jobs pay no
more per week than what an enterprising copra cutter could
earn in a good week. But there are not always good weeks, and
if there were more enterprising copra cutters, the enterprising
copra cutter might earn less.
What is also at issue, however, is the cultural construction
of “work” and “working.” Unfortunately, I did no systematic
cultural analysis of this domain while in the field, so the fol-
lowing discussion is after the fact and impressionistic. At one
level, “work” includes wage earning, copra cutting, gardening,
fishing, and the like. In some contexts, however, “workers”
means public employees, in contrast with those who are pri-
marily identified with work on land and sea. “Workers” are gen-
erally considered to be far better off than others, and those in
skilled higher positions have a certain prestige. Many of the
latter are centered at the island’s “capital” at Nuku, where they
occupy concrete block houses that go along with their jobs.
The chairman and others have often made statements such
as, “We did not come to Rambi to be workers on the land.” At
one council meeting, the chairman said, “We did not come here
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for work, but for freedom on our money.” The chairman avers
that one reason why the resettlement proposal was approved
in the first place was that the people, once resettled in Fiji,
would be closer to the high commissioner for the Western Pa-
cific, who was at that time the same person as the governor of
Fiji. The high commissioner for the Western Pacific is the next
step up the colonial bureaucratic ladder from the resident com-
missioner of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. Rambi was to
be ‘the land of grievance stating’. Working on the land carries
a negative value in the sense that grubbing about in the bush
for enough money to get by on is a compulsory way of life. This
should not be the case, and may not have been expected to be
the case. In this regard one must point out that on Ocean Island
many Banabans and now Rambi-resident Gilbertese were BPC
employees in positions of some skill and responsibility. What
they are doing now is considered an inferior activity.
In the meeting it soon became apparent that discussions
of the employment and public works patterns (which became
fused) were being used to articulate a number of dilemmas.
METHODOLOGY
We need terms to sort out what the Banabans were sorting out
in the meeting and how they went about it. To this end I have
modified and added to some of Burke’s (1962) terminology in a
manner that seems suited to the ethnography of the meeting.
Trying to sort out something means that something is
acknowledged as problematic. The kinds of things that can be
problematic are, of course, numerous: some feature of reality
(what did the adviser do?); the implications of doing something
(what will happen if the annuity is distributed?); how to bring
about a change (how can the adviser be persuaded to distribute
the annuity?); and so forth.
We begin with the character of the problematic situ-
ation11—a state of affairs that seems to point outward to the
larger community in that doing something about it arises as
a community problem. Doing may involve thinking about the
situation, discussing it, or cooperatively enacting measures to
change it. Examples in the Rambi situation are poverty, lack
of control over Banaban funds, the breakdown in relations be-
tween adviser and chairman. The character of the problematic
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situation is something that people may be arguing about. In
other words, the character of the problematic situation (like
everything else) may itself be problematic.
Second is the subject of the problematic situation: the who
or the what responsible for the situation being in the shape that
it is—for example, the government, the people, the adviser, the
council, the workers.
Third is the object: the who or the what on the receiving
end—for example, the people, old people, members of a reli-
gious group, specific individuals.
Fourth is the instrument (the “how”); the intermediary, if
any, between subject and object—for example, the council be-
tween the people as subject and the people as object or the ad-
viser between outside authority and the people.
Fifth is the means (the “how to”): the device through which
the situation is being made problematic—for example, using
funds for public works projects rather than distributing them to
the people.
The definition of the problematic situation requires that a
transformation of it is in some fashion part of the situation.
The same pentad can be mapped onto the question of transfor-
mation: its character (perhaps getting more money), its subject
(the people or the council), its object (say, the people again),
its instrument (perhaps the council), and its means (distributing
the annuity). I use the term “delineating” to denote the making
of all these connections.
Part of the delineating process is establishing what gets as-
signed to which term of the pentad. In the course of delineation,
people may adopt various stances. For example, they may name
(it is the board that is the trouble), contradict (it is not the board
but the council), query (what does the board do?), or make prob-
lematic (how is it that distributing the annuity would bring in
less money from the outside?).
This delineating activity is not, of course, a purely abstract
exercise removed from people’s actual experiences. It is, in
part, the nature of their experience that people are attempting
to work out through delineating. In clarifying for themselves
the adviser-council relation during the meeting, people pointed
out specific actions in the past which they considered to be
typical of that relationship, such as the adviser’s stopping the
council visit to the governor and the council’s decision not to
distribute the annuity. The outcome of the delineation of this re-
lationship is a recognizable structure of the relationship. Once
worked out, the adviser-council relationship gives structural
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form to historical incidents (incidents which touch a variety of
people in a variety of ways). The incidents cited become in-
stances of a general pattern—that is, the historical incidents
give tangible content to the structural form. Then that form and
its historical incidents (contents) become tan gible forms them-
selves and, thus, may be tangible content for other forms. The
adviser-council relation and its historical contents, for example,
interpreted as one in which the council is victimized by the ad-
viser, becomes the tangible content of a higher-level structural
form—the relation of subject victimizing object or the relation
subject (victimizer)–object (victim). Thus a form may become
content for another form. Integral to this transformation is the
use of the “special case,” where one thing is presented as a
special case of another. For example, the adviser’s stopping
the council from visiting the governor is a special case of the
pattern of action of the adviser victimizing the council.
The terrain covered in the delineating process (the number
of subjects, objects, and so forth) is extensive. The delineation
becomes complex if something of a comprehensive order is to
be approximated. In delineating the problematic situation we
observe the sorting out of a number of terms and the relations
between them (how the adviser relates to the people, how the
government relates to the people). “Something of a compre-
hensive order” in this case would be characterizing both those
relations, at a higher level, as relations of victimization. Victim-
ization gives structural form to those relations as the relations
give tangible content to victimization. Victimization as now de-
fined becomes a tangible form, and thus tangible content for
other forms at even higher levels.12
This structure which interrelates terms and relations of the
problematic situation is itself given form by certain symbols
at a higher level. I use the term “symbol” to mean a vehicle
for conceptions, a vehicle people may use to connect the un-
known with the known (see Turner 1970:48). Certain symbols
in Rambi Island culture are extremely powerful in their ability
to order wide domains of objects, relationships, and actions.
Land, freedom, the person, and progress are examples. Thus
the symbol “freedom” can give structural form to other forms.
For example, victimization becomes a special case of the ab-
sence of freedom, just as the adviser’s stopping the visit be-
comes a special case of victimization. Since the problematic
nature of the situation is construed in terms of such symbols,
the symbols themselves are made tangible and thus are struc-
tured in a conjunction.13
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An example of such a conjunction would be as follows: “The
annuity and bonus are the money of your lands.” The annuity
and the bonus may become tangible content for many things
other than “your lands,” and “lands” may give structural form
to many things other than the annuity and the bonus. The con-
junction is a structuring, and “land” is made tangible in that
structuring.
By speaking of a conjunction in this way, I do not mean to
imply that one set of meanings (those of “lands”) and another
set of meanings (those of “the annuity”) are simply added to
one another, nor that a structure is formed simply by putting to-
gether the meanings of the higher-level symbol which are har-
monious with the meanings of the lower-level symbol. I am sug-
gesting, rather, that symbols such as “lands” and “the annuity”
(or any symbols) have ranges of possible meanings. In the con-
junction, constrained by the context or other ways, certain fea-
tures of each symbol become stressed such that the meanings
which may be given to each can be organized in a hierarchical
form. In the “special case,” categories are juxtaposed and struc-
tured in such a manner that contextually stressed features of
some categories can be shown to be concretizations (actualiza-
tions, instances) of contextually stressed features of other cate-
gories (patterns, structures, symbols).14
To our list of delineation we must now add “concrete actors
and actions.” For we are dealing with a case in which “some-
thing happens in the end.” At the end of the meeting an action
was taken (voting was part of it), and that action gave structural
form to what had been built up before (the links through certain
symbols). What had been built up before it gave tangible
content to the action, the action becoming a tangible form
itself (and, of course, tangible content for other forms after the
meeting).
The form of the final action, however, did not come magically
out of a script book. That form itself became the problematic
situation, and a number of levels of form-content articulation
occurred within it. What happened in the end was giving form
to what had been mapped out for what might happen in the
end, which itself was giving form to what had been mapped out
during the previous phase of the meeting, and so on.
Recall that this is not a model designed for a case where
everything follows from everything else as night follows day.
Various “stances” apply to the establishment of form-content
relations, too. If an action is presented as a special case of a
pattern of action, for example, somebody may say it is not a
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special case at all. If a means of transformation (distributing
the annuity) is being linked to a general form (freedom), it
may be made problematic whether distributing the annuity and
freedom are really related in that fashion. This may be a product
of different constructions of “distributing the annuity,” different
constructions of “freedom,” or a host of other factors.
Two final and related points. First, various interventions in
the meeting were related more or less directly to setting out the
terms of the problematic situation or the terms of the transfor-
mation, but the distinction is an analytic one. This has an im-
portant implication both theoretically and ethnographically. The
extent to which various constructions of reality can be imple-
mented by actual behavior must constantly be borne in mind. In
fact, I would suggest that the losing side in the meeting might
have fared better had they borne this in mind.
Second, some segments of the meeting were developing a
structure for the problematic situation and its transformation;
this structure was one of victimization. Victimization by some
outside authority is an understood feature of the Banabans’ sit-
uation. Here the victimization is turned inward as well which,
among other things, makes the structure more actable or trans-
formable. That structure also allows for the introjection of ac-
cumulated grievances, personal and collective. The very issues
made this likely and (to speak with risk) it may have its own
compelling form which itself articulates the various levels of
form-content relations: name the crime (the problematic sit-
uation—not having enough rightful money); name the victim
(the object—the people) and the victimizer (the subject—the
workers, the adviser); name the weapon (the means—using the
money for work); consider redress; invoke specific evidence and
precedent (concrete actions out of the past); construe, direct,
and legitimize the case in terms of powerful symbols; deliberate
and take the appropriate action.15
THE MEETING
Before going on to an annotated extract from my minutes of
the meeting, a strong caveat must be introduced. Initially, I esti-
mated about two hundred people in the island’s central meeting
hall at Nuka and many others listening outside. It was a ten-
hour meeting. As people began to speak more rapidly with
emotion or speech was indistinct to me from distant parts of the
hall, my knowledge of the local language failed me. I can vouch
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neither for the completeness nor the accuracy of my minutes.
Even in the quotations cited below, half the information may
have been lost. I can only represent them as my best effort, hope
that the outcome of the exercise justifies the use of such inade-
quate data, and carry on as if the problem did not exist. In these
extracts a series of dots (…) indicates the omission of material
because of lack of understanding, the desire to save space, or
the speaker’s own stylistic indication that the sentence was in-
complete. This may be an important rhetorical device in itself,
signaling a common understanding and allowing the listener to
fill in the gap. Sometimes I fill in the gaps myself in brackets; re-
marks in brackets are my own observations. Remarks in paren-
theses are paraphrases of things said.
A brief note on the setting: the meeting hall itself is a
modern form of the maneaba, a meetinghouse with important
traditional meanings (see Silverman 1971). A meeting in it is se-
rious business. The Union Jack adorned the front of the hall. The
councillors, scribe, and adviser were literally on stage at the
front, “the people” thus being seated apart. Some internal divi-
sions were manifest in who was sitting with whom. Now, then,
to my annotated extracts:
1. Adviser: We ask for the truth. The adviser has no power;
the path [to the government] is from the council to the governor
[of Fiji]. These years are our chance for success.
2. Chairman: The Tabwewa [one of the four villages] coun-
cillors raised the question of the meeting to me. They wanted
to meet with the people [literally, ‘the inhabitants of the surface
of the land’] regarding the desire for the annuity, and whether
your adviser will retire from among you. [The chairman then al-
luded to two other issues which he said were settled: a specific
dispute between himself and the adviser and the handling of the
case of a worker who had damaged some equipment, which the
chairman said was settled by vote of the board.]
3. Adviser: I have worked for three years and asked re-
garding an additional three years. Talk to the governor if you
want me to retire. [Notes unclear on a statement about the
nature of the bonus, the distribution of which he was told would
create difficulties with the BPC.] The annuity was stopped long
ago by the council. My work on this was just advice.
4. Chairman: The annuity and the bonus are the money
of your lands. In the 1930s the government agreed that they
should be distributed. The money is your money. Here we used
it for work. The old men said there was no money. I said: “We
Chapter 6
124
will use it for work, for one or two years. If you want it we will
give it. If you want the money to work, then it will work. If you
want the money, then you will get it.”
5. A Councillor: The chairman said we would talk about the
annuity, not the bonus. First, with regard to the houses. We
asked the BPC for money. The [BPC] commissioners came and
saw that we were suffering [in difficulty, poor]. We talked about
the road, schools, and other things. We met in the house of the
adviser. The BPC board has to meet, the commissioners said.
After a few months the word came: they agreed. Also, with
regard to the adviser: he has done nothing wrong.
6. Another Councillor: I am unhappy too about not having an
annuity. I am also unhappy about the distribution of two-thirds
of the money. The adviser said: “The distribution of the annuity
may prevent the arrival of big things from the outside.”
We want the bank statement [showing Banaban funds].
Maybe things are hidden there. I am the one who goes outside.
If I say that two-thirds will be distributed, they have me. [This
councillor is also the Banaban representative on Ocean Island.
On his return to Rambi he was said to have circulated reports
of having learned that £14 million was due to the people in ac-
cumulated interest from a certain fund.]
7. Adviser: The answer of the government regarding the
money is well known. [A man interjects from the floor, “That
isn’t worth anything.” Speaker C rises and says he wants to talk,
but the adviser says: “The chairman first.”]
8. Chairman: Freedom under the money of Banaba. Who
is the person in whose hands it has been received? [People
from the floor answer, “No one!”] With regard to our accord on
the annuity, we cannot know how much money will go to each
person. It is the people’s money. The annuity is the only path
open.
The company wanted to give a good price in the 1930s, but
the government objected. [This refers to the 1927–1931 land
dispute. The chairman had said at other times that the BPC
had been on the point of making an offer closer to Banaban de-
mands, but the resident commissioner had intervened against
the Banabans.] If you do not complain all the time … [you get
nothing]. If you want the money to be divided, it will be divided.
Regarding the adviser: there should be one person [Eu-
ropean] here who is not paid by the government. The first ad-
viser (who came with the people in 1945) said: “In Fiji we can
state our grievances better. The land of grievance stating is
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here. Here, we want to see the governor, and the adviser stops
us…. Yes, we did agree to the extension of the adviser’s con-
tract, but the decision is your decision.”
9. D [one of the oldest Banaban men]: We need money for
the old people. The worker eats the money.
10. C [a middle-aged man who works for the cooperative
society]: … We are free under the money. The council held it for
our dwellings. Regarding the adviser: did he behave badly in the
council? If one or two hold the money, that is bad.
11. E [a middle-aged copra cutter]: The money is held for
the houses. But there are copra cutters. You [workers] live on
the money of the community. There are two ways for making a
living: copra cutting and wage earning. If I ask for work, will I
get it? You say that there are £14 million. We are filled to over-
flowing with your words! Distribute the annuity!
I stand for the adviser. It is the board [that is the trouble].
What is the value of the walkie-talkie, people say? [A set of
walkie-talkies had been purchased which many people thought
was of dubious value.] [From the floor: “Finish it!” F, a young
man, says: “I support him.”]
12. G [a young man employed by the Fiji government]:
Whose error is the error? It is yours [the people’s]; the election
was your election. Their errors are your errors.
13. Chairman: Perhaps we are finished stating our opinions.
Write down whether you want the annuity or not. If there is an
objection from the government, we will have a record. As for the
adviser, we are free after three years.
Let us start with the chairman’s first remarks (statement 2).
He begins in a low key by referring to the question of “whether
your adviser will retire from among you” rather than saying
“whether the adviser will be sacked,” These words are appro-
priate for an elder and attempt to give an aura of neutrality,
although the chairman’s true position was generally known.
He names a problematic situation as involving the annuity and
the adviser and indicates two other issues as nonproblematic
(issues which it might have been assumed would prejudice him
against the adviser). The softness, however, might be rhetor-
ically double-edged, the “you” and the “your” suggesting the
proper decision-making entity.
The adviser (statement 1) had situated the question vis-
à-vis truth and success, indicating (statements 1 and 3) that
the council (and its relationship to the governor), not he (and
perhaps not this meeting either), was the significant in-
strument. The council, not he, was the subject of the prob-
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lematic situation in stopping the annuity, and the distribution
of the bonus might not be a means of positively transforming
the situation but of increasing its problematic nature. He intro-
duced the government and the BPC as elements which had to
be sorted out.
Indeed, in general terms or through concrete incidents, the
major categories of secular agents which superintend the Ba-
nabans’ fate were named quite early in the meeting and, as
the meeting progressed, most of their possible combinations ap-
peared. The functions of one vis-à-vis the other were often prob-
lematic, with people trying to sort out what they are and to
indicate (when they were the subjects of victimization) how they
might be transformed.
Historical incidents are retrieved to justify the position
being taken, but in the process they become part of something
larger than those incidents taken separately. Just as the dis-
cussion of transforming the problematic situation relates the
present to the future, the citation of these incidents relates the
present to the past.
In statement 4, the chairman gives form to the elements of
his own interventions when he says that “the annuity and the
bonus are the money of your lands.” The nature of the con-
struction was adumbrated earlier. The bonus and annuity are
given structural form by, and give tangible content to, land. The
annuity and the bonus are also money, a necessary means to
gain European goods and services (this is made more explicit in
later statements). Land thus enters as a resouce and as some-
thing that belongs to these people. A frame is set for structuring
the problematic situation and its transformation—especially as
the government itself had on Ocean Island approved the distri-
bution of this money.
The chairman begins to develop a structure in terms which
are critical—the contrast between using the money (of your
lands) “for work” and giving it to “you,” the people. Two el-
ements must be elaborated here: the “work” element and the
“you” element.
People had said that if the annuity were distributed, it would
have to come out of the money presently used for work (the two-
thirds-one-third plan). But the contrast is more powerful than
the fact might imply. The organization of the various activities
involving construction and labor into the category “the work”
is a cultural organization itself. There is no a priori reason why
the category should exist in this form. Nor is the suggested con-
trast with “the people,” which explicitly recurred several times
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during the meeting, an a priori necessity. This structuring sug-
gested the evaluation placed on it, if not the concrete course
of action necessary to transform it. Quite clearly, things for
and to the people are superior to things that are not. What is
disputed between some and problematic to others, however, is
what “things for and to the people” are.
Given the historical incident about stopping the money in
the first place, it is ambiguous whether the council was the
subject of the problematic situation in that it stopped the an-
nuity or whether the council was the instrument of the people
who were the subject. This was played out later. But the people
were the object (in being denied the annuity), and the means
was using the money for work rather than distributing it to
them.
The chairman elaborates further. In statement 2 he spoke of
the councillors wanting to meet with “the people.” In statement
4 he speaks of “your lands” and says that the money is “your
money.” The emphasis now is on “you”: “If you want it … if you
want the money to work … if you want the money, then you will
get it.” The “you” refers to the Banaban people in general (not
the Rambi people in general, which includes non-Banaban res-
idents) and to the people at the meeting (later specified as the
landowners). In some way (later made problematic and elab-
orated), the people at the meeting are a tangible form which
“is” the Banaban people and, furthermore, they can make a de-
cision one way or another. What is now being set up is this: the
objects of the problematic situation (the people) can transform
it by becoming the subjects of the transformation (telling the
council what to do). The council (the position of which was un-
specified earlier) then becomes the instrument; the means is
then giving the money to the people rather than to the work; the
object (as the subject) of the transformation is the people them-
selves. The now more highly structured problematic situation
(not having more of the money of their lands) links to a set of
relations which is both a delineation of reali ty (what the people
can do, what the council can do, what happened in the past) and
a proposal. This is achieved by means of at least three transfor-
mations. First is the transformation of the present or possible
subject, the council, into an instrument. The council’s position is
ambiguous in any case, since whether it was acting as a subject
or instrument by holding onto the money is itself problematic.
By transforming the council into instrument (having it distribute
the money), the ambiguity is resolved for the future. Second is
the transformation of the object (the people) into subject (the
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final arbiters). Third is the transformation of the means into
their antithesis: money for work versus distributing the annuity.
The bonus and annuity are tangible content for “the money of
your lands” and the land (money) belongs to the people, who
can decide what to do with it, and so forth.
This definition of the situation is contradicted and made
problematic by the two councillors (statements 5 and 6). Using
the money for work rather than distributing it to the people has
already been a means of transformation (rather than an element
to be transformed): more money in the form of matching funds
had been granted by the BPC, and an understanding had al-
ready been reached that the money would not to be distributed
(who reached the understanding is not made explicit here and
became problematic later). Thus the people could not become
the subject of the transformation and, continuing as now, more
money might be forthcoming in the future. Note that the first
councillor addressed the question of the people’s “suffering,
poverty,” but not the question of the people’s lands. The second
councillor began by placing himself on the horns of a dilemma.
The chairman (statement 8) gives further form to the
problematic situation and its transformation. He asserts
“freedom under the money of Banaba,” thus linking the whole
affair to freedom, with a stress on freedom as something which
belongs to the community (which can make a decision) and the
money as something which belongs to the individual.16 Then he
performs one of his feats of rhetorical brilliance which is con-
ceded even by his opponents and which contrasts with his low-
key beginning: “Who is the person in whose hands it has been
received?” Having stated or closely implied some of the most
general symbols and meanings, having raised the discussion to
a high order of generality, he then takes the whole thing down
to the actual person.
The chairman has done a number of things here. First, “the
person” (closely linked to “freedom”) is in context a symbol with
a special character: its tangible content is the actor himself. And
the actor himself becomes form for the problematic elements
which had become tangible in that—literally—he holds or does
not hold them in his hands. In the succeeding statements (to
be described), the chairman deals with many relationships in a
manner so persuasive as to be mesmerizing. What bears under-
scoring is how the chairman, through the progressive transfor-
mations of levels of form and content, set the whole thing up.
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In the development of the discussion, the statement “in
whose hands” has a special role. The challenge to the
chairman’s earlier construction was made on the grounds of an
agreement having been made, the fact that more money had
been received, and the likelihood of even more money being re-
ceived. But here the chairman is asking which individuals have
the money as opposed, say, to having seen the products of the
money in houses or roads. The individual/collectivity problem
is thus brought into the argument. To project to future inter-
ventions, no one has “it” in “his hands,” even though some
are receiving money from wages, because the “it” here is the
money of Banaba which can be construed to be all the money
distributed in freedom, unmediated by things like employment.
That these two constructions are possible should not be sur-
prising. It is one of the ways a persuasive argument is built up.
Furthermore, one must “complain all the time” to get more, and
the demand for the annuity could be interpreted as a special
case of complaining against the existing situation.
The chairman broached another matter which was por-
tentous in terms of the meeting and events after it. Observe
closely the paragraph in statement 8 regarding the adviser.
Until this point, although making a definite construction of the
situation, the chairman had actually avoided coming out directly
for the annuity or directly against the adviser. Here he enters
the fray in an interesting way. In our terms, it is ambiguous
whether the adviser is the subject or the instrument of the prob-
lematic situation defined by the people’s and the council’s re-
lationship to outside authority. The adviser stopped the people
from going to the governor, but this is placed in a more gen-
eralized context: “There should be one person here who is
not paid by the government.” Note how this ambiguity could
structure a number of antiadviser positions—being against the
man but not the role, being against the role but not the man, or
being against both.
The delineation of the resident European’s position is given
structural form by something that might have had great reso-
nance at least because the chairman had made statements like
it before. Alluding to a statement of the first adviser (and thus
an adviser can say something like this, just as the government
could approve the annuity), the chairman pointed out: “In Fiji
we can state our grievances better. The land of grievance
stating is here.”
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In his statement the chairman defines a relationship be-
tween the presence of an adviser paid indirectly by Banaban
monies (the adviser is actually responsible to the Fiji gov-
ernment) and Rambi as a place where grievances can be stated.
This relationship is not the only one possible between these ele-
ments, nor is it the only relationship in which either the adviser
or the stating of grievances can be major components. The rela-
tionship as stated does, however, have its place in the meeting
as a further structuring and clarification of the problematic
situation in the following manner: the relationship posited by
the chairman is a structuring of two other relationships—(1)
Banaban–European (government) and (2) Ocean Island–Rambi.
Banaban nationality is, in an important sense, a product of the
Ocean Island–Rambi relationship; therefore, one of the Ban-
abans’ most critical problems is that of arriving at a consensus
on that relationship. The meanings of both Ocean Island and
Rambi can be given structural form by the symbol of Ocean
Island land, since Rambi was purchased with phosphate roy-
alties derived from that land. Certain things in one place are
seen in terms of certain things in the other place. Rambi things
affect Ocean Island things and vice versa. Implicitly here and
explicitly elsewhere, Ocean Island and Rambi relate in what we
might call a “transitive metonym.”17
The question remains: What are the “certain things” that
affect each other implied by the chairman’s statement? Ocean
Island affects Rambi in that phosphate royalties, which pur-
chased Rambi, maintain Rambi public works projects and pay
its workers. But land also symbolizes in Banaban kinship (which
is closely tied to Banaban nationality) its code for conduct. Land
is what connects the Banaban-government and Ocean Island-
Rambi relationships in a single structure. The actions suggested
by “grievance stating” involve phosphate, which is something in
Ocean Island land. Rambi is therefore related to Ocean Island
(affecting Ocean Island things) in terms of action.
The revised status of a resident European is a special case of
this structuring. A European responsible to the Banabans alone,
rather than to the government, becomes the advocate of Ba-
nabans, the instrument of Banaban action. Having thus struc-
tured the problematic situation and having suggested an in-
strument for its transformation, the chairman brings the trans-
formation back to the people: “The decision is your decision.”
He has made a construction in which action is inherently pos-
sible.
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By the time we reach statement 9, the chairman has given
the meeting a frame. When the people begin to speak, the
money to the people/money to the work contrast begins to be
elaborated.
One of the oldest men on the island (statement 9) rose and
said, “We need money for the old people. The worker eats the
money.” The wage earners were using up the money which
rightfully should go to the people. The contrast money to work/
money to the people as a means was now transformed into
workers/old people as subject/object. The workers were, in
effect, victimizing the people; just as it had been suggested by
the chairman that the Banaban adviser (in role or in person)
had wronged the council or the people (statement 8), the people
may have been wronged by the council (statement 4) and by
various outside authorities (statements 6, 7, 8). In statement
10, after reaffirming the reality of situating the matter vis-
à-vis freedom, speaker C asks whether some on the council
(including the adviser) may be holding the money and thus, fol-
lowing the theme as I decipher it, be victimizing the people.
The issue brought up by the old man was put more forcefully
by speaker E (who has a way of putting things forcefully) in
statement 11, when he baldly stated that there were two modes
of livelihood, copra cutting and wage earning; the workers “live
on the money of the community,” and not everyone might be
able to get work.
One may say that speaker D was presenting himself as
representing the interests of the old people whereas E was
presenting himself as representing the interests of the copra
cutter. Moreover, one may say they were relating the position
and experience of old people and copra cutters to both the
problematic situation and the meeting itself. It seemed to me
that in their highly charged remarks they were doing this, and
something more, in a very critical way. The chairman had re-
trieved the historical incident of the old men saying there was
no money (statement 4), and here was an old man saying old
men had no money and stating the reason. In his giving of
form he was presenting himself as tangible form. Similarly, the
copra cutter injected another element into the problematic sit-
uation—copra cutters. The elaboration of the money to people/
money to work contrast as a structure proceeded by constitut-
ing classes of victims (old people, copra cutters) who were there
at the meeting and victimizers (workers) who were also there.
The elements of the structure were not the invisible behind the
visible but the made-visible organizing other meanings.
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Although the frame given the meeting by the chairman is
elaborated by the people, there are counterproposals and con-
tradictions of that frame as well. Speaker E contradicts the de-
lineation of the adviser as subject of the victimization: it is,
rather, the board. And Speaker G (statement 13) contradicts the
indictment of the board by suggesting that, through the election
of their councillors, the people are the subject as well as the
object of their own dilemma. Perhaps as a response to this, the
chairman then calls for a vote, which will be a record in case the
government objects. The chairman might have been hedging his
bets on whether the people are totally free on the matter after
all, and (with no massive movement yet against the adviser?) he
notes that the people will be “free” after the three years of the
adviser’s contract are up.
The counterargument regarding money to work/money to
the people, introduced in statement 5, was elaborated later. It
was proposed that the workers had been serving the community
as a whole and as individuals. Here the alleged means of victim-
ization are depicted as a means of transformation—that is, the
transformation of the island into a more modern, comfortable
place to live and work.
The statements of speakers E and G—that the board or the
polity responsible for placing the board in office are the sub-
jects of the victimization—both imply that the councillors (from
whom the board is selected) are vulnerable. The chairman,
indeed, began with a kind of public confession that something
had gone awry with the council. Later he suggested that the
younger generation could carry the burden which the elder gen-
eration (his own) was having trouble with. But the councillors
were workers, too. One woman articulated part of the problem
later when she stated, “You councillors are landowners [too].” A
councillor who spoke little articulated his own dilemma and the
general dilemma:
There is the problem of the council and the board. We didn’t want
the bonus and annuity because of the money from outside. There
is the question of freedom under the money. Some people com-
plained about the annuity. They said: “You do not like it because
you are on salary.” No. We look at the future. From the side of the
board, I think: hold it. From the side of the council: give it. About
the adviser, there is trouble knowing what is right. We agreed for
three years. If I say I like him, you will say it is because he feeds
me. We agreed for three years.
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Another councillor, also an office worker, articulated a
similar dilemma but resolved it:
I have worked with the adviser for three years. He is helpful in
my work, yes. But for the people [‘the land’], no. If he stays you
will be unfortunate. The adviser is not worthwhile…. He is good
in the office. But we still have not seen the money on the ground.
We just eat cassava. We will not be fortunate quickly…. There is
a side that he cannot deal with…. For the Banaban race. There is
just money for housing and the road. Our group just salts cassava.
If we are fortunate, we will all be fortunate; if we have misfortune,
we will all have misfortune. A Banaban who does not work is not
fortunate.
The councillors were put on the defensive and were vul-
nerable on several counts. They had in fact voted for years
to withhold the annuity and bonus. They were also receiving
salaries from the money being withheld. Yet at the same time
no one could deny that the policy of “money for work” had in
fact resulted in some houses and a road where there had been
no road before—tangible contents for the argument adduced in
statement 5. Nor could one deny that the adviser was in part
responsible for those results. The adviser as victimizer was not,
then, all that unambiguous.
The dilemma is resolved by the position that although the
adviser had accomplished good things, those accomplishments
were beside the point. This is a definite construction of the sit-
uation: of the range of desirable things to get done, one was
singled out, and by this singling out, an ordering was achieved.
By saying “we still have not seen the money on the ground,”
the councillor meant in individual hands. (Thus the collectivity
is invoked—we, the people, our group, the Banaban race—but it
is defined in this context as an aggregate of equal individuals.)
Later in the meeting a man contrasted “work for the money”
and “work on the ground” (the latter in the sense of the works
projects in which the adviser was so personally as well as
ideologically involved), stating that the former was more im-
portant than the latter. In the closing segment (analyzed below),
the issue was stated as that between getting more money and
keeping the adviser. Here may have been a way in which the
problem of “the work” was resolved in a manner which was
actable in terms of the process of the meeting. The “work”
pattern was rehabilitated, as it were, by stressing some of its
features to construe two kinds of work: one was oriented to
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getting more money from the phosphate and into individual
hands; the other was selective in its benefits if not downright
wasteful from the people’s point of view. The island’s senior offi-
cialdom (including councillors) is properly involved in “working
for the money” (as contrasted with giving “money for the
work”), and thus their own positions are not essentially threat-
ened.
The “carry on as now” position was essentially a general
restatement of the people as victims, outside authority as vic-
timizer, the means of victimization as money being denied by
outside authority, the problematic situation as not having
enough money, and local authorities (the adviser, councillors) as
the means of transformation.
But when the matter was raised in the meeting, even those
arguing for the “carry on as now” position could not guarantee
that the additional money would be distributed. Some, indeed,
were inclined toward a “development centralism” and (more
forcefully outside the meeting) argued that position. There are
fundamental differences in the conceptions of how the com-
munity should go about conducting its business and what that
business is. Those differences are not, however, in the presence
or absence of certain elements (there should be more money,
there should be some planning) but in their structuring vis-à-
vis one another. Some people have not achieved a structuring
of these features vis-à-vis one another; this is what confusion
means.
The increased money might go for more “work” and thus
not to the people as a community of individual landowners,
the position of the individual landowner being linked to land,
freedom, and the person. The people might not be getting indi-
vidual payments, which would also be individual returns from
the lands they individually own, and would assert freedom on
their property. Besides, there was the “promises, promises!”
sentiment expressed in statement 11.
The “carry on as now” and development centralist positions,
then, could not be articulated with the higher-level symbols
(land, freedom) in as many ways as the position for the distrib-
ution of the annuity. They were symbolically unproductive.
After the proannuity sentiment had been expressed, the ad-
viser himself said that using the money for the distribution of
the annuity would not stop “the work” entirely. Thus individual
workers may not have construed the situation as an absolute
choice between agreement to the annuity’s distribution (loss of
their jobs) and maintenance of the status quo, even if they did
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not agree that more money would be forthcoming anyway. The
proannuity position, then, was more in line with the “maximize
your options” principle of the Banaban value system (see Sil-
verman 1969).
The counterargument was weak in another respect, one
which was crucial to the process of the meeting itself. The
counterargument did not spell out in any elaborate way a means
of victimization or a means of transformation having anything
approaching the power of the money for work/money to the
people contrast. The means, of all the terms in the pentad of
delineation, has the highest structuring potential because once
the means is given tangible form, it clearly implies all the other
terms. Thus a wide field of possibilities is opened up for iden-
tifying and structuring actors and events as subjects, objects,
instruments, and so forth (including actors and events particu-
larly meaningful to different people for different reasons).
The identification of money for work as a means of victimiza-
tion encompasses relations between Banabans and the
outside—the outside in general, outside public opinion (which
held that Banabans were well off), the government, and the
BPC. Money for work also encompasses relations of internal vic-
timization—the old people and copra cutters by workers, the
people and council by the adviser and the board, a religious
group by the adviser and the council, and even the people by
themselves. Money to the people is an equally powerful rela-
tional term, since it defines the transformation of the prob-
lematic situation while encompassing precisely the same wide
net of relationships as the means of victimization. These rela-
tionships could be identified and structured vis-à-vis one an-
other or they could be left safely ambiguous for the moment.
Lacking an elaborated means, the counterargument lacked the
relational power inherent in the money for work/money to the
people contrast.
THE CREATION OF A SYMBOL
The details of what went on during most of the meeting are,
of course, beyond the scope of this chapter. It is sufficient to
say that there was a “movement” and a “filling in” among the
various elements of this paradigm, with a good deal of ques-
tioning and uncertainty. A consensus on the annuity developed
and was both questioned and spelled out. The pace of anti-
adviser interventions increased toward the end in a form that
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crystallized what had been prefigured earlier. The adviser was
more or less in the witness box as defendant, and those who
felt particularly aggrieved by his actions acted as public prose-
cutors, judge, and jury. After these exchanges, the adviser left
the meeting.18
It was not long after the adviser’s departure that one thing
became quite clear. The people were not only collectively
constructing various symbols and meanings; they were also in
the process of creating a symbol—the meeting itself. Actions as
well as words and objects can be symbols.19 The notion of a
symbol as a vehicle for conceptions can be sustained here only
if we insist that the vehicle and the conceptions are in a dialec-
tical relationship—that in the flow of action their forms may be
problematic and their boundaries elastic, and that vehicles and
conceptions are not simple things but structures. In their state-
ments, movements, and feelings, the people were struggling to
give form to a vehicle for a number of conceptions. They may
have recognized this at the outset, but toward the end of the
meeting their struggle assumed a quite explicit reality.
One context for understanding the symbolic nature of the
meeting itself may be that it was not just any meeting but a
maunga tabu, an event which may have a special status because
of its infrequency.20 The calling of a maungatabu may be a struc-
tured part of a social drama (see Turner 1957) or a social-con-
ceptual drama in which the number of problematic elements in
the people’s lives has become great. In the simplest interpre-
tation, the whole thing may be seen as an attempt on the part
of some leaders and would-be leaders to get a public mandate
that would strengthen a council case with outside authority. But
even on those grounds there would be a major bind in internal
relations, external relations, or both.
Not every member of the Banaban community was present
at the meeting—or, rather, not every Banaban landowner was
present (and it was only Banaban landowners, Banabans by
birth or adoption, who spoke). But if one were to compare this
assembly with political meetings in the United States, it is clear
that the meeting was one of a significant proportion of a group
of people who think of themselves as a total community. There
developed an “in-touchness” with the total community, and the
history and future of that community, which is lacking in many
meetings elsewhere. (By this I do not mean to suggest that the
Banaban meeting was a unique event from a cross-cultural point
of view. Far from it.) The people were putting themselves in
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touch with their own history and their own future. There was
very much a feeling of being part of Great Events. How was this
symbol construction finally realized?
Toward the end, the meeting reached a new dialectical
phase, although elements of that phase had been broached
earlier. Now the focus shifted to the form that the final action in
the meeting would take. The creation of that form was now the
problematic situation, and the content included what had gone
on in the meeting before.
For the sake of brevity I shall not treat this material in
sequential detail. The alternatives presented and discussed
were not all mutually exclusive; they involved the issues of what
should be done inside and outside the meeting. Alternatives for
action inside the meeting included nothing more than signing
papers on either side of the argument, dividing the house, and
raising and counting hands. Alternatives for action outside the
meeting were to have a plebiscite conducted, presumably by the
council; to communicate the results of a vote in the meeting to
the governor and the BPC; and to send the results of a vote to
the council for its consideration.
The chairman, it seemed, was first calling for a plebiscite
or at least the taking of signatures. Speaker H, a young man
prominent in the affairs of church and state, made the critical
interventions in this latter segment (as he had done earlier by
“cross-examining” the adviser). Speaker H argued as follows:
“On a paper for the decision: this is the maungatabu. The heads
of families are all here. If the maungatabu is called, it is de-
cided. [Next sentence unclear; probably: As you, our old men,
have done from the past to the present.] … Who else is there
to call? Are the people here valueless? … Then it will go to the
council.”
Another man echoed the point: “What is worth more? The
heads of families or the council?”
And later, speaker H said: “How many Banabans are there?
The government can see how many. When this man [that is,
someone] comes, he speaks for his spouse and children.” And
later, “We call people here to sign for their families.”
The chairman then shifted his own position: “Ask the com-
munity of Banaba. Stay on the maungatabu of Banaba.” And
further on: “It is the decision of the maungatabu. Make worth-
while the decision of the maungatabu…. Pray that the governor
is guided [by God] in his decisions.”
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Speaker H used Banaban tradition to give form to the
maunga tabu as the maungatabu gave tangible content to Ba-
naban tradition. He stressed the continuity of that tradition and
the unique potential of the maungatabu for producing decisive
action. The maungatabu became a tangible form which struc-
tured the transformation of “the people” into the “heads of fam-
ilies,” the powerful images of kinship perhaps now becoming
content for the maungatabu. While some role for the council
was maintained, action in the meeting itself was presented as
critical and historic. That action would then give form to the
other structures.
One well-known supporter of the adviser and opponent of
the annuity argued for a plebiscite or a paper vote (which
one was unclear to me) in the meeting: “The word can be
changed. The paper cannot. This is not the time for unen-
lightened thoughts [‘thoughts of darkness, ignorance’]. The
light [‘electricity’, pointing to the fluorescent light above] is lit.”
The ‘time of darkness, ignorance’ and the ‘time of light, under-
standing’ are often used to indicate the contrast between the
Banaban way of life before and after missionization or, more
generally, as a contrast between ancient and enlightened times.
Later, speaker H came back to the issue by making of the
maungatabu a “special case” of modern political thought. He
said that the people were acting in a “democracy,” that the
maunga tabu was called so that people’s ideas could be made
known, one after another, and that each person is precious
in this system. The maungatabu thus became tangible content
for both the continuity of Banaban tradition and political ad-
vancement.21 Here is the artful rhetorician situating the maun-
gatabu at the interface of two conceived systems, the relations
of which are often quite problematic to the people—‘tradition’
and ‘progress’ (or, more generally, the nature and demands of
the modern world)—and stressing the actability of both. Here a
relationship can be made through action, through that action.
As a young man said with great feeling, “We want to see the
power of the community of Banaba!”
The chairman had put two papers on the stage and a few
people went up to sign, but there was hesitancy. The proposal
for a count of hands won out; perhaps the raising of hands
on each side was a more collective and momentary act. And
hand counters from both ‘the council’ and ‘the people’ joined to-
gether in legitimizing the act. The vote was read as 110 against
and 18 for the adviser.
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The winning side at the meeting, crystallized through the
‘heads of families’ route, made the Banaban community tangible
by constituting the people at the meeting as the Banaban com-
munity who by a concrete action could give form to such tan-
gible symbols and meanings as freedom and land, the worth of
the person and the sanctity of kinship, the preservation of Ba-
naban tradition and the commitment to progress.
During the course of the meeting, many relationships had
been set out as the problematic situation and its transformation
were elaborated. The people explored various definitions, sub-
jects, objects, instruments, and means, which were given form
by various symbols and meanings and which gave form to
various events. Toward the end of the meeting they had the
problem of building the structure for the transformation
(action) which would be accomplished now, a structure which
could operate on the wide-ranging sets of relations which had
emerged.
There was obviously an “audience present” which included
outside authority, and many ambiguities remained as to the
role of the council—what power lay where, and so forth. But
the position that “the maungatabu can do it” meant essentially
that the Banaban community, in their action, could become the
subject, object, instrument, and means of their own transfor-
mation, giving form to and being formed by themselves.
The symbol which was constituted by the action of the
meeting might be termed a “reflexive symbol,” since the symbol
and much of the universe to which its referent applied were si-
multaneously present and identical. The people were both the
instances of the Banaban community and the components of the
symbol in that they were participants in the action. Thus what in
other contexts are general symbols are given form by every in-
dividual, and every individual becomes more than an individual
by becoming the component of a symbol.
This is not to suggest that specific grievances, alliances, and
hostilities were irrelevant to the meeting, that the meeting con-
cerned only matters of policy and practice. Insofar as it was suc-
cessful, the ordering represented by the meeting was successful
because a diversity of concerns, complaints, and strategies—a
noble concern for the future of the community, a grandstand
play for position, an intense grudge against the adviser—could
be given form by that ordering. This is what any politician
knows. The commanding problem is not why certain people did
what they did, but the creation of the set of forms which en-
abled them to do what they did, for whatever reason. All was
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not enthusiasm and harmony at the end of the meeting. Far
from it. Those opposed to the position that “the maungatabu
can do it” were profoundly unhappy with what was going on
and questioned its legitimacy. Others were not sure how they
felt about the outcome of the meeting. The meeting did not re-
solve fundamental conflicts; it articulated them. But whether
people voted one way or the other, sat it out, made a dramatic
exit, quietly slipped through the side door—or did not attend
in the first place—something was going to happen and some-
thing did happen, out of a multiplicity of events and apart from a
multiplicity of events. As Althusser (1969:126) observes: “What
makes such and such an event historical is not the fact that it is
an event, but precisely its insertion into forms which are them-
selves historical.”22
ETHNOGRAPHIC EPILOGUE
Just before the voting began, one man suggested that there
should be a film showing afterward. After the chairman called
the meeting to a close and said that people were free in their
opinions, there was a discussion on the availability of a film. The
suggestion on the film was not out of place, because films are
shown there from time to time. In fact, a film was shown that
evening but some people, including myself, left before it. I eter-
nally regret that my exhaustion compelled me to withdraw from
the scene.
With the people (or what was left of them) now collectively
in the same position vis-à-vis an outside entertainment, they
demarcated the end of the previous form. The Banabans are
often quite energetic film-goers, talking and commenting. The
film may have provided some kind of release from a trying event
filled with hostility, latent and manifest. Perhaps the performers
in the action unwound, or rewound, themselves into an au-
dience involved in something entirely different: the medium (the
meeting) had become the message, bracketed itself by the final
action, and having accomplished this feat, further bracketed
itself by the introduction of another medium.
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CONCLUSION
Every analysis has its black boxes. Something goes into the box,
something comes out of the box. But what goes on inside the
box—a “how,” a process—remains essentially unexplored. The
analyst may consider the “how” to be understood, irrelevant,
somebody else’s business, perhaps describable in the future.
One can easily label the box without opening the lid but thinking
that one has, and then confuse product with process (for in-
stance, some uses of “self-interest” and “adaptation”).
One “how” becomes illuminated or even restructured (Lévi-
Strauss on how a myth means, Peacock on how a drama works,
Schneider on how kinship articulates, Turner on how a ritual
works) and others are created.
My own analysis has its black boxes, too, many of them of
noble antiquity. How do symbols really symbolize? What really
goes on in the conjunctions? What are the operations and rules
that specify how one thing can lead to another and how one
thing cannot lead to another? How does what I have described
articulate precisely with local social relations and with larger
structures?23
If this chapter has any theoretical utility, it may help to de-
lineate certain aspects of the how of events like the meeting,
events which are, if you will, macrocosms of the symbolization
process, where forms are under construction which enable (or,
to play it out, restrict) the—quite literal—making of sense.
Ethnographically, the chapter documents the microsystem-
macrosystem problem, discussed by several other contributors
to this volume, as one with an urgent reality to a people strug-
gling to become themselves and struggling to restructure at
least one aspect of the world they live in.
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ROTUMANS IN FIJI: THE
GENESIS OF AN ETHNIC
GROUP
Alan Howard
Irwin Howard
Chapter7
INTRODUCTION
In his introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, Fredrik
Barth points out that even a drastic reduction of cultural differ-
ence between ethnic groups in culture contact situations does
not correlate in any simple way with reduced relevance of
ethnic identities (Barth 1969:32–33). The point is well taken,
and there is considerable evidence to support his contention.
One can go farther and assert that without regular and per-
sistent contact ethnicity is socially irrelevant, for, as Barth co-
gently argues, the existence of ethnic groups depends less on
the sharing of a common culture than on the maintenance of
social boundaries. For social boundaries to be actively main-
tained, they need to be continually validated, and this requires
regular interaction with members of out-groups.
Given these premises, the effects of European colonization
on ethnicity in the insular Pacific are of particular interest.
Prior to European contact, many Pacific islands experienced
very little interaction with peoples of a substantially different
cultural background. An occasional canoeload of other islanders
might make a landfall from time to time, but as a rule they
were either driven off, killed, or absorbed into the local popu-
lation through interbreeding (see chapter 2). Particularly within
the large culture areas of Polynesia and Micronesia, such immi-
grants were likely to exhibit only slight differences in language
and customs from the host population.
The arrival of Europeans in the area, and the subsequent
establishment of colonial regimes, radically altered this situ-
ation. Not only did the Europeans inaugurate regular firsthand
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contact, but they also initiated and institutionalized boundary-
maintaining mechanisms designed to distinguish ethnic groups.
Furthermore, social privilege in many instances was allocated
on the basis of ethnicity. In the early contact period this resulted
in what was primarily a European-native dichotomy, but as time
passed different indigenous groups were brought into regular
contact with one another and immigrant laborers were brought
from outside the region (from India, China, and elsewhere)
into the crucible of plantation, mining, and urban communities.
Additionally, interbreeding between Europeans and indigenous
populations gave rise to a half-caste or part-European group.
The result has been the development of polyethnic societies and
an opportunity for social scientists to study ethnic groups in the
making.
One such group is the Rotumans, who currently form an
ethnic enclave within Fiji (see map 8). The processes by which
Rotuma developed into a hinterland community to Fiji’s urban
centers have been documented elsewhere (Howard 1961). Our
focus in this chapter is on the adaptation of Rotumans to the
social milieus of four such urban areas. Here we are concerned
with the degree to which they have formed viable ethnic com-
munities, the organizational forms that have developed, and the
extent to which ethnic consciousness has been created under
varying conditions. Special emphasis is given to an analysis of
the Rotuman community in Vatukoula, since it is there that the
processes germane to our thesis have been most intense.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Although a substantial literature has developed over the years
dealing with such topics as race relations, minority group
studies, and ethnic studies, most research and theory have
focused on relations between groups whose boundaries were
clearly defined or treated as unproblematic. Few studies have
centered on the processes by which a people who share a
common history are transformed into an ethnic group within
a larger social system. Acculturation studies in anthropology,
while dealing with processes of change, have generally dealt
with alterations in culture content, social transformations
within a group, or the significance of change for acculturating
individuals. Barth’s recent effort provides some promising
leads, but it falls short of projecting a theory of ethnic group de-
velopment. In this section we attempt to build on Barth’s formu-
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lation; specifically, we postulate a set of processes that lead to
the development and crystallization of ethnic boundaries and,
by implication, to the formation of ethnic groups. After pre-
senting data from the Rotuman case, we conclude the chapter
with a consideration of specific variables that hasten or retard
the relevant processes.
The theoretical paradigm we are advocating begins with two
distinct populations who are unaware of each other’s existence.
Initial awareness may occur either through direct contact or in-
directly through intermediaries, but in either case the first bits
of information provide the basis for the development of ethnic
categories. If information flow is slow and irregular, these cat-
egories may remain vague for a time, but with regular contact
information input is accelerated, generating preliminary stereo-
types. Barth points out that the features taken into account in
generating ethnic stereotypes are not necessarily based on “ob-
jective” difference, but that “some cultural features are used by
the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ig-
nored, and in some relationships radical differences are played
down and denied” (1969:14). He suggests two types of infor-
mation of relevance to the establishment of ethnic dichotomies:
one consists of the diacritical features that people look for and
exhibit to show identity, such as dress, language, house form,
and general lifestyle; the other involves evaluative criteria for
judging behavior and the products of behavior. Barth’s basic
message, however, is that “ethnic categories provide an organi-
zational vessel that may be given varying amounts and forms of
content in different socio-cultural systems” (1969:14). As such,
their social existence is independent of culture content but de-
pends instead on the maintenance of social boundaries.
Ethnic boundaries may not emerge with clarity as soon as
categories develop, however. In the early stages of contact
such boundaries may include extensive “shadow areas” in the
form of ambiguous situations, role discrepancies, and obtuse or
overlapping diacritical features. During these stages social re-
lations may involve the two populations more as ethnic aggre-
gates than as ethnic groups. Such is particularly likely to be
the case when there are no clearly demarcated geographical
boundaries between the populations. The distinction between
an ethnic aggregate and an ethnic group is that with the former,
ethnic designation is subordinate to other identity principles
in the organization of a population’s social life while with the
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Map 8. Movement from Rotuma to other Fiji Islands.
latter it is superordinate. Barth’s comments concerning poly-
ethnic social systems (1969:17) are what we have in mind in
considering ethnicity as superordinate:
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Common to all these systems is the principle that ethnic identity
implies a series of constraints on the kinds of roles an individual
is allowed to play, and the partners he may choose for different
kinds of transactions. In other words, regarded as a status, ethnic
identity is superordinate to most other statuses, and defines the
permissible constellations of statuses, or social personalities,
which an individual with that identity may assume.
The crucial question from the standpoint of the development
of ethnic groups can thus be phrased: Under what conditions
does ethnicity become the superordinate symbol of identifi-
cation within a social system? Our position is that the funda-
mental conditions underlying the transformation of an ethnic
aggregate into an ethnic group are (1) the development of
an ethnic community, that is, a localized interactive network
consisting of individuals of the same ethnic designation who
are emotionally committed to the symbols of their common
heritage and formally organized for the purpose of pursuing
common goals; and (2) the formation of eth nic consciousness.
Ethnic consciousness may be defined as a special case of ethnic
awareness, that is, a recognition by an individual that his eth-
nicity is a significant factor in ordering his social relations.
When ethnicity assumes a position of primacy for the individual
in structuring his interactions, whether with others of his own
ethnic category or outside it, his awareness may be said for our
purposes to have become consciousness.
Ethnic consciousness may develop on an individual level in
response to a number of circumstances: these include overt
discrimination by others, a sense of superiority or inferiority,
or status ambiguities that can be resolved by giving primacy
to ethnicity. Collectively, ethnic consciousness emerges as a
result of repeated messages circulated throughout networks of
kinsmen, friends, and neighbors to the effect that other identity
criteria are less significant for structuring interpersonal rela-
tions than ethnic differences. The redundancy of these mes-
sages serves to structure both social interaction among ethnic
cohorts and an ideology of “we-ness,” the sharing of a common
social fate. The structural manifestations of these messages are
the extension of close personal bonds characteristic of kinship
and friendship to all who are members of the same ethnic
category and the restricting of one’s personal relationships to
people within that category. That one member of the category is
shamed, offended, or honored implies shame, anger, and honor
for all vis-à-vis nonmembers. To the extent that nonmembers of
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an ethnic category view members as interchangeable, the re-
dundancy of the relevance of ethnicity is likely to be reinforced.
For example, when the message that an individual lost his job
or was abused because of his ethnicity circulates through a
network of people of the same category, indignation and emo-
tional solidarity are more likely to be engendered than if other
identity variables are acknowledged to have played a part. The
notion of sharing a common fate, if accepted by members of an
ethnic category, takes on the character of an ideology by which
people interpret their relationships within and without the net-
work of ethnic cohorts. At this point, we can say that an ethnic
group has emerged.1
The content of the unifying ideology may vary from group
to group, but it always involves a common symbol or set of
symbols. The key symbols may be racial features, religious
practices, a monarchy, or common acceptance of some kind of
charter myth, for example. Inasmuch as symbols and ideology
are involved, we regard the formation of ethnic groups as very
much a cultural process as well as a structural one, although
we agree with Barth that once a group is formed its culture
content may change drastically without the boundaries of the
group being affected. For Rotumans, the dominant symbol of
their shared ethnicity is the island of Rotuma itself: any person
may claim to be a Rotuman if one or more of his known an-
cestors was born on the island and shared in the core social and
cultural life that characterizes the society.2
As reported in an earlier article on conservatism among the
Rotumans, the emergence of a consolidating ideology is rooted
in the bicultural experience of nontraditional leaders, that is,
individuals whose prestige accrues from success in Western
occupations and professions (Howard 1963a:73–74). These
leaders are people of influence because they are educated Ro-
tumans among uneducated Rotumans; their success in the
outside world is acknowledged by other Rotumans as signif-
icant. Their influence and high status are located within the Ro-
tuman community and depend on its existence. Moreover, they
are leaders because of a demonstrated commitment to Rotuma,
a commitment that has become highly conscious as a result of
European education and experience in a Europeanized society.
Having learned the mechanics of European culture, they have
also learned to evaluate their own society in abstract terms as,
for example, these terms are used in school to describe models
of law and social organization (such as the government of Great
Britain). Possessing an intellectual idiom for perceiving a so-
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ciety, educated Rotumans have often been struck by the incon-
sistencies between ideology and behavior in Western societies,
as compared to a far greater consistency in Rotuman values and
behavior, and between Western (particularly Christian) ideology
and Rotuman behavior. Their education has therefore tended
to foster an idealism about their own society while their expe-
rience has provided means to implement their ideas in com-
munity action.
Before describing the circumstances that have generated
a Rotuman ethnic group in Fiji, we present in the following
section some aspects of social life on Rotuma that are relevant
to our basic discussion.3
ROTUMA
From Cession in 1881 until Fiji was granted independence,
Rotuma was administered by Great Britain as part of the Colony
of Fiji. The decision leading to this arrangement was based on
administrative convenience rather than on any existing ties be-
tween Rotuma and Fiji. In language, culture, and physical type
Rotumans are clearly distinct from Fijians, resembling more
closely than the latter the Polynesians to the east. Adminis-
tration of Rotuma (which lies some 300 miles north of the Fiji
group) was in the hands of a district officer who was responsible
to the commissioner and, ultimately, to the governor of Fiji. In
addition to his administrative duties, the district officer had the
power of second-class magistrate and presided over the Council
of Rotuma, which was composed of the paramount chiefs of
the island’s seven traditional districts, an elected representative
from each district, and the senior medical officer on the island.4
The traditional social organization is based on a system of
bilateral kinship. A key concept is kainaga, which in its broadest
sense refers to kinsmen and in a more restricted sense to the
bilateral descendants of an ancestor holding rights over a par-
ticular parcel of land. Kainaga, in the restricted sense, are the
major landholding units. In each traditional district, a limited
number of kainaga hold the right to a chiefly name, some being
eligible for paramount chieftainship within the district, others
not. Districts are divided into ho‘aga, which comprise from
three to seventeen households (with an average of ten). Ho‘aga
are essentially work units, whose members have an obligation
to assist one another in times of crisis and on ceremonial oc-
casions. The most basic socio-economic unit in Rotuma is the
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kau noho‘ag ‘household’ (essentially persons sharing a common
hearth and comprising a common consumption unit, since food
is easily the most important consumable commodity). The modal
‘household’ consists of a nuclear family with one or more rel-
atives of either spouse (39.3 percent) or a nuclear family by
itself (29.6 percent). Persons who are not members of a nuclear
family (widowed and divorced persons, orphans, offspring of
unwed mothers, unmarried adults) tend to have a high rate
of residential mobility, moving from household to household.
Almost every Rotuman man is an agriculturist, at least while
living on Rotuma. Even those engaged in wage labor maintain
gardens to provide their families with food. A man is judged
primarily in his role as provider, and to be a good provider
means to bring home more than enough food for his family’s
needs. With the exception of wage earners, this means being
a competent and industrious farmer and harvesting available
copra. The women on Rotuma have as their major tasks the care
of children, keeping the household clean and presentable, and
supplementing the family food supply by fishing on the reef.
This sexual division of labor is not rigid, however, and cooper-
ation between husbands and wives on domestic tasks is the rule
rather than the exception.
The traditional kinship-based socioeconomic organization is
crosscut by geographical divisions. Within Rotuma the sharpest
in-group/out-group distinctions are essentially territorial. We
found it rather striking that stereotypes held by persons of
each district paralleled those between ethnic groups elsewhere.
These stereotypes typically focus on alleged behavioral differ-
ences; for example, the people of one district are ridiculed as
being like chickens—that is, marrying with kinsmen who are
genealogically closer than deemed appropriate. For each dis-
trict (and in some cases for each village) it is possible to elicit
a stereotype that has currency and is essentially shared. Fur-
thermore, it soon became clear to us that territorial proximity
plays an extraordinary role in structuring social relations on
the island. It is a general rule that people who interact fre-
quently as neighbors, especially as ‘work unit’ mates, manifest
a strong solidarity; correspondingly, clashes between neighbors
often precipitate a residential move by one or the other. Even
close kinship ties are rarely strong enough to overcome long-
term geographical separation.
Two other organizational principles crosscut those of
kinship: one is religion and the other is the formation of vol-
untary associations. Voluntary organizations are formed mainly
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for the purpose of playing such European sports as soccer,
rugby, and cricket. They are generally ephemeral organizations,
lasting only as long as interest in a particular sport is salient.
As a matter of convenience they tend to be strongly influenced
by territorial patterning. For all practical purposes the only reli-
gious groups represented on the island since Cession have been
Methodists and Catholics. The division between these groups
largely coincides with a pre-European political division and,
therefore, also has a strong territorial patterning. Rivalry be-
tween the two religious groups was intense enough to provoke
a war just prior to Cession, and religion has remained a sig-
nificant factor in ordering social relations on the island to the
present day. Cross-religious marriages are frowned upon, and
when they do take place one of the partners usually is required
to convert. Even here, the power of territorially based solidarity
is manifest: it is the person who takes up residence in the
spouse’s village who changes religion.
Ethnicity is another factor considered by Rotumans in
accounting for behavioral differences on the island. The obvious
cases are when Europeans, Fijians, or Indians are involved. At-
titudinally, there is a hierarchical structure of stereotypes for
these three groups. While Europeans are regarded as superior
and are afforded deference (although they are also seen as
an enigma), Rotumans regard Fijians and Indians as of lesser
status than themselves and sometimes treat them with mild
disdain. Because the number of such cultural aliens on Rotuma
has always been very small in the past, Rotumans have not
been under pressure to differentiate themselves as an ethnic
group while confined to the island. Although they developed rel-
atively clear conceptions of other ethnic categories, their con-
ception of “Rotuman” remained vague. In large part it remained
vague because the great majority of people on the island rarely
if ever interacted with non-Rotumans, and so the interfaces be-
tween ethnic groups remained shadowy. It was only after people
gained a sense of what it is like to be treated as a Rotuman
(rather than as a farmer, a man from the district Oinafa, a
chief) that a sense of ethnicity crystallized. Our argument is that
this did not occur until substantial Rotuman enclaves developed
in Fiji. In recent years, as the circulation of people between
Rotuma and Fiji has increased to the point that most adults on
the island have spent some time in Fiji, awareness of Rotuman
ethnicity has spread throughout the population. Even so, such
ethnic identity is salient only in Fiji as a basis for self-identity
and for ordering social relationships.
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ROTUMANS IN FIJI
Rotuman emigration to Fiji in substantial numbers has been
relatively recent. The census of 1921 shows only 123 Rotumans,
or 5.5 percent of the total Rotuman population, residing in Fiji
(Fiji Legislative Council 1922). Fifteen years later the figure had
risen only to 273 persons, representing 9.7 percent of all Ro-
tumans. Since 1936, however, the rise has been rapid—to 569
persons in 1946 (17.2 percent) and 1,429 persons in 1956 (32.3
percent). The biggest Rotuman concentration in 1956 was in
Ba Province, the site of a large gold mining industry. Most Ro-
tumans living in Ba reside in Vatukoula, where the mine is lo-
cated, or in the nearby town of Tavua. In 1956, when the Fiji
census was taken, the Rotuman population of Ba totaled 669.
The second largest concentration was in Suva city, with 372 Ro-
tumans. Third came Lautoka township with 71 Rotumans, then
Levuka township with 56 Rotumans. These four locations ac-
counted for 81.7 percent of all Rotumans living in Fiji at the
time. Vatukoula not only contained the most Rotumans in ab-
solute terms during 1956 but also showed the highest ratio of
Rotumans to others (103 per 1,000); next came Levuka (37 per
1,000), then Lautoka (10 per 1,000), and finally Suva (1 per
l,000) (McArthur 1958).
By 1961, when we conducted our census of Rotumans in
Fiji, the overall number of Rotumans in Fiji had swelled con-
siderably. Increases were taking place selectively, however, with
Suva and Lautoka absorbing almost all additional migrants and
Vatukoula and Levuka remaining nearly constant. Thus the
1966 Fiji census shows 986 Rotumans in Suva, an increase over
1956 of 165 percent, and Lautoka shows an increase to 187
Rotumans for an increase of 163 percent (Zwart 1968). These
were, in effect, open towns from the standpoint of Rotuman mi-
grants. The Rotuman population of Levuka, on the other hand,
decreased by 14 (–25 percent) and that of Vatukoula decreased
by 3 (–0.6 percent). These were closed communities from a mi-
gratory viewpoint. During the same period the population of
Rotuma increased by 7 percent. We shall refer to Rotumans
in each of these urban areas as constituting an “ethnic en-
clave”—that is, members of an ethnic category who are residen-
tially embedded in a sociopolitical unit dominated by others.
Before going on to a comparative analysis of Rotuman com-
munities in Fiji, it is important for our argument to describe
briefly the social structure of ethnicity in Fiji at the time of our
study. One may gain a good initial picture of ethnic divisions
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from the dominant European perspective by referring to the
census categories used. The 1956 census lists seven categories:
Chinese and part-Chinese, European, part-European, Fijian,
Indian, Rotuman, and Other Pacific Islander. Broadly speaking,
and again from a European point of view, these groups may be
arranged in three major status categories with Europeans at the
top, part-Europeans intermediate, and native populations (in-
cluding Indians as well as Fijians and Rotumans) at the bottom.
The Chinese are generally less visible socially and their rank
is less clearly defined. There are, however, refinements within
these groups, one being that the Polynesian Rotumans are gen-
erally regarded as more advanced than the Melanesian Fijians.5
The key population from the standpoint of ethnic mobility within
this system is the part-European group. Because they are
racially mixed, social entry into this group is less rigidly
bounded than those based on “pure” race. Thus an educated
Fijian remains just that, unless he happens to have a European
ancestor and shows at least some European racial features; he
can then pass as a part-European and probably increase his
social privilege. It is significant for our purposes that Rotumans
enjoy a distinct advantage over Fijians and Indians with regard
to this mobility channel. As Polynesians, they were favored as
mates and mistresses by European men, so a high proportion of
Rotumans have a European ancestor. But apart from that, their
physical type is closer to that of the stereotypic part-European,
making it easier to gain acceptance without resorting to ge-
nealogical credentials. This circumstance probably has retarded
the consolidation of a Rotuman ethnic identity within Fiji in
some respects. It was easy enough, while numbers were small,
for Rotumans to pass for part-European, particularly since a
high proportion of early emigrants were in professional roles
such as teachers, and medical officers. The situation in Levuka
during 1960 was probably indicative of this early phase.
LEVUKA
Levuka, on the island of Ovalau, was the original capital of Fiji
when the colony was formed. After the capital was shifted to
Suva, Levuka remained an administrative center (the location of
the eastern commissioner, who holds jurisdiction over Rotuma),
but its importance slipped as a commercial and trading town.
The population of Levuka in 1956 was 1,535, including 56
persons registered as Rotumans (McArthur 1958).
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At the time of our study only six fully Rotuman households
existed in Levuka. Three of these were headed by men of profes-
sional status. A fourth was headed by a physician, Dr. Kautane,
who ranks as the senior assistant medical officer on the island of
Ovalau.6 The other two Rotuman households were headed by a
clerical worker and a postman. In addition to these, there were
two Rotumans (living with non-Rotuman spouses) and two Rotu-
man men, each of whom had a Rotuman mother and a European
father. The community was rounded out by seven student board-
ers and five Catholic nuns.
A significant feature of the Levuka enclave is that most of
the residents were assigned to their positions; they did not opt
to go there in search of employment or to be with relatives.
In fact, most of the residents are functionally nonkinsmen. This
distinguishes Levuka from the other communities to be dis-
cussed, in which kinship has played an important role in ex-
panding and organizing the enclave. As a corollary to this,
Rotumans in Levuka are geographically scattered instead of
being clustered in a neighborhood.
The Rotuman enclave in Levuka has no formal organization,
and no exclusively Rotuman clubs have been formed. Dr.
Kautane is the unquestioned leader of the enclave, but strictly
in an informal fashion. He is the one to whom people go for
advice regarding things Rotuman, and he serves as a critical
link with the home island by transmitting and receiving infor-
mation. It is to him that Rotumans outside the Levuka enclave
look when mobilization of resources is required. His primary
credentials are extraordinary prestige within the broader com-
munity and relatively lengthy residence in Levuka as well as
compelling personal characteristics. He is one of three native
members of the Masonic lodge in Fiji and a member of two pri-
marily European clubs; his closest friends are European and
part-European. He owns his own well-furnished and spacious
home, which serves as a hostel for Rotuman schoolchildren
studying in Levuka. Dr. Kautane is fluent in English and Fijian,
although Rotuman remains the predominant language within
his household.
Socially, then, the Rotuman enclave in Levuka forms a
loosely knit network with Dr. Kautane as the major node. Inter-
action is most frequent among the professional men and their
families, although there are occasions, such as births, when
most members of the network are present. But these occasions
are rare, and what is more important, most persons include in
their intimate network several non-Rotumans. Also of relevance
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is that Levuka is a small town, and, particularly among the pro-
fessionals, people are placed socially more by their positions
than their ethnicity. As a result, the ethnic boundaries circum-
scribing Rotuman ethnicity in Levuka are permeable. Whatever
centripetal forces are generated by a common language and
sense of kinship are more than balanced by such centrifugal
forces as professional association, interethnic organization, and
neighborhood scatter.
LAUTOKA
Unlike Levuka, Lautoka was a rapidly expanding town during
our period of research. A new wharf had just been completed,
and in addition to being the commercial and administrative
center for one side of Viti Levu, Lautoka was beginning to serve
as a major international seaport as well. Previously, the town
centered mainly on the Colonial Sugar Refinery and had served
as a market town for the sugar plantations which occupy much
of the land around it. The 1956 census showed a population
of 7,420 for Lautoka, including 71 Rotumans (McArthur 1958);
but by 1960 the population had climbed above 10,000, and the
number of Rotumans had more than doubled. Our question-
naire on residential mobility revealed that the Rotuman popu-
lation in Lautoka includes few short-term visitors, particularly
very few of those from Rotuma who intend to return to their
home island. In this respect it contrasts most with Suva, where
a high proportion of households include short-term “guests.”
As in Levuka, the Rotumans in Lautoka are residentially scat-
tered, but the Lautoka community does contain a core network
of closely related families.
Although there are no formal Rotuman organizations in
Lautoka, the level of Rotuman-oriented activity is higher and
the formalization of leadership is somewhat greater than in
Levuka. A monthly service is held in the Rotuman language at
the local Methodist church with the two Rotuman preachers
in Lautoka presiding. Unscheduled meetings of the entire Ro-
tuman community in Lautoka are called every month or so by
Mekatoa, the acknowledged leader of most of the families in
Lautoka. Very little business is discussed at these gatherings
according to Mekatoa, but he believes they are necessary to
keep the Rotuman community together. Because of the larger
population, and owing to the greater degree of kin relatedness
than in Levuka, there are more births, marriages, and funerals
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to bring people together and reinforce their sense of Rotuman
identity, but these still occur at irregular intervals and with
much less frequency than in Rotuma proper. In an attempt to
perpetuate Rotuman identity among the children growing up in
Lautoka, a night school was organized some years ago to teach
them the essentials of Rotuman custom, but the venture did not
take and dissolved from unknown causes.
Mekatoa has resided in Lautoka since 1939 and is employed
as a fitter for the Public Works Department. He is acknowledged
by all but three families to be the informal leader of the Ro-
tumans in Lautoka. The three families who do not recognize
Mekatoa’s leadership broke with him after an incident involving
kinsmen in Vatukoula and now look to one of their own for lead-
ership. Mekatoa also serves as coordinator of the Rotumans
within the Methodist church. As a leader, he enjoys neither the
legitimacy of Rotuman chieftainship nor the charisma of Dr.
Kautane in Levuka. His main credentials, in fact, come from his
long-term residence in Lautoka and familiarity with the local
scene. Whenever a new Rotuman family comes to Lautoka, they
are expected to inform Mekatoa of their arrival and intentions;
he then keeps them informed about Rotuman affairs.
Discussions with Mekatoa indicated that keeping the Ro-
tuman community together in Lautoka takes a strong conscious
effort on his part; without it, he says, the community would dis-
solve and Rotuman custom would be neglected. The factional
dispute mentioned above is only one indication of the tenu-
ousness of group solidarity. Although the Rotumans in Lautoka
are more organized than those in Levuka, they do not form a co-
hesive group. Ethnicity there has not yet clearly emerged as the
primary basis for structuring social relationships, although it is
clearly of significance.
SUVA
Suva is the city of Fiji. It is the center of government, com-
merce, and entertainment and by far the most cosmopolitan of
Fiji’s urban areas. The population of Suva in 1956 was 37,371,
of whom 372 were Rotumans (McArthur 1958). Residentially,
Rotumans concentrate in a few clusters in different parts of the
city; generally the clusters are formed around acknowledged
kinship ties. The range of occupations represented among Ro-
tumans in Suva is greater than in any of the other communities,
and the degree of residential fluidity is greatest there. Persons
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coming to Fiji from Rotuma are most likely to spend their initial
time in Suva, either because it is the center for services they
are seeking (medical, governmental, educational) or because
it offers the most by way of urban contrast with Rotuma. The
entire picture, reflecting that of the general urban milieu, is one
of considerable social, economic, and residential fluidity. Suva
is the place where Rotumans come to seek their fortune, so to
speak, and for many this changes on a daily basis.
Whereas the Rotuman enclaves in Levuka and Lautoka could
be considered as singular loosely knit networks, in Suva it
would be more accurate to characterize the social arrangement
as consisting of several closely knit networks within a rather
open-ended system of relationships. For one thing, class differ-
ences based on Europeanization and educational and occupa-
tional differences are more pronounced in Suva than elsewhere
in Fiji and they are reflected in contrastive life-styles. There are
also several Rotuman clubs to be found in Suva, some of which
are exclusive to district of origin in Rotuma and help newcomers
adjust to the city, although others are open to all Rotumans and
serve as sports clubs as well as fraternal organizations. Both the
Methodist and the Catholic churches in Suva regularly perform
services in the Rotuman language, and each sponsors Rotuman-
oriented activities such as bazaars and bingo.
Leadership within the Suva community is essentially in-
formal, as in Levuka, but it is multiple. Several Rotuman men
with high positions in the professions or in government reside in
Suva, and each is looked up to by a portion of the enclave. They
are asked for advice on issues pertaining to their competencies,
but none is acknowledged by all to be their spokesman. Several
attempts have been made to organize the entire community, but
all have been short-lived. It seems that internal differences of in-
terest are too great, and the pressures from outside too little, to
sustain solidarity. Nevertheless, it is far easier for an immigrant
to remain wholly within a Rotuman social world in Suva than
it is in either Levuka or Lautoka since the variety of Rotuman-
held jobs encompasses the entire range of services available
without going beyond the boundaries of the ethnic enclave. This
is made possible by the larger size of the Suva enclave and by
residential clustering in parts of the city.
Suva thus seems to provide conditions conducive both to
opening and to closing ethnic boundaries. Among the Euro-
peanized professionals and white-collar workers, it is often ex-
pedient to minimize one’s Rotuman background and pass as a
part-European or to leave the whole question of ethnicity un-
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spoken. Some minimize their affiliation with other Rotumans,
including kinsmen, in order to reduce the drain on their ac-
cumulating resources. For these individuals Rotuman ethnicity
plays a minimal role in structuring their social life. For others,
however, the fact of “Rotumanness” becomes paramount. They
are aware that the vast majority of people in the city are eth-
nically different from themselves and speak languages they do
not understand. They confine all significant social relations to
the Rotuman enclave and come to see the contrast between Ro-
tumans and non-Rotumans as the most significant ones in their
social worlds.
VATUKOULA
Vatukoula grew up as a result of a gold mining operation begun
in 1935 by three mining companies owned by overseas Eu-
ropean interests. Initially it was assumed that the mining oper-
ation would be short-term and so it was based on open-cut work,
but later on the lodes were found to have depth and under-
ground shafts have sustained a commercially profitable oper-
ation. Two of the companies ceased operations in 1959, leaving
the Emperor Gold Mining Company in complete control. At the
time of our study the EGMC’s management formed the effective
government for the entire community in the classic style of
colonial enterprise.
The mine management explicitly divides its employees into
ethnic categories as follows: Europeans, part-Europeans (ac-
tually limited to Euronesians, or mixtures between Europeans
and Pacific Islanders), Fijians, Rotumans, and Indians. Each
ethnic group has been allocated living quarters supplied by the
management. The quarters allocated to Rotuman workers are
insufficient for their needs, and many are forced to reside 10
miles away in Tavua until additional housing is made available
by the mine management. Unfurnished houses in Vatukoula are
assigned to individual workers and their families; the worker
is responsible for the upkeep of the house and pays a modest
rent. A worker is not permitted to sublet his house, and when
he leaves the mine’s employment he is obliged to vacate. The
house is then reallocated by the mine’s management. Thus, al-
though residence itself is quite stable in Vatukoula, there is an
aura of impermanence within the community.
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Although wages are the main basis of support, land for
cultivation is made available by request to the company. Despite
the perpetuation of subsistence activities by almost all the Ro-
tuman households, a fundamental alteration has occurred in
the relationship between people and capital in this new envi-
ronment. In Rotuma, a person’s descent group has use rights
over his land and can make legitimate claims on it for copra
cutting and residence sites. In Vatukoula, on the other hand, the
sole criterion legitimizing control of capital goods (house and
cultivated land) is merit with the company. A result of this al-
tered situation is that kinsmen, including parents, may be con-
sidered parasitic in Vatukoula if they stay in a household to
which they do not materially contribute. The critical distinction
is that wages do not involve prior capital, and they can be ac-
cumulated. Traditional rights are therefore not involved in the
same way, and the provision of support is likely to be inter-
preted by a wage earner as an act of benevolence rather than
one of obligation. Nevertheless, Vatukoula had the lowest per-
centage of nuclear households and the highest percentage of
expanded households of any of the Rotuman enclaves studied.7
This follows from the traditional Rotuman rule that those who
are well off ought to nurture those who are not, and since em-
ployment in the mines is tantamount to being well off for Ro-
tumans in Fiji, relatives are drawn to them. The net result is
a high degree of intrahousehold conflict and strains on rela-
tionships that are more severe in Vatukoula than elsewhere.
At the same time, some informants believe that wage earning
tends to reduce disputes between households that stem from
the system of land tenure on Rotuma. They point out that on
Rotuma, when a man needs money he must take coconuts for
copra off family land, thereby creating competition for limited
resources, whereas in Vatukoula, as one man put it, “We earn
our money by our own sweat and it is clean money.” When
asked what he meant by “clean money,” he explained that it was
free of the dirt of land problems and the potent curses that ac-
company family disputes.
Within the mining community itself, internal residence
change is most often the result of house promotion. Thus
whenever a house becomes vacant within the Rotuman allo-
cation, workers with less desirable homes are given an oppor-
tunity to occupy it in order of merit with the company. This
generally starts a chain response—a worker vacates his house
in order to occupy another, someone in an inferior structure
moves into his, and so on. Ultimately, this may result in someone
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who has been residing outside the company town in Tavua
obtaining a company house. One consequence of this system
is that job status within the company is directly translated
into a highly visible form of social rank. This contrasts with
Rotuma, where there is far less congruence between social
status and quality of housing, and herein lies what may be a fun-
damental metaphoric distinction between the two communities.
On Rotuma, social status often is symbolized in acts of social
deference; in Vatukoula, it is the kind of house one resides in
that conveys one’s social standing. Correspondingly, on Rotuma
social merit is judged largely in terms of the degree to which a
man uses his resources in the service of relationships and for
community benefit; in Vatukoula social merit is very strongly
(though not unequivocally) tied to the position a man holds in
the mining company.
These shifts in perspective are part and parcel of an ad-
justment to a wage-oriented market economy and away from
an economic system based on subsistence and ceremonial re-
distribution. Although Rotuma itself is involved in the money
economy of Fiji and the rest of the modern world, on the island
money has been adapted to the traditional system rather than
having transformed it (see Howard 1970). In Vatukoula Ro-
tuman custom has been adapted to the pressures of a cap-
italistic society; this is particularly evident in the way cere-
monial events are handled. The most relevant social aspect of
such events on Rotuma, the ritualized redistribution of food,
mats, and other items, is precisely the feature that came under
heaviest attack in Vatukoula. On several occasions known to
us, persons in Vatukoula refused to participate in ceremonial
(redistributive) exchanges at weddings and other events in-
volving close kinsmen and insisted on giving a cash gift instead.
The motives behind such deviations from custom seem to be
based on a growing economic conservatism oriented toward
maintaining a life-style commensurate with one’s rank in the
company and a cautious but nevertheless intense desire on the
part of some leaders to raise the Rotumans’ standard of living
and esteem vis-à-vis other groups. Characteristically, every
leader or would-be leader has a scheme of some sort for im-
proving the economic well-being of the Rotuman community.
Rather than being aimed at accumulating more goods, these
plans are calculated to save money. This preoccupation appears
to characterize Rotuman attitudes when dealing with collective
assets, not only in Vatukoula but on Rotuma as well. The Rotuma
Development Fund and the Rotuma Cooperative Association, for
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example, both have accumulated substantial assets which, de-
spite prodding by the colonial government, remain unspent. In
neither case are the Rotumans willing to eliminate the copra
taxes and high prices on goods, despite the fact that these are
genuine burdens on the population.
One can only speculate about the reasons for this dispo-
sition. Perhaps it has to do with pride. We believe that to Ro-
tumans the accumulation of money is symbolic of a capacity
to master the socioeconomic system that has been imposed on
them. The metaphoric power of the symbol lies, we suspect,
in the measure of independence that is predicated on having
capital reserves.
The concern of Rotumans for retaining independence and
control over their own affairs has been expressed in several
ways in Vatukoula, often to the dismay of the mine management.
This feature of Rotuman coping tactics is evident in the view
held by Mr. Carson, a European, the mine’s welfare officer.
From our field notes come Carson’s observations.
Mr. Carson feels that one of the problems in his relations with
the Rotumans is that they tend to allocate themselves more power
than they actually have. An example of this problem is that the
Rotumans believe they should have the power to allocate housing.
The mine management assigns housing facilities on the basis of
seniority of merits. The Rotuman community has various other
criteria of seniority that the mine management does not rec-
ognize, and this is the basis of the conflict. Mr. Carson states that
the heads of the Rotuman community approached him once and
wanted their native minister to have a house better than he de-
served by his other merits. After a good deal of consideration,
Mr. Carson pulled all available strings and got him the house in
question. This was all done with the recognition by Mr. Carson
that the minister was a man of great value to the community as
a whole. He confides that he is still feeling the dissatisfaction of
his superiors from that move. The Rotumans have come to him
recently and not only told him who should go into a given empty
Rotuman house, but have declared that a vacant European house
across the field should be let to a Rotuman family.
This concern for housing, incidentally, suggests that although
Rotumans have accepted the symbolic significance of housing
for social status they are unwilling to yield completely to the
mine’s unilateral right to assign that status.
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Another illustration of this desire to control their own
destiny is the Rotuman mess hall, which is run exclusively by
Rotuman shareholders. Each worker has a card that is punched
every time he has a meal. At the end of each month, the cards
are totaled and a list is sent to the company. The company then
subtracts that amount from the individual’s wages and turns
it over to the Rotuman mess; profits are then distributed to
the shareholders. What is significant about this is that the Ro-
tumans are the only ones in Vatukoula who take care of their
own food. The part-European and European mess are run by
contract to a Chinese caterer; the Fijian mess is taken care of
by the company. The advantage enjoyed by Rotumans in their
arrangement lies not only in profits but also in the capacity to
allocate jobs within the mess to Rotumans.
This ability of the Rotumans to organize, and the attitudes
underlying their quest for control, can be better understood in
the perspective of the way leadership has evolved within the
community. The first pure ‘headman’ (a person with the right to
make decisions for a collective) was Tafaki, who was also the
first Rotuman to be employed at the mines (in 1939).8 He had
a reputation in 1960 for having been too weak in his dealings
with the mine management. Tafaki’s headmanship ended with
his discharge from the company after he left his wife and family
and ran off with another woman.
After a brief interval, Riamkau, an electrician with the com-
pany and a man of strong character, was chosen as ‘headman’
by the Rotuman employees. In a short time he had gained a
commitment from the company for better housing, but his ag-
gressive manner also generated some antagonism within the
community. Then Chief Tausia, one of the seven paramount
chiefs from Rotuma, visited Vatukoula in 1950 and appointed
another man, Vai, as ‘headman’. Our informants claimed that
this move was unpopular but encountered no overt opposition.
Vai remained ‘headman’ until his death in 1960. He was de-
scribed as a weak leader, somewhat like a Rotuman chief whose
concern is more with ritual honor than with the instrumental ex-
igencies of leadership. It seems evident that despite Vai’s formal
role as ‘headman’, Riamkau, who assumed a chiefly title in the
mid-1950s, retained a great deal of influence in the community
and was the dominant political force. Thus when Vai returned
to Rotuma in 1959 to discuss the effects of an ill-fated land
commission, Riamkau took over in his absence and immediately
introduced some dramatic structural changes. He appointed a
committee composed of one man of chiefly descent from each
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district on Rotuma and then held a meeting of the entire com-
munity and obtained a confirmational vote.9 Upon Vai’s return,
Riamkau turned the role of leader back to him, but the com-
mittee remained operative.
Interestingly, the resultant structure very nearly duplicated
the social structure on Rotuma. Thus the ‘headman’ in
Vatukoula was put in a very similar position to the district
officer on Rotuma, and the committee corresponded to the
Council of Chiefs. Even the monthly meetings, which rotated
among committee members’ households, paralleled the Ro-
tuman custom of rotating host districts. After Vai’s death, a
meeting of the entire community was held in the Rotuman hall
(built by the mines for the exclusive use of the Rotuman com-
munity) for the purpose of selecting a new ‘headman’. Riamkau
was elected. Acting on a proposal by one of the defeated can-
didates, the committee then passed a motion limiting the term
of the ‘headman’ to two years. The inference was that Vai, who
had been in the office for ten years, would have been replaced
under such an arrangement.
The committee arrangement created some problems for the
mine management in their dealings with the Rotuman communi-
ty. Many of the problems that arose in relations between Rotu-
mans and the mine management required, in the latter’s
opinion, more rapid decision making than was possible under
the new arrangement. Furthermore, whereas Vai had been em-
ployed in Carson’s department (a position virtually ensuring
subservience), Riamkau is an electrician and works in a dif-
ferent part of the mine’s operation. As a solution, Carson pro-
posed that Sosefo Holt, a young, rather Europeanized Rotuman,
be appointed clerical assistant in his office to act as a liaison
between himself and Riamkau. This proposal was rejected by
the Rotumans, in large measure, we were told, because the
Rotumans regarded Sosefo as a man who was strictly out for
his own interests and would not adequately represent the com-
munity. It is likely, of course, that the mine management was
well aware of the potential such an arrangement would have
had for diluting Riamkau’s leadership and Rotuman solidarity in
general. Riamkau had made it clear in his election platform that
he was not afraid of the management and would try to push for
the welfare of the Rotumans even if his position with the mine
would be jeopardized. As the following passage from our field
notes makes clear, he was tapping a basic Rotuman attitude:
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Tomasi says that Vai was fine for dealing within the Rotuman
community itself, but he was too masraga ‘shy’, ‘respectfully def-
erential’ to present Rotuman views forcefully to the European ad-
ministrators. Riamkau, on the other hand, will go all the way to
the general manager if he sees fit and is not afraid to deal with
the management on even terms. Tomasi expressed in his conver-
sation that the Europeans are always trying to buy out Rotuman
leaders.
Rotuman suspiciousness of Europeans as being clandestine
manipulators out to get around the Rotuman people seems to
be one of the Rotumans’ big leadership problems. The Rotuman
leader who is well aware of European mannerisms and customs,
and displays them publicly, is often suspected of lacking alle-
giance to the Rotuman community. Another problem, leading to
misunderstandings between Rotuman leaders and European ad-
ministrators, is the reluctance Rotumans show in passing vital in-
formation to the Europeans for fear it will be used to their own
detriment.
Despite expressions of overall solidarity, including firm
dealings with the management and the refusal of Rotumans to
work on a day following the death of one of their number, lines
of cleavage do exist within the Rotuman community. These are
generally kept out of the management’s view. In addition to dis-
trict of origin on Rotuma, recognition of which has been made
explicit in the formation of the committee, kinship and religion
remain powerful organizational principles among Rotumans in
Vatukoula. Kinship figures prominently in recruiting for jobs
and in structuring informal relations, but it can also be divisive
in that leaders are under pressure to favor their kin in deci-
sions requiring impartiality. Also, as previously reported, the ex-
pectations of visiting relatives concerning extended, dependent
visits is frequently a cause of intrafamilial conflict. The Catholic-
Methodist dichotomy also remains potentially schismatic but
thus far has not resulted in factional conflict. In general, it was
our impression that church-oriented activities are somewhat
less central in people’s lives than on Rotuma. For example, the
Catholic group had not held a kato aga ‘large-scale feast in
honor of a notable event’ for nine years, the last time being
upon completion of a new church. On Rotuma, during our year
of fieldwork, two such feasts were held.
Despite these lines of cleavage, the overwhelming im-
pression we received in Vatukoula was one of community soli-
darity and ethnic pride. In the mines, being a Rotuman seemed
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to be more important to people’s sense of identity than being
from Oinafa, being a Catholic, being so-and-so’s kinsman, or
being a winder-driver. People spoke of “Rotumans” in reference-
group terms far more often in Vatukoula than elsewhere, in-
cluding Rotuma, and were concerned with their reputation as
an ethnic group in more active ways. They had clearly extended
their idea of personal relationships to include any person who
could be identified as Rotuman.
The development of firm ethnic boundaries that has taken
place in Vatukoula has resulted in sharpened ethnic stereo-
typing and a crystallization of intergroup attitudes. Let us now
consider Rotuman-other relations in this context.
If there is any dominant quality governing attitudes of
others toward Rotumans and vice versa, it could be charac-
terized as ambivalence. On the whole, the Europeans at the
mine and elsewhere in Fiji have high regard for Rotumans in
comparison with other native peoples. This is reflected both in
the high proportion of Rotumans employed in the mines and in
their overrepresentation in positions of responsibility. European
managers of various mine departments were nearly universal
in their praise of Rotuman employees. Despite such praise, it
was our feeling that the general attitude of Europeans was
somewhat condescending, that the praise had an implicit (if not
explicit) condition—in comparison with other native peoples. It
was as if their assumption is that native peoples are generally
rather hopeless and that Rotumans sometimes surprise them.
Rotuman pride is something of an anathema to many
Europeans precisely because Rotumans refuse to conform to
the docile, childlike native of the European stereotype. Thus Mr.
Dawson, the stock manager for the mines, openly dislikes the
Rotumans. “They haven’t an ounce of brains, and besides, they
hate Europeans,” he commented. When asked how they show
their hostility, he could not pinpoint any specific actions, but his
analysis made it clear that he equates hostility with refusing
to accept European dominance unconditionally. The reasons he
gives for the failure of Fijians to perform better at the mines is
instructive. He attributes their lack of success to the refusal of
most Europeans to join them in their work. Too often, he claims,
Europeans tell the Fijians what to do and then go away, as if to
show that they would never do that kind of work themselves. In
his own dealings with Fijians, Dawson says that he gets right in
there with them, “even if it means getting mud on my boots and
getting my hands dirty”; as long as he is with them, “I’d match
my Fijians against any group in Vatukoula” (our emphasis). He
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adds that he would rather have a not-so-smart fellow who is
willing to learn as best he can than a smart one, because the
smart ones are those who will fight for themselves and are not
“behind you.” Mr. Carson’s complaints about Rotumans allo-
cating too much authority to themselves, reported above, also
illustrate the irritation caused to Europeans by Rotuman pride
and self-respect.
The Rotumans, for their part, acknowledge the social
superiority of Europeans only inasmuch as it is associated with
standard of living, education, and occupation. They do not ac-
knowledge racial superiority, nor do they accept everything
culturally European as superior to those practices that are cul-
turally Rotuman. In short, they perceive no insurmountable bar-
riers in their Rotuman ethnicity to achieving an acceptable
position in the modern world.
One manifestation of the fluidity with which Rotumans per-
ceive racial boundaries is the ease with which they slip into the
part-European category after gaining an education and when it
suits their purpose. The advantage of passing for part-European
rather than Rotuman stems from European rather than Ro-
tuman ethnic conceptions. In general, the Rotuman stereotype
of part-Europeans is unfavorable; they are seen as pretentious,
particularly since the behavior of several of the more familiar
models is less than exemplary. But being a part-European pro-
vides the possibility for entrance into the European social world
in a way that being a Rotuman does not. There are six such
people in Vatukoula, and their attempt to pass as part-European
signals not only an aspiration to move up the ethnic hierarchy
but also an alienation from the Rotuman community.
Relations between Rotumans and Fijians are likewise
marked by strong ambivalences. In general, Rotuman attitudes
toward Fijians parallel the attitudes of Europeans—a mixture of
mild disdain with patronizing condescension. They see Fijians
fairly much in the mold of indigenes quite a bit more primitive
than themselves. Yet Rotumans hold Fijian chiefs in high regard
and show them the ritual courtesies they would show their
own chiefs; in this sense they see themselves more as part
of an indigenous world in which mana and other aspects of
Malayo-Polynesian supernaturalism are significant considera-
tions. Since Rotumans do not practice sorcery whereas Fijians
do, the latter are a source of awe if not fear. In general, though,
Rotumans in Vatukoula have come to see themselves as com-
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petitive with Fijians. In charitable ventures in Vatukoula, for ex-
ample, Rotumans attempt to outdo Fijians (and other groups) in
a massive, public presentation of their contribution.10
The prevailing attitude of Fijians toward Rotumans appears
to be one of resentment. Thus it was reported to us by several
sources that incidents of hostility between Rotumans and Fi-
jians were not unusual and were caused in large measure by
Fijian resentment of privileges enjoyed by Rotumans in the
mines. During the previous year, following a massive layoff
of personnel, Fijian antipathy to Rotumans reached a boiling
point. The general consensus was that this occurred because
only one Rotuman was among those dismissed. Apparently the
matter cooled after a ceremonial presentation of kava by the
‘headman’ of the Rotuman community to the head of the Fijian
community. The headmaster of the local school also stressed
Fijian resentment of Rotuman achievement. He stated that Ro-
tuman children appear to be much brighter on the average than
Fijian children and this results in jealousy. Fijian teachers are
unnecessarily harsh with their Rotuman students, he maintains,
and will assign them all the unpleasant jobs, such as cleaning
lavatories, while assigning the pleasurable ones to the Fijians.
They never put a Rotuman child in charge of Fijians, but always
do the opposite. Rotuman teachers are discriminatory in a re-
verse fashion, he says, but with somewhat less vigor.
Before concluding this section on ethnic relations it may
be appropriate to comment on language use. In general, most
Rotuman men learn to get on well in both English and Fijian.
English is necessary to comprehend information passed down
from managers and is clearly the status language in the overall
community. Fijian, on the other hand, is frequently necessary
to communicate with Fijian workers whose command of English
is poor and who cannot be expected to learn Rotuman. Most
Rotuman women learn Fijian, but they are less likely than the
men to be accomplished in English. This is because they are
able to deal with shopkeepers, service suppliers, and in some
instances servants in Fijian even if exchanges are with Indians,
but they have less interaction than men with Europeans or other
exclusive English-speakers.11
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RESETTLEMENT AND ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS
We believe the evidence we have presented demonstrates that
the development of ethnic communities and ethnic con-
sciousness varies markedly within the different social milieus
in which migrants live. In this concluding section we discuss
some of the variables that appear to have had significant effects
on these processes for Rotumans in urban Fiji. What we would
like to account for by reference to these variables are (1) the
degree to which individuals from a given ethnic category (in
this case Rotuman) confine their meaningful social relations to
persons of a like background, (2) the degree to which ethnicity
provides a basis for formal organization, and (3) the degree
to which ethnic identity becomes salient in ordering social re-
lations with persons who do not share the same background.
Loosely speaking, we believe our study suggests a rank or-
dering of the four communities with regard to the importance of
Rotuman ethnicity. In Levuka it has the least effect, in Lautoka
and Suva it is intermediate, and in Vatukoula it is a dominant
principle.12
The variables affecting ethnicity can be classified into three
types, demographic, social structural, and cultural. We have al-
ready mentioned the prime demographic variable required for
the formation of an ethnic group in the sense we are using
the phrase—the existence of an out-group, a people sufficiently
contrastive in diacritical features to create a sense of in-group
identity. For ethnic boundaries to be formed and actively main-
tained requires, as we pointed out in the introduction, regular
contact with at least one other group. When Rotumans were
confined largely to their home island, opportunities for inter-
acting with non-Rotumans were highly restricted, thereby lim-
iting the kinds of experience upon which a solid sense of ethnic
identity could be based. In Fiji, however, Rotumans are in
regular interaction with several distinctive out-groups.
The absolute and relative size of an ethnic enclave appears
to have a significant effect. If the number of individuals in
a group is small, the possibilities for organizing along ethnic
grounds may be too restrictive, given a minimal number of roles
that must be played in a viable organization. If all are kinsmen,
of course, they may in fact form a tightly organized group, but
chances are that ethnicity will play a salient role, especially if
nonkin are required to fill crucial organizational positions. From
the standpoint of other persons in the town, ethnic stereotyping
becomes a convenient means of ordering social relations only
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when a sufficient number of persons become socially visible
to provide a consistent set of expectations. If this is correct,
there is probably a “critical mass” or threshold required for eth-
nicity to become salient. Thus we believe it is no accident that
the boundaries around Rotuman ethnicity roughly follow size of
Rotuman population in the four towns, being least distinct in
Levuka and most pronounced in Vatukoula.
Relative size of population also may exert an influence, in-
asmuch as it affects overall visibility. Even though several hun-
dred members of an ethnic group may dwell in a city, if they
are scattered and form an insignificant portion of the population
they may be absorbed without their ethnicity becoming salient.
One way in which this sometimes happens is for such people
to be incorporated into a more inclusive stereotype—as Scandi-
navians rather than Swedes or Norwegians, as Orientals rather
than Japanese or Chinese, as Polynesians rather than Rotumans
or Samoans. Scattered residence patterns may not only di-
minish ethnic saliency by making a group less visible socially;
it also reduces interaction among members of the group and
makes organization more difficult. It likewise increases inter-
action with members of out-groups who are neighbors or who
perform localized services, generating friendships and cooper-
ative relationships across ethnic lines. Contrariwise, condensed
residential patterns are likely to facilitate organizational po-
tential and diminish meaningful external contacts. Stability of
residence is likely to be another factor, since the crystallization
of ethnic identity is probably facilitated by feedback within
fixed communication networks. Also, if personnel are contin-
ually changing, organizational potential may be hampered and
leadership rendered more problematic. It seems clear that both
the nucleated residence pattern and the relative stability of res-
idence in Vatukoula have greatly increased the capacity for or-
ganization of Rotumans there in comparison with those in Suva.
One further demographic variable seems worthy of mention
although its effects are far from obvious—the degree to which
a community is growing or declining in size. Our hypothesis
is that growth through immigration tends to increase ethnic
consciousness because of the continual need to socialize new-
comers, a process frequently requiring the explication of
boundary mechanisms.
With regard to social structural variables, one must distin-
guish between those that are imposed by sources outside the
ethnic community, particularly those prevailing in dominant so-
ciopolitical groups, and those endemic to the ethnic enclave. To
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the extent that the dominant society makes ethnicity a major
criterion for defining social roles and social privilege, one would
expect ethnic consciousness to be fostered. As we have already
pointed out, in Fiji ethnicity has been the major criterion for al-
locating privilege, with the gold mining community in Vatukoula
epitomizing the situation. Thus the Rotumans coming to Fiji
stepped into a social structure that sought to classify them by
race from the very beginning. The process was fostered by their
distinctiveness from Fijians in racial type (closer to Polynesian)
and language; it was probably furthered by European favoritism
for Polynesians (with whom Rotumans are generally classified
by Europeans) over the darker Melanesians (including Fijians).
It was to the Rotumans’ advantage to accept if not nurture the
distinction. However, the presence of the part-European, or Eu-
ronesian, group probably has had a reverse effect. What is sig-
nificant about this ethnic category, in addition to the fact that
it is second in ethnic rank to European, is that its boundaries
are fuzzy; it is therefore easily permeated by those who look
like they might have some European blood, speak English rea-
sonably well, and display appropriate decorum. On looks alone,
it is easier for Rotumans to pass into this category than any
other ethnic group in Fiji. Rotumans who have acquired an edu-
cation, and particularly those who are in professional or quasi-
professional roles, have often elected to pass as part-European.
Social structural variables internal to an ethnic enclave may
be equally important for the crystallization of ethnic identity.
We might begin by considering a major point of articulation
between the ethnic community and the larger structure—the
allocation of jobs. It seems clear that in wage-earning, market-
oriented societies, one of the primary bases of shared interest
is comparability of position in the occupational structure. Men
who work together in parallel roles tend to identify with one
another and share common concerns. This was particularly ev-
ident in the gold mines, where the work is frequently dangerous
and where safety and well-being are directly in the hands of
one’s work mates. In Lautoka, Suva, and Levuka, by contrast,
Rotumans are unlikely to be working together in such teamlike
efforts. Our hypothesis is that the sharing of work roles greatly
increases male solidarity and in turn fosters the development of
ethnic solidarity.
Another variable favoring the development of viable ethnic
communities is effective, legitimized leadership. Migration may
create some difficulties on this score. Thus, on Rotuma,
chieftainship is essentially localized and related to the land; Ro-
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tumans in Fiji are deprived of these criteria. If a man assumes
a Rotuman title while in Fiji, which is possible, it will be a title
from Oinafa or Pepjei or some other Rotuman district. Other
members of the enclave are from other districts, and although
they may pay appropriate ritual deference, they are unlikely to
accept his secular leadership as legitimated by the title. Legit-
imation of leadership in Fiji has therefore become associated
with elections, and competency with political effectiveness in
the larger community. Whereas effective leadership appears to
have a strong centripetal effect on ethnic solidarity, ineffective
leadership tends to produce factional disputes along lines of ex-
isting cleavages. These may be along kin lines, as in Lautoka,
prior locality in the homeland, or religion and occupation. We
would therefore advance the proposition that the creation of
ethnic solidarity is inversely related to the number of salient di-
visive criteria within the community as well as the effectiveness
and legitimacy of leadership.
There are undoubtedly many features of culture that bear
on degree of solidarity among ethnic enclaves, and to com-
plicate matters they may operate at different levels in commu-
nication systems. For example, the degree to which a people
perceive their customs to be compatible with those of other cul-
tural groups is obviously relevant: if the enclave regards out-
siders’ customs as repugnant, or vice versa, this is likely to
inhibit assimilation and lead to rigid ethnic boundaries. But at a
broader conceptual level, the very way in which cultural formu-
lations about differences in custom are arrived at may be signif-
icant. In short, variations in epistemology of cultural difference
may be of greater importance than the differences themselves.
Whereas one group may postulate crucial differences to be
racial (this seems to have been characteristic of colonizing Eu-
ropeans), another may hold supernatural belief systems, lan-
guage, or custom to be crucial. Clearly, these different views
have different implications for the formation of ethnic bound-
aries. A people may be able to change their language but they
cannot readily change their physical characteristics.
Another significant variable has to do with the importance
of being a member of a culturally cohesive community. Some
cultural systems produce individuals who feel personally im-
mobilized unless they are part of an integral community, or at
least they derive great pleasure from being part of one. Those
reared in such a tradition tend to form compact ethnic com-
munities even when they are few in number. Other cultural
systems place a premium on independence and the mainte-
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nance of social distance from others; individuals from a back-
ground of this type may self-consciously avoid forming close ties
with other members of their ethnic category. The Rotumans are
intermediate between these extremes. They seek neither to con-
verge with nor to avoid other Rotumans with any pronounced
motivation.
At an even broader level, cultures may vary in the degree to
which they emphasize abstract formulations of cultural differ-
ences. We have already proposed that Western-educated Rotu-
man leaders are likely to be more conservative than chiefs
without Western education precisely because they have learned
to make abstract contrastive judgments about social systems
and cultural styles (Howard 1963b). The point is that the very
concept of integrity of a cultural system may be of major signifi-
cance. For the Rotumans, then, Western education has provided
the cultural equivalent of a concept of tribal integrity in strongly
unilineal societies. It has helped to provide clear criteria for in-
clusion in a social unit of a higher order despite the fact that the
traditional system was characterized by groupings with highly
permeable social boundaries.
It would seem, then, that in addition to the demographic and
social structural variables that foster the development of ethnic
communities, the emergence of an ethnic group is facilitated by
the presence of individuals for whom ethnic identity not only be-
comes problematic but is of ideological import. Although such
individuals may develop within an ethnic community, we be-
lieve it is more often the case that they are the products of
isolation from their native cultural systems, with the very iso-
lation heightening their ethnic awareness. Western schools are
breeding grounds of such individuals by virtue of the degree
to which they render one’s identity problematic (particularly
for non-Occidentals) and the degree to which ideological solu-
tions to identity problems are encouraged. But ideological solu-
tions are apt to remain idiosyncratic unless they feed back into
communication networks like those provided by ethnic commu-
nities. The Vatukoula community and its leadership exemplify
this process. When this occurs, and an ideology gains accep-
tance, conditions are optimal for transforming an ethnic ag-
gregate into an ethnic group.
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CONCLUSION
We have argued in this chapter that the development of an
ethnic group from an aggregate of individuals who are members
of the same ethnic category is primarily dependent upon the
development of an ethnic community and ethnic consciousness.
Ethnic communities are defined as localized interactive net-
works consisting of individuals of the same ethnic designation
who are emotionally committed to the symbols of their common
heritage and formally organized for the purpose of pursuing
common goals. Ethnic consciousness is defined as a condition in
which ethnic awareness assumes a position of primacy in struc-
turing social relations. For a collectivity, ethnic consciousness
is assumed to emerge as a result of repeated messages circu-
lated throughout the network of an ethnic community to the
effect that other social differences are less significant for struc-
turing interpersonal relations than ethnic differences. The com-
bination of these conditions generates a critical mass, or
threshold effect, leading to the extension of individuals’ in-
tegrity circles to include all members who identify themselves
in terms of the relevant ethnic category (Howard and Howard
1964). This process results in the development of a secondary
community in which the “we-feeling” characteristic of primary
face-to-face groups is extended to other members of the ethnic
category on the basis of an ideology.
We hypothesize that the major variables responsible for the
transformation of an ethnic aggregate into an ethnic group are
demographic, social structural, and cultural For Rotumans in
Fiji the major demographic variables favoring the development
of ethnic communities have been numbers of individuals and
residential contiguity. Only in Vatukoula have these variables
produced a cohesive community. Social structural variables also
have favored Vatukoula as a location for the genesis of Rotuman
ethnicity, in large part because the management of the gold
mines has used racial criteria as the primary basis for orga-
nizing labor. Demographic and social structural variables have
therefore combined in Vatukoula to make it the primary place
in Fiji for a critical mass to be reached, allowing for the crys-
tallization of Rotuman ethnic identity. The cultural variable of
prime significance has been the development of an ideology of
cultural contrast, introduced by a Western-educated elite. Al-
though the birth of the Rotumans as an ethnic group has taken
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place in Fiji, we expect that the ideology which gives it sub-
stance will eventually be accepted by all Rotumans and that a
general consolidation will be the result.
The Rotuman case may contain some unique features, but
we believe that the processes analyzed here may provide the
basis for a universal theory of ethnic group development.
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SYDNEY ISLAND, TITIANA,
AND KAMALEAI:
SOUTHERN GILBERTESE
IN THE PHOENIX AND
SOLOMON ISLANDS
Kenneth E. Knudson
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter is concerned with the analysis of cultural change
in a community of Gilbert Islanders relocated at Titiana Point in
the Solomon Islands (map 9). This community dates back to the
1930s, when the government of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands
Colony initiated a program to alleviate incipient overpopulation
in the Southern Gilbert Islands. This was to be done by re-
settling volunteer families in the virtually uninhabited Phoenix
Islands, some 800 miles to the southeast. The first settlers ar-
rived in the Phoenix group in December 1938 and began the
task of creating new and relatively self-sufficient communities
for themselves on three islands they named Manra (Sydney
Island), Orona (Hull Island), and Nikumaroro (Gardner Island).
This chapter is concerned specifically with the Sydney Island
community. After a period of enforced isolation brought about
by World War II, it was discovered that the Phoenix Island area
was subject to repeated and lengthy intervals of drought. In
the early 1950s the male elders of Sydney Island petitioned the
colony government to find a new home for their people. They
were eventually offered a site at Titiana (pronounced see-see-
AH-nah) Point on Ghizo Island in the Western District of what
was then known as British Solomon Islands Protectorate.1 After
a survey party of Sydney Islanders viewed the site and deemed
it acceptable, the new relocation began in 1955. The last re-
maining families left Sydney Island in 1958.
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Map 9. Relocation of Gilbertese to Solomon Islands.
In the Solomons the settlers faced new problems of adjustment,
not only to the terrain and climate but also to the presence
of culturally distinct neighboring communities and a different
pattern of government administration. Adjustment continues,
but the principal features of life in the new setting were well
worked out by 1962, when a fieldwork period of fourteen
months in Titiana was begun. The trends evident at that time
were still apparent in 1975, when three more months of
fieldwork were completed. The recorded history of the com-
munity (Knudson 1965; Maude 1952) and the data collected
during the two field periods form the basis for the analysis pre-
sented here.
The history of the Titiana community can be seen as a se-
quence of adjustments to environments that were themselves
in a state of flux. The analytic framework best suited to this
view is an adaptational one. This framework has a long history
in anthropology, in which studies of ecological and evolutionary
change have been intimately related (Sahlins and Service 1960;
Steward 1955; Watson and Watson 1969). With very few excep-
tions, however, the adaptational approach has not been used
extensively in the analysis of short-term change in studies of
single communities (see Harding 1971; Murphy and Steward
1956; Sahlins 1957; Sharp 1952). If the culture of a community
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is viewed as adaptive for that community, as is generally ac-
cepted in anthropological theory, it follows that the analysis
of change in any community ought to be conducted within an
adaptational framework regardless of the time period being
considered.
At this point let me clarify what I understand by “environ-
ment,” since definitions of the term and statements of what it
comprehends are rarely, if ever, explicit. For purposes of this
chapter the environment of a social system includes three dis-
tinct categories of phenomena: the physical environment, which
includes such matters as terrain and climate; the biological en-
viron ment, which includes the flora and fauna of the area;
and the so cial environment, which includes the cultures of the
other societies with which the community is in contact. In ex-
amining the history of the Titiana community it will be seen that
the initial relocation on Sydney Island involved primarily small-
scale differences in physical and biological environments, while
the later relocation to the Solomons involved some differences
in physical and biological environments but a major change of
social environment.
Thus a transplanted social system may be viewed as
adapting to a new environment. It follows that an analysis of
this kind must begin with a description of the system that is
transplanted, since it is this system that adapts to new social,
physical, and biological settings. The circumstances of relo-
cation must also be described, for it will make a difference
whether an entire community is relocated or whether people
from somewhat different communities are brought together to
form a new social system.
In the following sections of this chapter the traditional
culture of the Southern Gilbertese is briefly described in its
environmental setting, along with a summary of the changes
known to have occurred in the historic period. This sets the
stage by providing an overview of the cultural background of
the people who were resettled in the Phoenix Island group.
The relocation program itself is then described, followed by a
history of the adaptive changes that took place on Sydney Island
and in the Solomons.
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THE SOUTHERN GILBERTS
Like almost all the islands of the Central Pacific, the seven
islands of the Southern Gilberts (Nonouti, Tabiteuea, Beru,
Nikunau, Onotoa, Tamana, and Arorae) are coralline in
structure and include both reef island and atoll forms. They
are rather large as coral islands go, averaging about 7 square
miles in land area. Elevation above sea level rarely exceeds 20
feet. The climate is characterized by a minimum of seasonal
variation, due to the islands’ proximity to the equator and dis-
tance from large bodies of land that might alter the moderating
effect of the sea. Temperatures are warm, but rainfall is com-
paratively low by oceanic standards, ranging between 35 and
60 inches per year. The large size of the islands undoubtedly
aids in storage of subsurface water, a factor that lessens the ef-
fects of the considerable annual variations in rainfall; droughts
are frequent and may persist for several years. Soils are poor
throughout the Gilberts, and there is little surface water. Water
for horticultural, household, or other uses is generally obtained
by digging down to the underlying freshwater lens.
“Fresh water” is something of a misnomer, since the
available water is more or less saline depending on locality.
Gilbertese horticultural activities depend on trees and other
plants that are adapted to semibrackish groundwater rather
than to fresh water. During long drought periods the ground-
water becomes increasingly saline, but production may not be
affected markedly for several years. Rene Catala visited the
Gilberts in 1951, when the region had experienced two consec-
utive years of severe drought conditions, and noted that even
then most trees appeared healthy and some were actually pro-
ducing new growth (Catala 1957:iv, 31, 49–55, 61–66). It is
probable that personal habits and preferences of Gilbertese are
related to the general scarcity of fresh water: bathing is usually
done in the sea with only a quick rinse of fresh water, and the
Gilbertese do not like to drink fresh water since they consider it
tasteless and insipid.
Although life on these islands might appear precarious, the
available data do not bear out this conclusion. It is true that
famine and scarcity are themes that appear in Gilbertese
folklore, but there is no evidence that these themes are more
frequent or intense there than elsewhere in the Pacific. Severe
storms are virtually absent from the area, and the combination
of large islands (with concomitantly large subsurface storage
capacity for water) and dependence on plants adapted to
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brackish water added up to dense populations that were rarely
affected by the considerable local fluctuations in rainfall.
Indeed the available population statistics indicate nothing in the
way of abrupt changes that might be associated with famine
conditions (Knudson 1970:89–90).
The Gilbertese traditionally depended on both the sea and
the land for their subsistence and daily needs. Interisland trade
in the area was almost nonexistent. There were (and are) two
major resources on the land: wet gardens and orchards. Wet
gardens were located in the center of the larger islands. These
plots were made by digging down to the subsurface water
and planting Cyrtosper ma chamissonis (the Gilbertese name is
babai), and the plants are mulched with leaves and other or-
ganic material to create a small area of very rich soil. In the
Southern Gilberts the produce of wet gardens was not a daily
staple in the diet, and it should more properly be considered in
the category of festive or special occasion foods. The production
of large tubers had competitive aspects, and much prestige ac-
crued to the man who grew a very large one.
Orchards included two kinds of trees. The Gilbertese bread-
fruit, a variety that is somewhat tolerant of brackish ground-
water, is found in the interior of the islands close to the wet
gardens. Coconut and pandanus trees, having greater tolerance
for salinity, usually are located closer to the shore. Pandanus
fruit was the staple in the Gilbertese diet that helped make pos-
sible the area’s dense population, since pandanus grows practi-
cally everywhere, rendering the entire surface area of an island
productive.
The surrounding waters appear to have been exceptionally
rich because their local temperatures were cooler than those
of island groups further west. They were exploited by many
techniques, including the use of nets, traps, hook and line, and
spearing. Shallow-water areas appear to have been most im-
portant and provided the most consistent catches. The lagoon
and open sea were of somewhat less significance, but some-
times provided spectacular catches. On a few islands fry were
raised in special ponds, but these do not appear to have pro-
vided continuous production; harvesting them was a festive
occasion (Maude 1963:55–57). As might be expected, canoe
making was a valuable skill and Gilbertese men prided them-
selves on the qualities of the canoes they sailed. Canoes were
far too difficult and expensive for most individuals to construct;
hence they were usually sponsored by a group. Large fishing
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traps built in the shallow waters were also group-owned, as
were fishing and gleaning areas in the lagoons and on the reef
flats.
The groups exploiting these resources are of four distinct
types at increasingly inclusive levels of organization (Knudson
1970: 98–106, 287–288). The smallest unit was the household,
averaging about five or six persons in size. Households usually
were formed about a nuclear family consisting of a man, his
wife, and their young unmarried children, but there were also
many exceptions to this pattern. The men of the household
fished and did most of the garden and orchard work; the women
were concerned mostly with keeping house and caring for the
children.
Several households were grouped into a kawa ‘household
cluster’, the average population of which was twenty-seven
persons, equivalent to about five households. The men of a
household cluster cooperated in tasks that required more than
one person, such as housebuilding and some fishing operations,
and the lands exploited by the members of a household cluster
were usually located nearby; frequently such lands came close
to comprising a single large block.
Although there were probably a few large independent
household clusters, in most cases two or more household
clusters constituted a kainga ‘estate group’. Such groups av-
eraged about thirty-eight persons and usually were made up
of one large and one small household cluster. The household
clusters of an estate group were not necessarily contiguous. In
fact, they appear to have been rather widely separated so as
to exploit resources located some distance apart. One of the
household clusters served as the administrative center of the
estate and was the site of a meetinghouse and the canoe sheds
used by members of the estate. The estate group also provided
the organizational basis for the construction, operation, and
repair of canoes. An estate was an organizational unit in district
administration, and its members cooperated in the construction
and repair of the estate buildings.
Aboriginally and in the early contact period a district (or
“village”) in the Southern Gilberts averaged 500 to 800 persons
in population. There were at least two districts per island and
on Tabiteuea, the largest of the Southern Gilberts, there were
nine. Thus the islands were densely populated, averaging on
the order of 200 persons per square mile of land area. Districts
were politically autonomous, being ruled by a council composed
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of the elder male leaders of the estate group encompassed by
it. On the average, there were about twenty estate groups per
district.
The existence of a district was marked by a maneaba
‘meetinghouse’. A meetinghouse had a large gable roof en-
closed at the ends, the eaves extending to within 5 feet of the
ground. There were no interior partitions, and the center was
left clear during district gatherings. The space under the eaves
and just inside the ends was divided into traditional boti ‘sitting
places’ assigned to the various estate groups of the district. At
district meetings the elder men of the estate groups sat on the
inside, toward the center of the building; young men, wives,
and children sat behind them. Only elder men were allowed to
speak.
The people of the Southern Gilberts were at a tribal level of
organization (Sahlins 1968; Service 1962). Chiefs were absent
even at the district level, although there were rules of prece-
dence among the assembled male elders (Maude 1963), and
from time to time individuals did manage briefly to exert strong
leadership over a considerable region (Knudson 1970:104–106).
Chieftainship may therefore be said to have been incipient in
this area, although it was well developed in the Northern
Gilberts (Lambert 1966). Small-scale wars and feuds seem to
have been common.
Goodenough (1955) was the first to comment on the flexi-
bility of Gilbertese rules of descent and to point out the adaptive
consequences of this system in an area of limited resources.
Descent was traced from the ancestral founders of the estate
groups, who were thought to have been the earliest settlers of
a given island district. Descent might be traced through either
male or female links, and demonstration of descent was re-
garded as establishing a claim to part of the lands of the an-
cestral founder. Descent was most often claimed through male
links, however, and Gilbertese themselves tend to describe the
system in terms of patrilineality and patrilocality; sometimes
only after considerable discussion does it become apparent that
the tendency represents a preferred pattern but not an ex-
clusive one.
Estate groups, therefore, approximated patrilineages with
inmarrying females, while household clusters approximated
minor patrilineages or patrilateral extended families. A man
could, however, choose to live in his mother’s estate group, or
his grandmother’s, or even his wife’s, so long as he or his wife
was entitled to some portion of the original land of the founder.
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Because descent was traced through either male or female
links, an individual could lay claim to many different plots in
the ancestral estates of many early settlers of a given district
or island. In fact, not many generations had to elapse before
an individual could claim membership in nearly all founder es-
tates. Such potential claims had to be kept current by making
contributions to life-crisis feasts (births, first menstruation for
girls, marriages, deaths) and other important occasions in the
families of those who actually occupied and worked the claimed
land. After such contributions ceased, a claim to membership
was likely to be challenged. In practice, genealogies were chal-
lenged frequently when claims to land were tenuous or when
those who actually used the land wished to retain it or allocate
it to someone of their own choice.
The Gilbertese system of land tenure was, therefore, inti-
mately bound up with the kinship system and choice between
alternative residences. The ancestral founder of an estate di-
vided his holdings among his descendants at his death, and this
pattern of inheritance has continued. Land was held by indi-
viduals, and a person inherited from both his mother and his
father. As a result, a person’s inheritance was likely to consist of
a number of widely scattered parcels, and exploitation of all of
them plus exploitation of a spouse’s parcels was difficult. A se-
lection was made, and parcels that could not be put to use were
entrusted to others, usually close kinsmen. With time, and with
continued use by others, claims to such parcels became tenuous
and eventually were only vaguely remembered. When this oc-
curred, attempts to activate the claim would almost certainly be
challenged by the occupants.
Aside from the inheritance pattern there were numerous
ways of adding to one’s holdings. These included fosterage of
children, concubinage, and care for the ill or elderly. All these
were rewarded by gifts of land. Finally, confiscation of land was
the typical punishment for theft, murder, and adultery. Only
when a man was without land would he be punished by death,
and even this fate was unlikely; a man without land was usually
forced to work for others as his punishment if he committed a
crime.
In view of the density of population and the low level of
productivity of these islands compared to other areas of Mi-
cronesia, it is not surprising that access to resources such as
land and fishing rights was valued by the Gilbertese. To be
without land was equivalent to being a slave. The Gilbertese
were also aware that they lived quite close to the population
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limits of their islands and consciously maintained a nominal
rule that no woman should be allowed more than three living
children. Adoption, abortion, and infanticide were recognized
processes for adjusting the population in accordance with the
available resources, and adoption in many cases was merely
nominal, serving primarily to extend the choice of possible resi-
dence sites. The behavior of young, unmarried girls was strictly
regulated with an eye toward eliminating opportunities for
sexual intercourse, and the definition of adultery was extended
broadly to include such nonsexual acts as speaking to male
nonkinsmen. Again the effect was to reduce the opportunities
for intercourse and hence control population numbers.
CHANGE IN THE HISTORIC PERIOD
The preceding summary describes Southern Gilbertese culture
and its environmental setting as it was during approximately
the first two decades of the nineteenth century. At that time
contact with the world beyond the immediate horizon was just
beginning, and during the years up to 1930 the Gilbertese expe-
rienced a great change in social environment.
In terms of political life, when the resettlement program
for the Phoenix Islands was proposed, by the mid-1980s, the
Gilberts had become part of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands
Colony. The colony was under British administration and a
uniform governmental system had been instituted, each island
having its own administration and government center. Religious
change had been considerable; Christian missionaries had been
at work for several decades and had succeeded in converting
most of the islanders to either the Catholic or Protestant faith
(the London Missionary Society was the major Protestant orga-
nization represented), although a few adherents of the native
religion remained scattered throughout the island group. Fi-
nally, the Gilberts had entered the world cash economy; both
wage labor and the export of copra had become important
sources of money income.
The major features of Southern Gilbertese life in the 1930s
are quite well known (see, for example, Catala 1957; Goode-
nough 1955; Grimble 1921; Knudson 1965:11–13, 25–27; Lunds-
gaarde 1966, n.d.; Luomala 1965; Maude 1950, 1960, 1963,
1967; Maude and Maude 1931). As a result of nearly a century
of political change, the apparently continual precontact out-
breaks of small-scale wars and feuds had been suppressed.
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Each island had its own government, staffed with local people.
The administrative structure included a magistrate and court,
an administrative staff, a council of legislators, a police orga-
nization, a jail, and a hospital. Cooperative trading stores were
beginning to appear throughout the Gilberts, displacing the nu-
merous independent traders who were mostly of Chinese de-
scent. The cooperatives were supervised by personnel from the
colonial government headquartered at Ocean Island, some 250
miles west of the Gilberts proper. The central government staff
was made up almost entirely of British personnel. These ad-
ministrators toured the islands at intervals during the year, re-
viewing the activities of the local island governments. For the
most part, then, the island governments operated without day-
to-day supervision by nonislanders.
Most villages had both a Catholic and a Protestant school,
and the colonial government was beginning to actively foster a
program for the improvement of education. An alphabet closely
paralleling Gilbertese phonemic forms had been worked out by
a missionary during the 1860s, and by the mid-1930s a growing
literature was being produced by government and mission
printing presses. Education was primarily in the hands of native
Gilbertese ministers and catechists, who acted as both church
leaders and teachers.
Subsistence activities had also changed, and by this time
Gilbertese men were being recruited to work for two or three
years mining the phosphate deposits on Ocean Island. The
mining operations were controlled by the British Phosphate
Commission, a quasi-governmental organization that also re-
cruited a few Gilbertese for their operations on Nauru. Some
Gilbert Islanders also found employment in the copra plan-
tations of the Line Islands to the east of the Gilberts. Most
Gilbertese, however, obtained a small but steady income by pro-
ducing copra from their own orchards and marketing it through
the cooperatives or other local trading stores.
The average populations of districts and islands had
changed little by this time, although local populations had
become more clustered into villagelike forms. The average size
of a district remained at about 500 to 800 persons. Traditional
district boundaries were more or less preserved, although on
each island the creation of a government center altered the
precontact situation somewhat. Representation on the island
council was by district, and the island government center was
spatially distinct from any of the “villages.” Districts remained
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nearly autonomous on a day-to-day basis, and district affairs
continued to be the concern of the male elders of the com-
munity, who debated matters in their traditional meetinghouse.
The average size of a household at this time seems to have
been about 4.3 persons (Maude 1963:31), a slight decrease
from the 5.5 persons of a century before. The household cluster
and estate levels of organization persisted, although as distinct
population groupings they were not always visibly apparent
because of village centralization. The marked bias toward pa-
trilineality in descent and patrilocality in residence also per-
sisted, as did the alternatives for reckoning ancestors and resi-
dence. Gilbertese population control and sexual practices such
as abortion, infanticide, concubinage, and display of the nuptial
sleeping mat had come under political and religious attack. A
special land court had been instituted to deal with disputes in
tenure and inheritance. The association of estate groups with
traditional seating sites along the edge of the district meeting-
house went unchanged, however, and the elders of each estate
continued to speak for its members in discussions and to act as
their leaders and representatives in all district matters.
Kinsmen in household clusters still cooperated when
numbers of people were required, but for the most part the liter-
ature indicates that the members of each household lived from
day to day on the products of its lands and the surrounding
waters. In fact, households were considerably more inde-
pendent than they had been a century before, and the difference
in average household size, if significant, probably reflects a de-
clining need for larger numbers of people to cooperate. The
increasing independence of households seems to have been
due to changes in fishing operations that were in turn due
to the effects of the new social environment (Goodenough
1963:337–343). Cash and the ready availability of new tools and
new materials had resulted in a large increase in the number of
canoes in the Southern Gilberts, because it had become easier
for an individual to sponsor canoe construction. Furthermore,
new types of fishhooks, nets, and lines meant that lagoon and
open sea waters had become more important fishing areas,
while dependence on the shallow waters and the large, fixed
fish traps had decreased proportionately. The result was a de-
cline in the significance of household clusters and estates as the
basis of cooperation in the construction, operation, and main-
tenance of canoes and fixed fish traps. Undoubtedly, the avail-
ability of new tools for garden and orchard work plus the sala-
bility of copra (for which little or no cooperative work was nec-
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essary) contributed to the emerging significance of household-
level economics and the declining significance of inclusive kin
groups such as the household cluster and estate.
RESETTLEMENT ON SYDNEY ISLAND
It is clear, then, that a century or more of contact with the
outside world had influenced every aspect of Gilbertese culture;
from social and political life to economic and religious patterns,
the changes that had taken place as a result of the new social
environment were considerable. The administrators of the
colonial government were particularly concerned about the
effect of these changes on family life and individual welfare
(Maude 1952). It was pointed out that the outcome of (1) the
removal of population control techniques such as abortion and
infanticide, (2) the introduction of Western medical techniques,
and (3) the increased economic reliance on individual family
holdings was likely to be cumulative. Specifically, the combined
effect of these changes throughout the Gilberts was likely to
result in an overpopulation problem (brought about by in-
creasing birth rates and decreasing death rates) plus a land
fragmentation problem (brought about by the distribution of
land to large numbers of children). The ultimate result would
be poverty and a lower level of subsistence throughout the is-
lands. The administrators also believed that the problem was
imminent and that its beginnings were already being felt in the
southern part of the archipelago. There was in fact evidence
that on many islands, particularly in the Southern Gilberts, frag-
mentation of landholdings had become extreme and some peo-
ple were already living dangerously close to subsistence level.
The resettlement program was intended to relieve the sit-
uation by taking a large number of volunteer families from
among the poorest Southern Gilbertese and settling them on
the environmentally similar, though rather more barren,
Phoenix Islands. These islands, in the mid-1930s, had no in-
digenous inhabitants. There was a total population of about fifty
persons on the eight islands in the group (including Canton and
Enderbury, which lie to the north of the other six and are some-
times considered as distinct from them). Almost all these people
were engaged in operating the commercial copra plantations on
Sydney and Hull Islands.2
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The motives of these administrators may have been more
complex, although definitive data are lacking. It has been
pointed out (Hilder 1961:213) that the Phoenix Islands lie
almost exactly halfway between Hawaii and Fiji and a trans-Pa-
cific airline route was almost certain to be established shortly.
The aircraft of that day were limited in range, and therefore
control of the Phoenix Islands as a refueling stop would give ef-
fective control of the entire route. It was also known that one
of the few reasons the United States would recognize as sub-
stantiating a claim to an uninhabited region was colonization
(Maude 1961:69). In any event, the opportunity may well have
been seen as a chance to secure two goals at once, one human-
itarian and the other political.
A survey party which included a number of Gilbertese men
aware of Gilbertese subsistence needs and practices was led
to the Phoenix group by H. E. Maude, then a member of the
colonial administration and well acquainted with Gilbertese
culture. After its tour the party returned to the Gilberts to
discuss the projected resettlement with Gilbertese at village
meetings. Earlier talks had convinced Maude that there was
considerable enthusiasm among Southern Gilbertese about the
opportunity to improve their lot. The results of the survey and
the reports by the Gilbertese participants at the village
meetings were positive (though, of course, not entirely without
drawbacks and negative response). The decision was therefore
made by the colonial government to proceed with the program.
Three islands in the Phoenix group were selected for set-
tlement: Sydney, Hull, and Gardner. Gardner was to be given a
smaller number of settlers than the other two islands because
its undeveloped resources were insufficient for a large popu-
lation. Canton Island was selected as the headquarters of the
Phoenix Islands administrative district, which was incorporated
into the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony as part of the reset-
tlement program. The plan was not intended to effect culture
change; it was expected that Gilbertese culture would be repli-
cated in the Phoenix Islands. Volunteers were to be taken as
family groups, and each individual was to be allocated plots
of productive land. Island governments and schools were to
be established, trading cooperatives were planned, and native
mission personnel were allowed for.
The volunteers were told that they must agree to be treated
according to Gilbertese custom as castaways, which meant they
would have no further claim to their lands in the Gilberts. The
rights over these plots were distributed to close kinsmen of the
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emigrants. Finally, in seeking volunteers, the quality of their
prospective life in the Phoenix Islands was consciously played
down by the administration, emphasis being placed on the fact
that the work of development would be hard and long and the
life one of isolation. Despite the emphasis on the rigors of the
resettlement program, it did not prove difficult to find volun-
teers. Those in charge of selecting emigrants were surprised
both by the numbers of people who responded and by the se-
verely limited resources on which many had been forced to rely.
Selection was on the basis of quality and quantity of resources
available, and those who seemed to have the least to draw on
were chosen. It seems evident that many of the Gilbertese saw
that their situation might become difficult within a short time,
although motivations for volunteering differed from person to
person and family to family. Informants stated that some par-
ticipants actually had considerable resources but concealed this
fact and took part primarily for the adventure. While a large
percentage of migrants were land-poor and probably on the
young side, given the preference for people in excellent health
the population of migrants did represent a cross section of
Gilbertese society vis-à-vis social status and knowledge of Gil-
bertese culture.
The first party of forty-one Gilbertese landed on Sydney
Island on Christmas Day, 1938. The arrival of the last boatload
of emigrants in September 1941 brought the total population
to 302 persons. Large numbers of settlers had also been estab-
lished on Hull Island, but Gardner received only a few in ac-
cordance with the resettlement plan. Canton Island came under
development as an airbase just before the outbreak of World
War II in the Pacific in late 1941. It continued to serve as a
regular refueling point until the advent of long-range jet aircraft
in the late 1950s. Canton, with its important airfield, eventually
was placed under a joint American and British administration
but continued to be the headquarters for the Phoenix Islands
District of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony.
Like the islands of the Gilbert group, Sydney Island is low-
lying and coralline in structure. The maximum height above sea
level is only 20 or 30 feet. The island is shaped somewhat like
a doughnut when seen from the air, being oval in shape with an
average diameter of about 2 miles. In the center of the island
is a highly saline lake which lacks an opening to the sea. The
lake is somewhat more than a mile in diameter, so that the
width of the surrounding rim of land varies from about one-
third to just over one-half mile. Annual rainfall on Sydney Island
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appears to vary considerably, as it does in the Gilberts. Fur-
thermore, the rainfall appears to average only about 40 inches
per year (Knudson 1965:42), lower than the average for most
of the Gilberts. The small land area and the saline lake in the
center of the island imply a small subsurface lens of fresh water.
This in turn probably accounts for the fact that although the
flora and fauna of the Phoenix group are very similar to those
of the Gilberts, the total number of plant species in the Phoenix
group has been estimated at only twenty to thirty, or approxi-
mately half that of the Gilberts. The marine life of the area is
apparently even richer than that of the Gilberts; however, the
absence of an extensive fringing reef limited fishing activities
to some extent and led to the construction of small canoes that
could be launched and landed easily despite the difficult surf.
The early settlers on Sydney Island attempted to grow cyr-
tosperma by digging wet gardens, but the subsurface water
proved too saline and the gardens were abandoned. Pandanus
was also a failure when introduced in the early years of the set-
tlement, but it was introduced again about 1950, this time suc-
cessfully. Portulaca, an edible plant that grew wild over much
of the island, became a mainstay in the diet (Turbott 1954)
and was gathered in daylong excursions involving entire house-
holds. There were, then, some differences in subsistence activ-
ities because of the differences in resources on Sydney Island.
The migrant population of three hundred people was divided
into two contiguous village areas and a government station.
A complete island government headed by a magistrate was
established. In 1940 an island meetinghouse was erected to
serve all residents and immediately became the center of a
dispute over traditional sitting places. Meetinghouses in the
Southern Gilberts differ in details of construction and also in
the seating arrangements assigned to estate groups. Since the
island residents included household groups from all islands of
the Southern Gilberts, the argument over who should sit where
seems to have been intense and apparently lasted several days.
It was finally resolved with the advice of the British adminis-
trative officer in charge of the developing Phoenix Island com-
munities. He suggested that each household should be assigned
a spot, with no one being allowed to occupy the location he had
been accustomed to in the Gilberts.
The decision to ignore traditional seating patterns in or-
ganizing the Sydney Island meetinghouse represented a break
with tradition. Yet older men continued to be the only people
with the right to speak at community meetings, although this
EXILES AND MIGRANTS IN OCEANIA
189
rule was probably stretched somewhat, since not all household
heads were elderly. The result was therefore a kind of “least
common denominator” of pan-Gilbertese custom and demo-
graphic reality stemming from the fact that the units of emi-
gration from the Gilberts were households rather than extended
kinship units.
A similar process of change can be seen in the organization
of life-crisis feasting, events that were attended in the Gilberts
only by kinsmen of the celebrant. On Sydney Island one of the
earliest such events to be celebrated was the wedding of the
daughter of the island magistrate. The magistrate invited all
island residents to the feast he sponsored, and this became a
general pattern for all life-crisis feasts thereafter. We may be
sure that not all the three hundred or so residents attended
each feast, but they were entitled to, and each household
probably sent a representative, bearing, of course, the contri-
bution of food, clothing, or whatever custom demanded.
The single most important event in this formative period
of the Sydney community was a dispute between two groups
that culminated in a permanent schism in the community. One
group, perhaps best referred to as the “collectivists,” argued
that development of the island would proceed faster if it were
done cooperatively. They suggested that when difficult tasks
arose everyone should help without regard to locale or land
ownership; thus, they reasoned, the entire island would benefit
from the marshaling of as much help as possible for any task
that might arise. Another group, the “individualists,” argued
that such a system would make it possible for the lazy to live
through the efforts of the energetic; they suggested instead that
development of the island would best proceed if each family
were to do its own work. The collectivists outnumbered the in-
dividualists, but they could not force cooperation on an island-
wide basis. One of the two villages did work on a collective
pattern, however, so that this classic divergence in ideologies
differentiated the two villages on the island.
The schism, though permanent, did not eliminate the occa-
sional need for cooperative labor. After World War II an Ameri-
can visitor to Sydney Island suggested that young men form
a service club which would make the labor of its members
available to all who might request it, the only requirement being
that meals be served while the task was in progress. There were
also social aspects to the club, which had its own meetinghouse,
and it proved to be a great success, drawing members from both
the collectivist and the individualist groups.
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Not only did the two groups maintain their social schism,
but they also elaborated it even further through religious sec-
tarianism. The first group of settlers on Sydney had all been at
least nominal adherents of the Protestant faith. They asked that
all later arrivals also be Protestant; the colonial government
agreed, hoping to avoid the schisms between Catholics and
Protestants that were so disruptive wherever they broke out
in the Gilberts. As it turned out, it seems that some settlers
on Sydney had previously been Catholics but became at least
nominal Protestants because they wanted to settle on Sydney.
Early in the 1950s a Catholic missionary arrived on the island
and immediately succeeded in obtaining converts. Later a cat-
echist arrived to lead the new, though small, congregation. In-
terestingly enough, a considerable number of the Catholic con-
verts were members of the individualist faction, and it therefore
appears that differences of opinion on the island were great
and tended to diverge into strongly opposed philosophies. The
schism between Catholics and Protestants grew continually
wider, ultimately leading to the formation of a separate Catholic
community after the Sydney Islanders arrived in the Solomons.
In spite of differences of opinion and lines of cleavage that
appeared in the Sydney Island community, there was a genuine
esprit de corps and a pride in the island that developed quickly
as the inhabitants settled in. The war years served mainly to
isolate the Phoenix Islands (other than Canton) from the rest of
the world. Imported luxuries and manufactured goods became
scarce or unobtainable for a time, but the settlers either did
without them or, when possible, resumed making the traditional
objects that had been displaced. Thus the isolation does not
appear to have severely disrupted normal life.
Eventually, Canton Island became a place of employment
for men and even a few women from Sydney and the other
Gilbertese settlements. There was employment in a wide variety
of occupations, including domestic servant positions in the
homes of European and American administrative personnel,
work in the island hotel, at the military and airline facilities, and
with a commercial fishing company. Later some men worked
in the copra plantations of the Line Islands and a few even
traveled to the islands of Hawaii, Midway, and Wake in the
employ of one of the airlines. The economic function of Canton
Island relative to the Phoenix Islands was therefore much the
same as that of Ocean Island relative to the Gilberts. As in
the Gilberts, the opportunities for fulltime employment on one’s
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home island were few (limited almost exclusively to mission and
island government personnel), and the work on Canton involved
life on another island for a considerable period of time.
The total population of Sydney Island appears to have in-
creased gradually over time, with the original number of 302
prewar settlers growing to 369 permanent residents who were
relocated to the Solomons in the middle and late 1950s. In spite
of Canton’s modern airport and overseas services, Sydney and
the other islands of the Phoenix group were more remote from
the world economy than were the Gilberts. In the years 1949 to
1952, the period during which off-island employment was at its
highest, only about 10 percent of the Sydney Island people were
working on other islands. Copra production on Sydney seems
to have been low compared to Gilbert Islands levels, although
sales of handicraft items to airport personnel and travelers on
Canton provided an added source of cash. On the whole, Sydney
Island is remembered by its former inhabitants as a delightful
place to live and one where money, though still necessary, was
relatively unimportant in life.
RELOCATION TO THE SOLOMON ISLANDS
During the early years of the Phoenix Island relocation
program, the plan appeared to be an unqualified success—so
much so that Gardner Island was settled by a full complement
of Gilbertese a few years after the end of World War II (Laxton
1951). In the late 1940s, however, about a decade after the ar-
rival of the first group of settlers on Sydney Island, there were
several years of low rainfall, and drought conditions prevailed
throughout the Phoenix Island area. There is some evidence to
show that drought periods occur on approximately a seven-year
cycle in the Phoenix group, and it is probable that these re-
curring periods of low rainfall are responsible for the absence
of an indigenous population. The droughts also vary in intensity;
those of the late 1940s were endured by the Gilbertese without
undue difficulty, but those in the early 1960s forced the colonial
government to abandon the resettlement program entirely.
The administrators of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony
were concerned about the effect of the droughts on the Phoenix
Island settlers, but a doctor who visited Sydney Island in 1950
was surprised at the general level of good health in the com-
munity. The settlers were found to be existing on a well-bal-
anced though monotonous diet, and later in the Solomons my
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informants from Sydney remarked frequently that they had felt
very well there and that children were especially strong and
active.
In spite of these reports, the elder leaders of the Sydney
Island community eventually sent a group of representatives to
colonial headquarters at Tarawa in the early 1950s, asking that
the government find a new home for their people. It had not
been easy for the island leaders to reach this decision; they
thought the island should be abandoned whereas the adherents
of the newly founded Catholic mission expressed a desire to
stay on the island even if the remainder of the population were
moved elsewhere. But gradually most people came to agree
with one of the non-Catholic elders who, during a community
meeting attended by a visiting colonial administrative officer,
remarked that while the island was certainly a healthy place
to live, it held little prospect for future development. Their
children, therefore, could look forward to little more than mere
continued existence at the same level as then obtained.
According to informants in the Solomons, the availability of
fish on Sydney was not changed by the droughts, and when
the settlers’ wells became brackish a rationing system was put
into effect for dispensing water from a rainwater cistern in the
government center. But the long periods without rain killed
many young coconut palms, and during periods of heavy rains
the level of the lake in the center of the island rose, inun-
dating planted areas and killing all growth touched by its saline
waters. Therefore the island offered little in the way of im-
provement for the future and the decision was taken to request
relocation elsewhere.
The colonial government decided that the effects of the
droughts were indeed severe, that Sydney Island had been the
most seriously affected, and that the settlement there should
ultimately be abandoned. Having made this decision, it was not
easy to find a new home for the Gilbertese settlers. Return to
the Gilberts was clearly out of the question, and there were no
other unpopulated islands suitable for habitation. After much
deliberation, the colonial government decided to offer the
Sydney Islanders an opportunity to relocate their community
in what was then called the British Solomon Islands Protec-
torate. The Solomons differ from the Gilberts and Phoenix in
many respects, but both areas were and are under British ad-
ministration. This would obviously simplify the relocation con-
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siderably, and it was felt that since the Solomons seemed to be
underpopulated, the Gilbertese could easily be accommodated
as new settlers.
There may have been other factors in the decision, just
as there may have been other factors involved in the Phoenix
Island resettlement program. In the mid-1950s, the initial steps
were being taken toward eventual independence for both the
colony and the protectorate. Elsewhere in the world, in the
West Indies and the Rhodesias, British administrators were at-
tempting to bring culturally diverse peoples together under
single, independent governments. They may have thought that
establishing Gilbertese settlers in the Solomons would be a step
toward a similar unity between the Gilberts and the Solomons.
If such a plan ever existed, however, definitive information
about it is lacking.
Both the protectorate and the colony were under the
jurisdiction of the high commissioner for the Western Pacific.
At the time, the high commissioner’s purview also included
Fiji and the British government of the New Hebrides Condo-
minium (administered jointly with France). The offices of this
inclusive government organization were located at Honiara on
Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. A joint relocation program
was worked out between the protectorate and the colony, the
first measure being to take several representatives from Sydney
Island on a tour of possible sites in the Solomons. Representa-
tives of several islands in the Gilberts were also included in the
touring party, since it was hoped that the Solomons would prove
able to take settlers not only from the Phoenix Islands but from
the Gilberts as well, thereby helping alleviate new population
problems there.
The Western District of the Solomon Islands was selected
as the probable relocation area, since it was the least populous
part of the Solomons. Several locations were examined by the
survey party, and, although they expressed a preference for
places that resembled their coral island homelands, they finally
stated that a site at Titiana Point on Ghizo Island would be
acceptable to them. (See map 10.) On their return to Sydney
Island they enthusiastically reported their experience at a com-
munity meeting, and the elder leaders of the island agreed that
this would be their people’s new home.
The site at Titiana was preferred by administrative officers
over other locations because of its proximity to Gizo town and
because of the availability of mature coconut groves that could
be used by the settlers. Gizo town is the administrative center
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Map 10. Destination islands: Ghizo and the Shortlands.
for the Western District of the Solomons, and government of-
ficers could readily monitor the progress of the new community
and help avert crises that might arise in this new and different
environment. Since the settlers would have to begin from
scratch, clearing the dense tropical forest from the village lo-
cation and planting new gardens and orchards, the mature
coconut groves would provide a needed resource until the com-
munity became self-sufficient.
Ghizo is one of the smaller islands of the Solomons, being
only about 6 miles long by 4 miles wide. It is roughly oval
in shape, and the northern coast is deeply indented by two
inlets that cut nearly across the island. Ghizo is low in relief
but rugged, since the interior consists of steep hills forming an
amoebalike backbone that renders land away from shore dif-
EXILES AND MIGRANTS IN OCEANIA
195
ficult to use. The maximum elevations of these interior ridges
are only 400 to 500 feet, but since the area has an annual
rainfall of about 125 inches, the land away from populated areas
is covered by dense tropical forests.
There are a number of smaller, lower islands just offshore to
the north, east, and southeast of Ghizo. These islands are con-
nected to one another and to Ghizo by an intricate reef system
which makes travel between them time-consuming, even by so
small a conveyance as a canoe. Some of these islands were
cleared and planted with coconuts before World War II; others
retained their natural cover of trees and brush.
Gizo town is located at the east end of Ghizo Island, and
in 1962–1963 it numbered about two hundred permanent res-
idents. The town area was relatively clear—most of it planted
with aging coconut palms. Not only was it an administrative
center with government offices, a hospital, post office, police
headquarters, agricultural offices, and public works center, but
it was also a trading and distribution center. Ships from
overseas entered its sheltered harbor as frequently as twice a
month to unload cargo and take on copra. This cash crop was
collected and stored in government warehouses while awaiting
shipment overseas.
The town and the island, though small, are surprisingly di-
verse culturally. In addition to the European community with
its nucleus of government officers, planters, missionaries, and
a businessman or two, there was a sizable Chinese community
associated with the many small and large trading companies
in the town. There was also a heterogeneous Melanesian com-
munity of civil and business employees and a sprinkling of Poly-
nesians from islands such as Rennell, Sikaiana, and Ontong
Java. Finally, there were a few Fijians and also some Japanese
businessmen. Several Christian religious denominations were
represented in the town, and there was a large Catholic mission
station on Logha, a small island just across the harbor.
Titiana is located on Ghizo Island’s south shore about 2
miles west of Gizo town. There are two Melanesian villages on
the island: Pailongge is located about 2 miles further west of
Titiana along the same shore, while Sagheraghi is on the remote
northwest point of the island. Both these villages are small,
numbering about a hundred persons each. All four settlements
are located on narrow coastal plains that are rarely as much as
a quarter-mile wide.
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As in the case of the Phoenix Islands program, the reset-
tlement at Titiana was not envisaged as a culture-change
project, although it was realized that some change was in-
evitable. The Solomon Islands Protectorate at the time was in
the process of changing from a “headman” form of local ad-
ministration to a system of local councils. In contrast to the
Gilberts, where islands had had their own local governments for
several decades, in the Solomons the headman had been a local
leader who served as the focus of contact between a community
and the protectorate’s district administrative officers. The of-
ficers of the protectorate administration were primarily British,
though a scattering of other nationalities was represented in
fields such as agriculture and public works. In the local council
system, a council represented a region including a number of
distinct communities; this system was still in its formative years
and local councils were in no way as nearly autonomous as the
Gilbertese island governments. The Sydney Islanders, it was
clear, would no longer constitute a distinct governmental entity:
they would now be subsumed within the administration of one
of the local councils.
The new settlement was to be led by a resettlement officer
who was to be a Gilbertese; this role came to parallel that of a
local headman in the protectorate organization. The relocation
was to include settlers direct from the Gilberts as well as from
Sydney Island; this decision was made because it was thought
that the Sydney Islanders were likely to be dispirited and physi-
cally weakened by their drought experiences, and the inclusion
of a nucleus of settlers direct from the Gilberts would provide
a strong and vigorous cadre. The protectorate’s agricultural
department would provide instruction in local gardening tech-
niques as well as seeds and cuttings for planting. Ultimately
each household head was to be provided with clear title to a
4-acre block of land.
The first party of settlers, numbering thirty persons, arrived
on Ghizo on 26 September 1955. It included settlers from both
the Gilberts and Sydney and was led by the resettlement officer,
who came direct from the Gilberts. This party began clearing
the village site and garden areas, and its members were allowed
to take occasional stevedoring work in Gizo town to vary their
routines somewhat. Over the next three years small groups of
new arrivals gradually increased the size of the community. Set-
tlers continued to arrive from both the Gilberts and from Sydney
Island, until by the early 1960s those from the Gilberts com-
prised approximately 20 percent of the Titiana population.
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Adjustment to the new setting took place gradually and
with little difficulty. A representative was selected for the local
council having jurisdiction over Titiana, and a local court was
established in the community subject to the higher district court
in Gizo town. The London Missionary Society, which was not
represented in the Solomons, handed over care of its adherents
to the Methodist church, while the Catholic Gilbertese affiliated
with the local Catholic mission. The early arrivals constructed
a community meetinghouse, celebrating its completion with a
feast to which the village elders invited all Gizo Europeans. This
became an annual event for the community. A Methodist church
building was also erected next to the meetinghouse with ser-
vices conducted by Gilbertese church leaders and Melanesians
trained in the Methodist mission; these Solomon Island pastors
also conducted the local school until the establishment of a gov-
ernment primary school led by a native Gilbertese. Masses for
Catholics in the community were conducted in the meeting-
house by a priest from the Catholic mission on Logha opposite
Gizo town.
The slowly expanding community had filled nearly all the
available space at Titiana Point by early 1958. Therefore when
the decision was made by the protectorate and colony govern-
ments to remove all the remaining settlers from Sydney Island,
it was necessary to construct a subsidiary village about a half-
mile nearer Gizo town; this site came to be called New Manra.
More than two hundred newcomers were settled into houses
there in late September 1958 when the move finally took place.
These included most of the Catholic faction, who had continued
to hold out the hope that they would be left to occupy Sydney
by themselves. After this large and sudden increase in the size
of the community to approximately five hundred persons, a few
settlers were added in small numbers direct from the Gilberts,
but this flow had ceased almost entirely by 1962.
THE TITIANA COMMUNITY
In mid-1963 the Titiana community numbered 436 persons
living in four distinct residence areas. In Titiana proper lived
298 persons, while 86 Gilbertese resided in New Manra. A
further 25 members of the community lived in Gizo town, while
27 persons lived on Logha Island, near the Catholic mission
station. The Catholic members of the Titiana community had
continued to differ with the Protestant faction over many issues
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of village politics as well as religion. In the late 1950s the island
of Logha had been purchased by the Catholic mission, and in
1959 the Titiana Catholics were offered wage-labor jobs con-
structing the mission buildings; later they were given the op-
portunity to live at one end of the island and work the coconut
groves as a source of income. Most of the Catholic population
took advantage of this opportunity. In mid-1962, however, land
was made available to the Titiana community at Kamaleai Point
in the Shortland Islands about 150 miles northwest of Ghizo.
This was the first instance of land allocation to Gilbertese from
Titiana. Land in the Ghizo area was not made available until the
following year. The opportunity to settle in the Shortlands was
given to Catholic members of the Titiana community because
the Shortlands were and are a predominantly Catholic area. By
mid-1963 some eighty-five persons lived at Kamaleai, most of
them Catholics who had moved there from Logha. In addition to
the two communities of Titiana and Kamaleai, in mid-1963 there
were some twenty-five Gilbertese affiliated with the Titiana re-
settlement program who lived in Honiara, most of them either
attending school or in government employ.
Subsistence in the Titiana community rested on three major
sets of activities. Fishing and gardening were traditional tech-
niques for obtaining needed goods. Both techniques were, or
course, modified somewhat in accordance with local conditions.
Titiana is protected by an offshore reef. The beach is therefore
free of rough surf, and canoes constructed locally could be
made larger to take advantage of these conditions. Divers
equipped with goggles and spear or knife obtained various
kinds of marine life, including shellfish. Gardens were not irri-
gated, but the abundant rainfall made this unnecessary, and a
variety of plants were cultivated in small plots of flat land.
A second subsistence strategy actually encompassed a
number of different part-time cash income enterprises. An im-
portant opportunity here was stevedoring at the port of Gizo, a
job that paid comparatively well for the few days each month
that overseas ships were in the harbor. Another source of cash
was the sale of handicraft goods and souvenirs, such as mats,
model canoes, baskets, and so on. There was always a small
but steady, demand for such items among the Europeans in
Gizo, and at Christmastime the market was considerable. An-
other source of cash was the sale of copra. Several of the islands
near Ghizo had been acquired by the protectorate government
from their former owners and given to the Gilbertese for use
as resource areas. The members of the community were divided
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into six copra sections for exploiting these resources, two sec-
tions being at work at any given time and remaining at work for
two weeks. These sections were not cooperative groups; each
household worked on its own to harvest coconuts, open them,
and dry the inner flesh. Quotas were set by general agreement,
each family keeping the money it earned. A third major activity
was full-time employment. There were a number of opportu-
nities in the government offices, businesses, and homes in Gizo
town.
Given these activities open to the Titiana people, three dis-
tinct modes of subsistence had developed, and with them dif-
ferent household types. The multigeneration extended family
remained important and usually involved two adult males. One
was typically employed full-time at an unskilled job such as la-
borer. He provided the family with the money for necessities
while the other was busy at gardening and fishing, providing the
staple foods.
Among smaller, nuclear families there were two modes of
subsistence. In some households an adult male had a garden
and did some fishing but also engaged in stevedoring when a
ship was in port. This income, combined with copra and handi-
craft sales, was about equal to that of a laborer, and there was
the additional advantage of having adequate time for traditional
subsistence pursuits.
Finally, other nuclear families depended almost entirely on
the cash income of the family head, who was employed full-time.
Most of these family heads were skilled workers holding jobs
such as teacher, powerhouse mechanic, nurse, or plumber. The
income from these occupations was sufficient to enable their
families to buy their necessities, offsetting the disadvantage of
full-time employment which left very little time for gardening or
fishing.
The organization of the Titiana meetinghouse was similar to
that on Sydney Island, each household having its own seating
area along one of the sides. The addition of new families from
the Gilberts meant that the Sydney Island meetinghouse could
not be duplicated, of course, and the departure of a number of
families for Kamaleai changed the number of households rep-
resented. Membership in the Titiana community was dependent
on participation in meetinghouse activities, such as the annual
feast and dance commemorating its completion and the New
Year’s Day dancing competition. Those who did not participate
or contribute to these activities withdrew, in effect, from the
community. In one such case a Gilbertese woman who married
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a Melanesian man from Pailongge took up residence with him in
Gizo town, granting control of her house and plot to a near rel-
ative. She no longer participated in meetinghouse activities, nor
did she make contributions to them (such as food or mats for
the floor) when the elders required it; she was not considered to
be a member of the community. In the opposite case, however,
a Melanesian man from Pailongge moved in with his Gilbertese
wife and participated in community affairs to the best of his
ability; he was considered at least nominally a member of the
Titiana community.
Membership rules were therefore clearly defined in the com-
munity. The actual conduct of meetings was somewhat less
rigorous than reported for Sydney Island or, certainly, for the
Gilberts. Younger men did speak, as did women on occasion.
This practice reflected the structure of the community, in which
not all families had elder representatives to speak for them, but
it also reflected the emergence of smaller, nuclear family house-
holds as a significant and viable unit in the local economy. In-
formants spoke of the meetinghouse as a “free maneaba” where
anyone could speak his mind, although usually only male elders
did so.
The community was arbitrarily divided into halves for
competitive purposes. The two divisions were called North and
South, and formerly the Catholic residents of Logha constituted
a third group. These divisions practiced separately for the New
Year’s Day dancing competition, which aroused great interest
and attracted many spectators from Gizo and local Melanesian
communities. The anniversary of the completion of the meet-
inghouse was celebrated in August. For this event a fish drive
was held in the lagoon and the elders directed each household
to contribute equal amounts of specific local foodstuffs. The
entire European community from Gizo town was invited to the
feast each year and treated to a display of Gilbertese dancing.
The north/south division was not an important organizational
feature for this event; instead the feast demonstrated to gov-
ernment officials that the community was self-sustaining.
Formal relations with the protectorate administration were
the concern of a six-man committee; a seventh man served
as principal contact with Western District officials. It was the
resettlement officer’s retirement in 1962 that led to the es-
tablishment of this committee. Its powers were undefined,
however, and its sphere of authority was unclear, so that in
1962–1963 most community affairs were actually being handled
by the elder men. The community also had a representative on
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the local council that had authority over the area, but because
of the proximity of Titiana to the protectorate offices, the people
of Titiana participated but little in local council activities.
Relations between the Gilbertese and members of other
communities were neither intensive nor hostile. There had been
a few intermarriages, mostly involving Gilbertese women and
Melanesian men. Liaisons and marriages between Gilbertese
men and Melanesian women were very rare. On the whole,
the Gilbertese did not feel close to their Melanesian neighbors,
although there were many individual exceptions and several
friendships. Early attempts at mixed stevedoring crews of
Gilbertese and Melanesians proved unsuccessful, and segre-
gated crews had become the rule. There had been some minor
altercations in Gizo town between Gilbertese and Melanesians,
but no large-scale fighting. The Gilbertese tended to view the
Melanesians as somewhat backward, crude, and uncivilized.
The Melanesians, on their part, felt that Gilbertese were noisy,
slightly immoral, and lacking in culture. In addition, there were
feelings of resentment on the part of many Melanesians, who
viewed the Gilbertese as having taken land and jobs that ought
to belong to Melanesians.
The Titiana Methodist church, virtually the only religious
organization in the community after the departure of most
Catholics for Kamaleai, was gradually being integrated into
the local Methodist mission organization. It was headed by a
Melanesian pastor, but most were services led by Gilbertese
members of the church organization. In 1963 exchange services
with Melanesian congregations were being held, and the church
was emerging as an important cross-cultural link with other
local ethnic groups. Within the Titiana population the church
was the focus of one of the most important community events,
the Christmas Day singing competition between the northern
and southern halves of the village.
One major problem for both the community and the govern-
ment was that of how land was to be allocated to the immi-
grants. The government had maintained at the outset of the
relocation program that each household in Titiana would re-
ceive clear title to a 4-acre plot of land. There were several
stumbling blocks to land allocation, however. The government
had to decide what constituted a household and a household
head (since title was granted only to household heads) and
whether very large households were to get one or two plots of
land (as some eventually did). The land had to be surveyed and
recorded before legal titles could be issued. In the process, the
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government discovered that there was not enough productive
land in the Titiana vicinity for all the households. To make up
the deficiency, many of the small islands near Ghizo, which had
been used as communal resources for copra production, were
subdivided and included in the lands to be allocated to house-
holds. The islands were from 6 to 10 miles from Ghizo and ac-
cessible only by canoe. Land in the Shortland Islands, 150 miles
north of Ghizo, was purchased by the government for distrib-
ution to emigrant households. All families retained their rights
to house plots in Titiana and New Manra.
The allocation of land took place in 1963. The government,
in order to be fair in distribution, used a random selection pro-
cedure to match households with land plots. Regardless of the
fairness of the procedure, many households were enraged at
being placed far away from Titiana. Others were furious at
having spent years clearing and cultivating plots only to have
them allocated to other households. By making land exchange
possible, the government was able to alleviate some, but by
no means all, of the discontent over the allocation. To make
matters worse, it took another ten years for the government to
issue the deeds of title. In the meantime, government agricul-
turists in the Solomon Islands determined that a 4-acre plot was
too small for household subsistence; 10 acres was deemed to be
a reasonable minimum.
The land allocation program has had several outcomes.
First, it has forced a dispersion of the community, which now
has people living in Titiana, New Manra, Gizo, Mbambanga (a
small island southeast of Ghizo), and on Alu and Laomana in
the Shortland Islands. Second, it has resulted in considerable
tension between the community and the government. Third, it
has provided the community with another problem which has
yet to be resolved: how to reallocate land at the death of a
household head.
The dispersion of the Titiana community began in mid-1962
with the creation of a village at Kamaleai Point in the Shortland
Islands. The Shortland Island group is a complex of large and
small islands, and Kamaleai is located on the most northerly
point of Shortland Island (map 10), the largest of the group.
Shortland Island is called Alu on some maps, and Alu is also the
name for the native Melanesian inhabitants and their language.
Kamaleai is situated on a small bay facing Bougainville Island,
the nearest point of which is only about 6 miles away.
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Shortland Island is larger than Ghizo, being about 20 miles
east to west and 10 miles north to south. The interior of the
island is hilly and rolling, but the maximum elevation is only
about 650 feet. Rainfall in the area averages about 160 inches
per year, so that the island is covered with dense tropical forest.
The coastline is low and much of it swampy; extensive areas of
mangrove are common. The mountains of Bougainville, which
dominate the northern skyline from Kamaleai Point, are the
scene of moderate but continual volcanic activity, and earth-
quakes are frequent.
As is the case in most of the Solomons, human settlement
in the Shortlands is in coastal regions and the interior is un-
inhabited. The greatest concentration of people is found at the
southeast tip of Shortland Island. Here a number of smaller is-
lands lie just offshore and the sheltered channels separating
them are frequently less than a half-mile wide. A large Alu
village is situated in this area, as is the Catholic mission station,
a small trading store, and the government station. In 1962–1963
there were no government personnel posted permanently in
the Shortlands; the government station consisted of a single
building used as a rest house by touring officials.
The Catholic mission is located at a site called Nila. The
mission operated a small boarding school that provided several
years of education for both boys and girls. Every six to eight
weeks a mission ship brought mail and supplies from Gizo, and
the mission operated a small motor vessel for local transpor-
tation. This converted sailing craft was also used for frequent
trips to the town of Buin on the south coast of Bougainville,
where weekly airmail service was provided from New Guinea.
Since there were no other missions in the area and visits by
government ships were irregular and infrequent, the mission at
Nila was a primary focus of Shortland Island life and the major
point of contact with the outside world. There are other set-
tlements on the eastern and western coast of Shortland Island,
but Kamaleai, about 12 miles from the mission station and 8
miles from the nearest Alu village, was remote and isolated.
There were virtually no overland roads or trails on the island
and travel was undertaken by boat or canoe.
Kamaleai’s isolation was in marked contrast to Titiana’s
setting near Gizo town. The sole means of subsistence of the
eighty-five residents were fishing and gardening. The sale of
copra provided a source of cash income; the crop was produced
on the mature trees of the plantation which had been subdi-
vided for the settlers. Households at Kamaleai received a total
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of 8 acres each in contrast to the 4-acre plots allocated at
Titiana. The copra was sold to small trading ships that visited
the area occasionally. These ships operated out of Gizo, and
their Chinese owners acted as middlemen, selling the copra at
the government storage facilities in Gizo town. The ships were
in fact small floating stores and provided the major source of
rice, flour, tobacco, cloth, and other purchased items.
The creation of the new community represented the at-
tainment of a major goal for its basically Catholic population:
separation from Protestant-oriented Titiana. A few adherents of
the Protestant faith lived in Kamaleai, but the small Catholic
church that had been erected was the community center.
Masses were occasionally said in it by the catechist who had
originally led the Sydney Island converts. An effort was begun
to establish a local school in 1963, but a number of children con-
tinued to be educated at the Nila mission school.
The community was led by its traditional leaders, the male
elders. The catechist acted as community spokesman in rela-
tions with the mission and the government. A meetinghouse had
not been erected, though one was planned, and in the meantime
the church building served for village meetings. The community
was a close-knit one, and the Sydney Island pattern of general
participation in life-crisis feasts was followed (in contrast to
Titiana, where such feasts had become mainly the business of
the kindred of those sponsoring the feasts).
The Kamaleai residents plainly enjoyed their new sur-
roundings and contrasted them favorably with Titiana. In par-
ticular they liked the escape from what they regarded as the
money orientation of life on Ghizo. They found their reliance
on self-production congenial and said it allowed them more
freedom and leisure. The strait of water separating them from
Bougainville served as an excellent, easily accessible fishing
ground, and they saw this as an added advantage over the
Titiana area, where fishing might involve several miles of canoe
travel.
In mid-1963 more Gilbertese arrived in the Kamaleai area to
begin new communities. One of these was at Harapa Point about
3 miles to the west, where a group of immigrants direct from
the Gilberts began constructing a new village. The other was at
Laomana about 6 miles to the west, where more people from
Titiana had been granted land under the allocation program.
The land at both these sites had been part of the same plan-
tation purchase that led to the Kamaleai resettlement and
therefore there were mature coconut palms to provide an eco-
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nomic base. The establishment of these new communities within
easy reach of one another had important implications in that a
sizable Gilbertese ethnic enclave was taking shape, although in
1963 only a beginning had been made.
POSTSCRIPT 1975
By mid-1975 the community at Titiana had been in existence for
nearly twenty years, a period of time equal to the total history
of the Sydney Island settlement. The most visible manifestation
of the incorporation of Titiana into Solomon Island life was the
greatly increased frequency of contact between the Gilbertese
settlers and Gizo town. By 1975 Titiana was essentially a sub-
urban outlier of the bustling little urban center.
In about 1964 and 1965 a logging company had worked
the forested interior of the island, constructing a road system
to facilitate removal of the timber. In the late 1960s this road
system was extended to points on the coast to reach the three
villages on the island. It is now possible to drive from Gizo town
to Sagheraghi at the northern end of the island and also to Pai-
longge, which lies about 2.5 miles west of Titiana. The road
to Pailongge passes through both New Manra and Titiana, oc-
cupying what was once a broad central pathway in each com-
munity.
From Pailongge to New Manra the road follows the coast,
turning inland at the end of New Manra to cut across the in-
terior of the island to Gizo. A few people occasionally still take
the path along the beach from New Manra, which offers beau-
tiful panoramic views of the sea, the reef, and the nearby is-
lands. The road, however, is the scene of a continual flow of
traffic to and from the town. Seven or eight families in Titiana
and New Manra own motorcycles, used mainly to commute
to full-time jobs in the town. In June and July of 1975, there
were two automobiles and a small pickup truck in use, also
owned by Gilbertese families. The pickup and one of the auto-
mobiles served as taxis, driven continually between Gizo and
the Gilbertese villages. If there were sufficient passengers or
other demand, service was also provided to Pailongge or
Sagheraghi. Though unscheduled, this motor transport was fre-
quent and inexpensive. Particularly in the early morning and
late afternoon hours there was a steady flow of people along the
road, going to and returning from work or shopping.
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Patterns of employment and subsistence activity had not
changed fundamentally, but there were noticeable differences.
Many families still supported themselves by fishing and gar-
dening plus part-time employment, cash cropping, and handi-
craft sales. There were no longer any Gilbertese sailing canoes
in the Ghizo area—Solomon Island dugout canoes had replaced
them, and a number of families owned outboard motors. The
canoes were purchased from Solomon Island craftsmen, who
had adapted their traditional design to include a square stern
on canoes intended for use with outboards. Fishing activity was
much less common in 1975 than in 1963, and the canoes were
used mainly for transportation of people and goods. The garden
areas near Titiana and New Manra had been greatly extended
and a tarolike plant was much in evidence. (The Gilbertese re-
ferred to this plant as babai, but I was unable to verify its
identity; the plant was not present in 1963 and apparently was
acquired in the Solomons rather than being imported from the
Gilberts.) In spite of the expansion of garden areas, purchased
food items were clearly more commonly used in 1975 then in
1963, and a cooperative store serving Titiana and New Manra
was well stocked and busy.
About 40 to 45 percent of the families in Titiana and New
Manra included a person who worked full-time for wages. This
is about the same proportion as in 1963, but there was a marked
difference: no longer was there a sizable number of unskilled or
semi-skilled laborers; almost all the jobs at which the Gilbertese
worked in 1975 required considerable skill and training, such as
accountant-clerk, wireless operator, outboard motor mechanic,
and medical assistant. Stevedoring work was still available and
provided part-time income for many men. Opportunities for this
work actually had expanded since 1963; timbering had become
a major industry and because much of the lumber was exported,
casual labor was recruited to load the ships.
Gizo itself had grown into a busy town of perhaps a thousand
people. Ships were seen much more frequently in the harbor un-
loading oil and other fuels, bringing cargo from Australia, and
loading copra. Nusatupe, an island just across the harbor, had
been leveled in the late 1960s to serve as an airport, and every
day except Sunday an airline service provided mail, cargo, and
passenger transport to other points in the Solomons including
Honiara and Munda, where connections with international car-
riers could be made. There were also other means of local
transportation, including a scheduled weekly ship from and to
EXILES AND MIGRANTS IN OCEANIA
207
Honiara. Government, mission, and trading vessels as well as
the air service provided frequent transportation to and from
other points in the Western Solomons.
In 1975 the local council system of government was well
established. The Solomons were near the point of self-gov-
ernment, and expatriate administrative personnel served
mainly in an advisory capacity. There had been many changes
in the council system, however, and there was a single council
for the entire western area. Its headquarters and administrative
offices remained in Gizo, but because of the frequency of local
ship and aircraft movements there was regular contact with
subdistrict offices and personnel in outlying areas.
A government primary school had been established in Gizo,
replacing the one that formerly served the Titiana community.
Most students in Titiana and New Manra continued to attend
classes in Titiana, however, for the existing building had been
taken over by the United (formerly Methodist) church and op-
erated as a mission school. The school also served the com-
munity of Pailongge. In mid-1975 four teachers were employed
in the school and a new classroom building was under con-
struction to replace the aged thatch structure. Catholic stu-
dents from Titiana and New Manra traveled to Gizo to attend
the mission school there.
The Titiana community was geographically dispersed. About
315 people lived in Titiana itself.3 In New Manra there were
about 115 residents, and in the village that had been created
on Mbambanga in 1963 there were about 35 persons. Perhaps
50 or so additional people affiliated with the Titiana community
lived elsewhere in the vicinity of Gizo, including 35 to 40
persons living in Logha, where the Catholic mission station con-
tinued to employ Gilbertese adherents in producing copra from
its plantation.
The composition and dispersion of the Titiana population
has been significantly affected by two developments elsewhere
in the Western Solomons. In 1962 the Gilbert and Ellice Islands
Colony administration decided to terminate the Phoenix Islands
resettlement program entirely, because the severe drought that
began about 1960 had brought genuine hardship to the settlers
remaining on Hull and Gardner islands. In 1963 the Gilbertese
living on those two islands were also relocated in the Western
Solomons, this time on Vaghena Island off the southeastern tip
of Choiseul Island. Vaghena is about 75 miles from Ghizo and
remote from centers of population. The Gilbertese at Titiana
retained many ties with the newly arrived settlers, of course,
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stemming from the years on Sydney Island when the people of
Hull and Gardner were in continual contact with them. Titiana
has therefore come to serve as a point of entry for families
and individuals from Vaghena who wish to live and work in the
Ghizo area. In 1975 five households in Titiana, three in New
Manra, and one on Mbambanga were comprised of people who
had come from Vaghena, relying on ties of kinship or friendship
to become established near Gizo town. Another seven or eight
households from Vaghena were to be found in or near Gizo
itself.
The other major development that influenced the Titiana
population was the lumber industry, which had become an im-
portant economic factor in the Western Solomons. In 1975 the
major center of timbering operations was at Ringgi Cove, on
the southern coast of Kolombangara Island about 20 miles from
Ghizo. Up to seventy-five Gilbertese men were employed there,
and many had brought their families to live with them. Most of
the families were from Vaghena, but there were several from
Titiana as well. Employment in the lumbering operations re-
sulted in a flow of households out of the Titiana area, while
the creation of the settlement on Vaghena resulted in a flow of
families into Titiana and the Gizo area. Furthermore, in 1975
Titiana was no longer the only Gilbertese community in the
Ghizo area. There were perhaps 300 or more Gilbertese at
Ringgi Cove, while about 800 remained on Vaghena.
Thus the population affiliated with the Titiana community
was not only scattered but also fluctuating and heterogeneous.
There was a continual movement of individuals and families
into and out of the community according to work opportunities.
It was also increasingly heterogeneous in that individuals and
families moving into the community were often kinsmen or
friends rather than long-time residents.
There had also been increased intermarriage with Melane-
sians by 1975. Although such marriages are still infrequent, at
least some of the younger people thought that intermarriage
with Melanesians was desirable and would hasten assimilation
of the Gilbertese into Solomon Island life. There were a number
of other Melanesians resident in Titiana, either as friends of
Gilbertese residents or relatives of Melanesians married to
Gilbertese. Some of these were children enrolled in the Titiana
school. A number of other Melanesian children traveled from
Pailongge each day to attend school. The school itself was
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headed by a Melanesian, and the committee responsible for
school affairs (including the construction of the new school
building) included several Pailongge residents.
Community organization in Titiana has changed markedly
since 1963, and it is not difficult to identify the factors asso-
ciated with the changes. Given the greater frequency of contact
with Gizo exemplified by the morning and evening commuter
traffic, the increasing significance of money in the local
economy, the scattered and fluctuating population, the in-
creasing effectiveness of the local council system of gov-
ernment, the organizations such as church and mission which
cut across ethnic lines, the slowly growing number of non-
Gilbertese residents, and a younger generation born or raised in
the Solomons who regard themselves as Solomon Islanders, it is
not surprising that leadership no longer resides primarily with
the elder males of the community. They retain the respect tradi-
tionally accorded them, but their influence is no longer what it
was.
A new meetinghouse was erected in 1964–1965 of per-
manent materials (a corrugated iron roof replaced the former
traditional thatch). There were no meetings of the elders in it
in June and July of 1975, but there were two dances featuring a
local band that used electronically amplified instruments. There
was 24-hour electrical service in Gizo town, but this had not yet
reached Titiana, so a small portable generator provided power.
The community was led by an eight-man committee, whose
members were debating in private whether or not a fee should
be charged for use of the meetinghouse by private groups.
One of the dances had been sponsored by the youth group of
the United church; the other was promoted by an individual
as a money-making venture. The committee had appointed a
headman to serve as its leader and contact man for other com-
munities. The powers of the committee and its headman were
uncertain. They were unpaid and served primarily to assess
public opinion and discuss alternatives in community-wide af-
fairs, tasks traditionally the domain of the elder men.
There were other indications of the declining authority of
the elder men in 1975. Traditionally, these leaders were respon-
sible for organizing hospitality for village guests and for feasts
and dances. In 1963, for example, the first settlers for Harapa
in the Shortlands visited Titiana for several weeks awaiting
transportation to their new village site. On that occasion the
elders divided the community into groups of households, each
responsible for feeding the visitors on a given date. The new set-
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tlers ate and slept in the meetinghouse according to Gilbertese
custom, and many of the elders stayed there also, entertaining
the guests with cards, dancing, and conversation for the entire
period. In 1975, however, guests were hosted by families or by
the church.
The elders were also traditionally responsible for village
feasts and dances, including the anniversary of the completion
of the original Titiana meetinghouse and the New Year’s Day
dancing competition. By 1975 the anniversary in August had not
been celebrated for some time, and no plans were in progress
for that year. Enthusiasm for the New Year’s Day dances had
also declined, and participation had been decreasing for several
years. Practice for that event usually began in late October, but
it was reported that in spite of the exhortations of the elders at-
tendance was low.
The fragmentation of the community was also apparent in
changes in attitudes of village identity and affiliation. By the
early 1970s the Gilbertese living in New Manra had apparently
developed a considerable feeling of identity separate from
Titiana. In 1973 they constructed their own meetinghouse and
gave New Manra another name: Ribono. This feeling of separate
identity had been apparent in 1963, but to a much lesser
degree.
Titiana and New Manra had formerly been divided into two
arbitrary groups for singing competitions at Christmas and
dancing competitions at New Year’s. The two groups were ap-
proximately equal in size: one consisted of about two-thirds of
the Titiana residence area while the other consisted of New
Manra plus the remainder of Titiana. In 1963 the land allocation
led to a dispersal of population, and later the competitive
groups were reorganized. Again there were two groups, one
consisting of Titiana as a whole, the other of New Manra plus
Mbambanga and the other scattered residents in the Ghizo
area. The new grouping probably contributed to the ultimate
separation and renaming of New Manra. During the 1974–1975
holiday season there had been three competing groups because
the Gilbertese at Ringgi Cove on Kolombangara had indicated
an interest in participating. Despite this added incentive, enthu-
siasm in Titiana, Ribono, and Mbambanga was not sufficiently
raised; the Ringgi Cove group was apparently superior in both
singing and dancing.
There were other signs that Titiana was undergoing a
gradual transition from a homogeneous, subsistence-oriented
cultural enclave of Gilbertese to something quite different: a
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suburban community with a particular ethnic and historical
background. In 1963 travel from Titiana to Gizo was much less
frequent than in 1975; in the evening families gathered at their
homes for the principal meal of the day. The main path was
quiet; children and young people stayed with their parents as
the day’s events were discussed and next day’s plans made. In
1975, however, late afternoon was a time for soccer and vol-
leyball games by the youth, and crowds of children were at play
along the central road. On some evenings dances and other en-
tertainments in Gizo attracted numbers of young people. Tradi-
tional life-crisis feasts were still in evidence, though attendance
was ordinarily by kinsmen only. Birth and marriage were im-
portant events, but the occasion of a young girl’s first menstru-
ation was quietly celebrated by the immediate family only. No
wedding took place in mid-1975, but people stated that the vir-
ginity of the bride was not so widely publicized as before. There
appeared to be increasing sensitivity to criticism from outside
the community and a growing feeling that visible celebrations
of first menstruation and of bridal virginity were undesirable.
Given the rapidly changing social and economic conditions
in which the Gilbertese in the Titiana area found themselves,
land tenure and inheritance practices were not clearly estab-
lished. In cases where a landholding household head died
leaving only one heir, there was no difficulty; but where there
were several living heirs, the evident practice was for them to
come to agreement among themselves about the exploitation
of the holding if the deceased had not made clear his or her
wishes. The final technicalities of land allocation and issuance
of title were not cleared away until 1974, and it remains to be
seen how quickly clear-cut rules will develop.
Titiana was a predominantly Protestant community in 1975.
Religious factionalism was not a major feature of village affairs,
although the Baha’i church had gained some converts,
particularly on Mbambanga, where this may foreshadow the for-
mation of another organized community sometime in the future.
The Methodist church in the Solomons had been reorganized
as part of the United Church of Papua and New Guinea. The
former Methodist church building standing next to the meet-
inghouse had been replaced by a building of permanent mate-
rials adjacent to the school. As has already been mentioned, the
school was operated by the church. Financial assistance was
provided by the Solomons government, however, and the new
school building was being constructed with the aid of a gov-
ernment grant.
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The United church, with its youth and women’s groups,
was also a social center, drawing its membership from Ribono
(New Manra) and more distant areas as well as Titiana itself.
A small church meetinghouse had been constructed across the
road from the church itself, and in mid-1975 bazaars, bingo
games, and auctions were being held in it to help finance the
new school. The women’s group held monthly meetings in the
church meetinghouse, where they auctioned off handicraft and
food items. At each meeting it was decided what was to be
auctioned at the next month’s gathering. The proceeds of the
auction were put into a common fund with the church taking
a share. Anyone who did not bring an item previously agreed
on could make a cash contribution in its place. The fund was
divided in equal shares among the member women at Christ-
mastime.
It is interesting to note that the auctions seemed to function
as a cash redistribution system. Women from affluent families
were likely to contribute cash and to pay higher prices for
auctioned goods. Women from families with low incomes were
likely to contribute goods they had made and to pay lower
prices for auctioned goods. All shared in the cash fund that was
accumulated, however.
The men of the community had their own cooperative work
group, although details of its organization were not clear to me.
Anyone who wanted a specific task accomplished quickly, such
as construction of a house, could pay for the work and the ma-
terials at set rates. The materials and labor were contributed by
members and the funds were pooled. A member of the group
could draw his share at any time, and there did not appear to be
an annual division as in the case of the women’s church group,
although there could be if the members wished. This cooper-
ative group was apparently rarely activated, but it appears to
have been a development stemming from the former Sydney
Island young men’s club. Early in the history of Titiana there
had been an effort to reconstitute that organization, but enthu-
siasm was lacking and the club itself was no longer active by
1963.
A final comment should be made regarding the growing evi-
dence of significant economic differences in Titiana. In 1975
some households were visibly affluent relative to others. There
had been some signs of differences in 1963, but they were re-
stricted to one or two households. By 1975 a number of fam-
ilies had considerably more in the way of material goods than
others; radios, motorcycles, outboard motors, and houses built
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of permanent materials were much more common than in 1963,
but not all or even most households had them. This trend runs
counter to the strongly egalitarian values of Gilbertese culture
and perhaps will act in the future as an added stimulus to edu-
cation and training for highly paid positions.
In 1963 the Gilbertese themselves commented on the con-
trast between the rural, subsistence-oriented life of Kamaleai
and the gradual inclusion of Titiana within the social and eco-
nomic life of Gizo town. The contrast was greatly accentuated
by 1975, even though Kamalaei had come to experience much
more frequent contact with other communities.
By 1975 the government station at the southeast tip of
Shortland Island had been expanded to house a number of
permanently stationed personnel. Government shipping from
Gizo was on a regular schedule, stopping there at least once
a month before continuing on to Shortland Island villages. The
government ships carried cargo for the network of village co-
operative societies that had been established, so that Kamaleai
and the other nearby Gilbertese communities had regular com-
munication links with the rest of the Solomons.
A large-scale malaria eradication program had been set up
throughout the Solomons during the 1960s, and personnel con-
nected with the program visited Kamaleai at least once a week
to administer antimalarial drugs. Blood samples were taken
regularly to detect the presence of the disease, and there was
periodic inspection and spraying of all buildings (the same
program was also in effect in the Ghizo area including Titiana).
There was regular travel to Bougainville from the Shortlands.
Kamaleai was therefore no longer isolated to the degree it
was in 1963. Furthermore, the village had become part of a
more inclusive Gilbertese community that included Harapa and
Laomana. Each of these three villages had its own meeting-
house. The population of Harapa was about 200 persons, that of
Laomana about 100; Kamaleai was perhaps the smallest of the
three, with 96 residents in July 1975. The three villages formed
competing groups for singing (on Christmas Day) and dancing
(on New Year’s Day). The villages took turns in hosting the com-
petitions. Each village also had its own cooperative society, but
only Harapa had a school and health clinic due to its central lo-
cation about midway between the other two communities. Ka-
maleai was still isolated, but it had become part of a Gilbertese
cultural enclave numbering about 400 persons and spread over
three village sites.
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The community was still subsistence oriented and retained
much of the characteristic life of a Gilbertese community. The
elder men of the village were still its leaders. When the resi-
dents gathered for some purpose, such as greeting important
visitors or discussing village matters, the elders took their ac-
customed places and dominated the discussion, as tradition
dictated. Catholicism remained the dominant religion, and the
catechist was still the spokesman for the community in its rela-
tionships with the administration and the mission. The former
church building was no longer standing, however, and Sunday
services and occasional masses were held in the meetinghouse.
Extensive gardens had been planted in the swampy area
west of the village site. Much of this was what they called
babai—the same plant that had been introduced at Titiana. Fish
were still plentiful in the waters nearby; Solomon Island dugout
canoes were the usual means of transportation to the fishing
grounds. There were still a few Gilbertese sailing canoes, but
they were used only infrequently, mainly for trips to Buin on
Bougainville. At Buin there was a weekly market at which the
Gilbertese sold fish. The Kamaleai cooperative society also
owned an outboard motor and a large dugout canoe. Both were
used for “official” trips to nearby villages, but fuel was ex-
pensive and difficult to come by, so that such trips were infre-
quent.
The village cooperative also participated in a government
cattle ranching project, which provided subsidies for clearing
and fencing land and made cattle available for stock. By 1975
the Kamaleai cooperative had cleared about 20 acres of land
and had seven head of cattle in the enclosure. The project was
still in its beginning stages in the Solomons, however, and facil-
ities for processing and marketing the final product were still in
planning by the government.
A women’s group and a men’s cooperative group were in
existence in Kamaleai operating on lines similar to those in
Titiana. There was also some mission activity by the United
church; the people of Laomana were predominantly Protestant
and were helping in the construction of a church building in Ka-
maleai. There were two Protestant families in Kamaleai itself.
Protestant services were held at the new church site, led by a
Gilbertese missionary from Titiana who also lived there. This
location was about a half mile from Kamaleai proper; the mis-
sionary and his family did not otherwise participate in the life of
the community, although the Protestant residents of Kamaleai
thought that they should be included.
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In spite of the increased frequency of contact and the ex-
tension of government and mission projects, Kamaleai in 1975
was much as it was in 1963, and its traditions were reinforced
by the proximity of other Gilbertese communities. Enthusiasm
for the singing and dancing competitions was high, life-crisis
feasts were major community events, the leadership of the elder
men was followed, the community as a whole acted as hosts for
visitors, and only two buildings (a house and the cooperative
store) were constructed of nontraditional materials.
Thus while there were undoubted pressures for change in
Kamaleai, and while new pressures can be expected to appear
as the frequency of contact continues to grow, the actual extent
of change has been minimal compared to Titiana. It seems ob-
vious that the reason for the differential rate of change between
the two communities lies in their different settings: the isolation
of Kamaleai in contrast to the proximity of Titiana to Gizo town.
CONCLUSIONS
The nearly forty-year history of the Titiana and Kamaleai com-
munities reveals a series of adaptations and experiments in
adjustment to new and varied circumstances. When the com-
munity first took shape on Sydney Island, the major differences
in environment were physical and biological. Sydney Island was
small and lacking in extensive reef areas. It also had a highly
saline central lake and, correspondingly, less capacity for sub-
surface freshwater storage than the islands of the Southern
Gilberts. This meant that some of the traditional subsistence
foods of the Gilbertese could not be cultivated. A local sub-
stitute was found which came to be a staple in the diet, but no
change other than reorganization of household subsistence ac-
tivities seems to have resulted.
The other factor influencing culture change on Sydney
Island was the selection of households as the unit of reset-
tlement. This was an obvious choice in formulating the re-
settlement plans. Households based on nuclear families had
become increasingly independent economically in the Gilberts
since the inception of the colony; furthermore, if household
groups were the unit of relocation more families remaining in
the Gilberts could be aided. Taking sets of closely related fam-
ilies would have meant a smaller number of numerically larger
units. Fewer such large units could have been taken from each
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island, and there would have been a magnification of the ad-
ministrative problems of reallocating their lands to those who
stayed behind.
Because small family units were taken from different islands
and localities in the Southern Gilberts, many specific local tradi-
tions were represented among the new residents of Sydney
Island. The immediate result was a “least common denomi-
nator” approach to solving questions of the interpretation of tra-
dition. The community meetinghouse organization is an obvious
example of this. The concept of specific seating places was re-
tained, but no family sat in the same location it had occupied
in its home meetinghouse and no permanent allocation of order
of precedence in meetings was made. Another manifestation of
this generalizing approach was in life-crisis feasts, where par-
ticipation was extended to all island residents rather than being
limited to kinsmen as in the Southern Gilberts.
The selection of household groups meant that cooperation
based on kinship to accomplish a specific task could enlist only
a few individuals. The problems of initial development of the
island (and, once this was accomplished, maintenance and sub-
sistence) seem to have required more people, though perhaps
at only infrequent intervals. The debate over how this was to be
accomplished resulted in a gradually widening schism between
the collectivists who favored group effort and the individualists
who opposed it. There does seem to have been some need for
collective effort, however, and the later formation of a young
men’s club for this purpose was the outcome. Nevertheless,
the schism in the community grew deeper and led to accep-
tance of a new faith, Catholicism, in the previously Protestant
community. Later the gap grew into a desire for separation—a
desire that appeared as a wish to remain on Sydney after the
rest of the community had been relocated in the Solomons.
The growing independence of nuclear families in the
Southern Gilberts prior to resettlement was a trend that was
probably carried to Sydney Island, but it was reduced in in-
tensity there by the isolation of the island and the apparent
need for cooperation of larger numbers of people in at least
some tasks. A foundation for the potential assertion of indepen-
dence of sons from their fathers was present in the fact that
land on Sydney was allocated to individuals. In the Gilberts
the fact that land was inherited from one’s parents created a
sanction that tended to make young people think twice about
deviating from parental guidance; everyone had land on Sydney,
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however, so that the impact of this traditional sanction was re-
duced. The potential was never seized upon, however, and elder
men retained their prestige.
In spite of the marked differences in physical and biological
environment presented by the setting at Titiana when relocation
to the Solomons took place, culture change resulting from these
differences was minimal. This statement must be tempered,
however, in the light of the features of the program that resulted
in resettlement at Titiana Point. A certain quantity of land was
promised to the settlers in the form of an allocation to each
household head. As it turned out, the physical setting proved to
be too small in area to make such an allocation possible at a
single site. The result was the dispersion of the community in
the Titiana area and the creation of another community at Ka-
maleai. At Kamaleai one religious faction achieved its goal of
separation from the other. In the Titiana area the dispersion of
the community resulted in an assertion of independence by res-
idents at one site, New Manra. There are also early signs that
this pattern may be repeated by the residents of another site,
the village on Mbambanga Island.
The marked difference in social environment between
Sydney Island and the Titiana area has had a marked effect
on culture change. The proximity of Gizo town with its admin-
istrative center and employment opportunities has resulted in
a decline of the prestige of the elders as community leaders,
and the life of the Gilbertese in the Titiana area has been
markedly adapted to that of the town. Titiana has also become
a channel through which other Gilbertese gain employment and
the attractions of town life. Urbanization is therefore the major
process of change in Titiana.
The interpretation of change in Titiana as a process of
adaptation to a new social environment is supported when a
comparison is made with Kamaleai. Although Kamaleai is set
within the same general Solomon Island administrative and eco-
nomic framework, its remoteness from any urban center has
resulted in greater continuity of Gilbertese tradition, and this
continuity of tradition has been reinforced by the establishment
of similar subsistence-oriented Gilbertese communities in the
same vicinity.
A concept of adaptation to differing social as well as physical
and biological environments has been used in this chapter as
a framework for discussing culture change. The utility of the
framework is evident, even though the history of the community
spans less than forty years. Of course the process is an ongoing
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one, and adaptation continues in Titiana and Kamaleai. The
Solomons in mid-1975 were nearing self-government, with inde-
pendence in the foreseeable future. Both Titiana and Kamaleai
were therefore part of a changing setting rather than a static
one, and the younger members of the two communities are
certain to find that their cultural traditions provide guidelines
but not necessarily solutions to the new situations they will face.
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TIKOPIA IN THE RUSSELL
ISLANDS
Eric H. Larson
Chapter9
INTRODUCTION
Success in any venture, so folk wisdom tells us, almost always
carries with it problems that the successful never dreamt of
before embarking. So it is with the relocated Tikopia community
in the Russell Islands. (See map 11.) Like other relocated com-
munities described in this volume Tikopia emigrants had to
cope with the inevitable problems of recreating an infra-
structure and a social system in a novel environment. They
appear to have been more than reasonably successful in dealing
with these problems. Yet their success in adjusting to life in
their new environment has brought with it a great deal of frus-
tration and insecurity that seem to permeate community life.
This chapter is primarily concerned with the nature of this frus-
tration and insecurity, how these feelings came to be, and how
the Tikopia have attempted to deal with them.
Although Tikopia have been emigrating from the home
island since 1904, the patterns of migration have changed con-
siderably since 1956, when the resettled community of
Nukufero was established (Firth 1931; 1936:42; 1954). Prior to
1956, it was mainly single males who left Tikopia to seek work
or a change of scenery in the Central Solomon Islands. Since
the resettlement of Tikopia in the Russell Islands, it has been
larger groups, mainly nuclear families, that have emigrated. By
1964, approximately one-quarter of the total Tikopia population
resided on Lever’s Pacific Plantations and in the resettled com-
munity in the Russell Islands (see tables 2, 3, and 4).
A basic reason for Tikopia emigration is the scarcity of
resources on the home island. Tikopia measures only 2.5 by
1.5 miles in size and is physically isolated from main lines of
communication. The distance from major population centers
and the lack of marketable goods with which to establish trade
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Map 11. Movement from Tikopia to Russell Islands.
cause the Tikopia to depend almost entirely on local resources.
Given the small size of the island, population increases and
natural catastrophes compound subsistence problems. Firth
(1959:51–53) notes an increase in people from 1,300 in 1929 to
1,750 in 1952, a gain of about 35 percent in twenty-three years.
He also describes the effects of a hurricane that swept Tikopia
in 1952, causing extensive damage to fruit-bearing palms and
flooding of the sea onto gardens close to shore. The hurricane
brought near famine to the island, and the British government
was forced to provide food to offset shortages. The anthropol-
ogist James Spillius estimates that possibly seventeen of the
ninety deaths in 1952 and 1953 may have resulted from the ef-
fects of malnutrition, if not starvation (Firth 1959:59).
The British government adds to pressures on the island’s
limited resources by declaring illegal or immoral certain of the
traditional population controls. In precontact days, elder heads
of families reduced the birth rate by discouraging young men
from marrying. Coitus interruptus was practiced in an effort to
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TABLE 2 Tikopia Migrating to Russell Islands, by Sex, Number of
Visits, and Duration of Stay: 1949–1964
Duration
Males
Number of Visits
Females
Number of Visits
of Stay 5 or 5 or
in Years 1 2 3 4 More 1 2 3 4 More
7+ 22 0 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 0
6 7 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
5 36 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 0
4 51 31 3 0 0 31 15 0 0 0
3 87 62 23 0 0 62 51 18 0 0
2 123 147 93 63 36 92 102 72 41 18
1 110 172 87 51 23 84 111 63 36 10
NOTE: The table shows individuals who have gone once or more
to the Russell Islands and who may have remained for varying
periods depending on the visit. Thus a given person may be
represented in several of the cells shown in the table, since
some people make more than one trip and stay for different
extended periods.
reduce the number of pregnancies. Abortion was not common
but did occur among unmarried females who hoped to avoid
giving birth. Population growth was also checked by infanticide
(burying the face of infants in the sand), by people being lost at
sea, and by interisland warfare (Firth 1936:373–374).
The internal pressures of population and scarce resources
on Tikopia would themselves have been sufficient causes for
the eventual mass movement of inhabitants to other areas, but
the specific migration to the Russells is largely the result of en-
couragement given by the British government and Lever’s plan-
tations. The need for cheap labor is an attribute of the large-
scale production of tropical crops on plantations (Courteney
1965:2–7; Myint 1965: 54). Since the indigenous population
of the Russell Islands is neither sufficiently large nor willing
to provide the necessary manpower to work Lever’s estates,
the company recruits outsiders. Thus Lever’s plantations, with
the government’s cooperation, made special efforts to entice
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TABLE 3 Tikopia Migrating to Russell Islands, by Age:
1949–1964
Age of Migrants
in Years
Total Migrant
Population (%)
0–9 20
10–19 19
20–29 28
30–39 25
40–49 5
50 and over 3
TOTAL 100
NOTE: The percentage in each age category is computed
on the basis of the chronological age of persons living in
the resettlement and the duration of the stay for each
visit. For example, if a person migrated to the Russell
Islands for one year at age twenty-three, category 20–29
was scored one point; if the same person visited again
for two years at age thirty-three, category 30–39 was
scored two points, and so forth.
Tikopia to come to the Russells. Following the advice of Spillius,
the company altered recruitment practices and improved
working conditions on the estates, thus opening the way for
Tikopia not accustomed to regimental labor to adjust to a new
life (Spillius 1957). Lever allowed Tikopia recruiters and not
outsiders to interview prospective workers on the island. As
a result, only those the recruiters thought would be happy
and productive on the plantations were selected. The Tikopia
chiefs were also included in the selective process. This decision
tended to stabilize the flow of migrants to and from the island,
since the chiefs desire to maintain a balance in population be-
tween Tikopia and the Russells.1 Segments of extended families
may locate both at home and abroad at the same time, keeping
up properties in the two locations. Finally, the company agreed
to be flexible in assigning jobs on the plantations. Tikopia were
thus able to organize into small groups of their own choosing
and to cooperate in labor tasks following traditional patterns of
work organization.
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TABLE 4 Tikopia Populations in Russell Islands and on Tikopia: 1964
Russell Islands Tikopia
Age Male Female Total (%) Male Female Total (%)
0–9 62 50 26 158 134 29
10–19 42 37 19 99 143 24
20–29 82 46 31 80 103 18
30–39 53 24 19 73 85 15
40–49 9 4 3 37 36 7
50 and over 6 2 2 25 38 7
TOTAL 254 163 100 472 539 100
The government for its part stimulated emigration by recom-
mending that Lever offer Tikopia free land in the Russells.
Together the government and Lever’s representatives met with
Tikopia chiefs and other influential men of the island and agreed
to send a reconnaissance group of six Tikopia, including one
chief, to inspect areas for possible resettlement in the Russells.
The Nukufero site was later chosen, and the government and
Lever provided the initial migrant contingent with food, seed
for planting gardens, tools, and supplies to begin village con-
struction. The government and plantation management
promised eventual relinquishment of legal rights of the land
to the Tikopia, and the migrants were led to understand that
the government would allow resettlers full autonomy in what
Tikopia regarded as the normal run of village affairs.
The favorable conditions of emigration as seen by Tikopia
have continued over the past two decades, and in 1964, at the
time of this investigation, 417 Tikopia people were residing in
the Russells. In that same year, the number living on Tikopia
was reduced to 1,011, or approximately 58 percent of the figure
reported to have been on the island in 1952.
Tikopia in the Russells live in two plantation labor com-
pounds, Semata and Pepesala, and in Nukufero village on
Pavuvu Island (map 12). Pavuvu and neighboring Banika Island
are the main land bodies of the Russell group, which also in-
cludes a number of smaller, low-lying islets. Banika Island is
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more developed than Pavuvu: European management and the
main Melanesian labor force number approximately a thousand
in residence, and there is a store, an elementary school, a small
hospital, an airstrip, and a police station. Pavuvu is the larger
of the two islands, but with the exception of 3,700 acres of co-
conut estates, it is covered throughout with thick tropical forest.
Tikopia constitute the main population on the island and are
charged with sole responsibility for maintaining Lever’s estates
in the area.2 Contacts with the small Melanesian settlements
on Mane and Karamaloun Islands are infrequent, and migrants
generally leave the resettlement only for special reasons—to re-
ceive medical attention, purchase items in the store, or make
travel connections on Banika. On the other hand, the Tikopia
form a tightly knit society, and communication between
Nukufero and the labor compounds is easily maintained by close
physical proximity. Nukufero village, built and developed by the
Tikopia alone, is the hub of activity with thatch houses, a church
and mission school with three elementary grades, a dispensary,
and surrounding gardens. Migrants residing in the labor com-
pounds own or have access to houses and land in the village.
Thus Tikopia in the Russell Islands have their own village,
which is politically and socially autonomous. Contact with Euro-
peans and Melanesians is periodic and minimal. Even the work
on Lever’s plantations is organized almost wholly by Tikopia
themselves. The Tikopia, in other words, are more or less left
to run their own affairs as they see fit. Given these facts, a cu-
rious feature of the resettled community is the continual and ex-
plicit stress that residents place on their ethnic uniqueness and
on the maintenance of their traditions in their interaction with
one another. It is common in both public and private meetings to
hear people haranguing one another about maintaining Tikopia
‘custom’. The extent to which people consciously pursue this
subject is curious for several reasons. One would think that
since Tikopia interact almost exclusively with one another in the
village they would simply assume the relevance of their ethnic
identity and talk about whatever is current at the moment. Their
harping on the maintenance of custom would be more under-
standable if there were Melanesians and Europeans constantly
present and in contact with them, but this has not been the
case. There is no other ethnic group continually present to serve
as a model for alternative life-styles.
It is obvious that the Tikopia are aware of their ethnic
uniqueness and of the fact that they have an ancient tradition
to maintain. Firth (1936) noted this long ago. Yet their continual
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Map 12. Tikopia settlements in the Russell Islands.
reference to the subject raises several questions: Do the Tikopia
believe that, all other things being equal, they will lose or
forget their traditions without conscious safeguards? Do they
really believe that their traditions are in fact brittle? Do they
fear the influence of outsiders as powerfully subversive even
with minimal contact? Are there circumstances peculiar to the
Nukufero situation that pose a threat to the maintenance of
Tikopia tradition?
The answers to these questions lie in the ways that Tikopia
conceive of three things: themselves as an ethnic unit, their tra-
ditions, and their situation in the Russell Islands. I shall demon-
strate that because of the ways in which Tikopia conceive of
themselves as an ethnic entity and their traditions, they per-
ceive their situation in the Russell Islands to be highly am-
biguous. The continual haranguing about maintaining Tikopia
custom can be seen as a response to the ambiguities with which
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they must live. I shall also demonstrate that the major conflicts
in the Nukufero community are all manifestations of the ambi-
guities of their situation.
I shall demonstrate the nature of the ambiguity in the
Nukufero community and how it arises in the following way.
First, I shall describe the organization of the community, its re-
lations with Lever’s plantations and the colonial government,
and its relationship to Tikopia. Second, Tikopia ideas about
their own ethnic characteristics and about their historical tra-
dition will be presented. I shall then relate these data to those
presented in the previous section to show how ambiguity arises
in the resettled community. In other words, I shall show how
Tikopia concepts of ethnicity and tradition structure their per-
ceptions of Nukufero. Finally, I shall show how the ambiguity
structures conflict in the community and how the Tikopia at-
tempt to resolve it.
NUKUFERO
Nukufero village consists of approximately 200 acres of land
near the shore of an inlet of West Bay on Pavuvu Island. An ad-
vance party of nineteen men, including a headman appointed
by the four Tikopia chiefs, began the work of clearing land,
building houses, and planting in May 1956. The advance party
was joined throughout 1956 and 1957 by other men from
Tikopia and from two other plantations on Pavuvu Island
(Semata and Pepesala). Once a communal sleeping house had
been constructed, work on gardens began.
Each resident chose his own garden plot in consultation with
the village headman and worked on it independently. Plots vary
from 2 to 8 acres in area. The major crops planted have been
tapioca and sweet potatoes; taro, bananas, and breadfruit are
of less importance. This pattern contrasts with the Tikopia re-
source base, in which taro, breadfruit, coconuts, bananas, cyr-
tosperma, sago, and yams (in that order) were major crops
(Firth 1939:65). The reasons for this shift in emphasis seem
to be that tapioca and sweet potatoes require less trouble to
cook and coconuts are already plentiful and are collected for
use from plantation land (with Lever’s permission). With the
exception of the first six months after founding the village,
Nukufero residents have been able to subsist entirely on village
resources.
EXILES AND MIGRANTS IN OCEANIA
227
The ownership and use of land in Nukufero more or less
replicate that on Tikopia. Chiefs are the titular owners of the
land on Tikopia, and this is also ideally the case for the original
land allotment (of 75 acres) in Nukufero, though the supple-
mentary allotment of 125 acres seems to be owned by people
other than chiefs. The actual control of land both on Tikopia
and in Nukufero is vested in patrilineages. Although it has been
mainly individuals that work each land plot, plots are claimed
for the individual’s lineage. Control and inheritance of plots
follow the rules of patrilineal succession and inheritance that
are characteristic of Tikopia. As on Tikopia, exploitation of land
is carried on jointly by people who are related as cognates or
as friends. Such joint use is more frequent in Nukufero than on
Tikopia for two reasons. First, newly arrived emigrants often
have no agnates living in Nukufero, so they stay with people to
whom they are related cognatically, using their relatives’ land
until they can establish their own garden plots. Second, the
abundance of arable land in Nukufero relative to the low popu-
lation density allows each person more options in land use than
on Tikopia.
Once families began to emigrate to Nukufero, in 1957,
family dwellings replaced the communal residence house. By
1965 there were thirty-one houses with several more under
construction. Households consisted mainly of nuclear families,
often with a sibling or parent of either spouse (67 percent of
the households). Other households contained adult cognates or
siblings or families with one spouse dead or absent (see table
5). Their composition reflects the structure of the Nukufero
population in that the categories of kin with whom one would
normally live on Tikopia are often absent in Nukufero, necessi-
tating various relationships in arranging residence (see Larson
1966:70–72). The household organizes the daily activity of its
members, such as work on Lever’s plantations, work in the
family’s gardens, cleaning, cooking, and the like. As on Tikopia,
the household is the major unit of economic production and
consumption. The location of households generally follows the
major paths traversing the village: houses tend to cluster in a
line along the paths as on Tikopia (Firth 1939:50– 51; Larson
1966:16).
By 1965, there were two schools in Nukufero. A boarding
school for boys, built by students, teachers, and a few men
in the village, drew its students—who numbered forty-four in
1965—from the plantations in Semata and Pepesala and from
the village. The boarding school was staffed by three Tikopia, all
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TABLE 5 Composition of Tikopia Households in Russell Islands and on
Tikopia: 1964
Russell Islands Tikopia
Composition Number % Number
%
Married couple only 6 7 7 3
Nuclear family only 29 34 79 29
Nuclear family plus sibling(s) of
spouse(s)
8 9 26 10
Nuclear family plus parent(s) of
spouse(s)
10 11 68 24
Nuclear family plus sibling(s) and
parent(s) of spouse(s)
7 9 18 7
Family with one spouse dead or
absent
3 3 27 10
Other* 24 27 45 17
TOTAL 87 100 270 100
*This category includes several kinds of households that are
found only on Tikopia and dormitory housing on plantations at
Semata and Pepesala in the Russell Islands. A more detailed
listing of household types and their distribution is presented in
Larson (1966:72).
of whom were trained in Melanesian mission schools. The head-
master, a 25-year-old man of high rank in a Tikopia clan, had
been trained in a government teacher’s college. The school has
its own garden plots (worked by the students) from which the
students’ and staff’s subsistence is drawn. The normal school
day includes morning prayer and breakfast, followed by work in
the gardens, morning instruction, the noon meal, physical ed-
ucation (usually soccer games or relay racing), garden work,
evening prayer, the evening meal, and, finally, evening leisure
and study. The curriculum includes English, arithmetic, health,
geography, and religion. The girls’ school, which had just begun
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in 1965, had two Tikopia women as teachers; students came
from the village and the Semata plantation for two hours each
morning. Subjects taught were English, arithmetic, and re-
ligion. Most instruction was conducted in English, though
teachers used the Tikopia language to explicate difficult ma-
terial.
The boys’ school has played an important role in village af-
fairs almost since its inception. The boys constitute a well-orga-
nized labor force that has participated in church construction,
road construction, the laying out of a soccer field, feast prepara-
tions, and lending sundry aid to visiting dignitaries. The school
headmaster, a talented teacher and organizer, exercised an in-
fluential position in Nukufero village affairs. His influence was
based not only on his education and talent but also on his po-
sition as a religious leader of the village.
The political organization of Nukufero village represents
significant departures from but also continuities of Tikopian
tradition. While the four clan chiefs and their ‘high-ranking
kinsmen’, the maru, wield political authority on Tikopia, a
village headman, appointed by the chiefs and representing
them, has charge of the affairs of Nukufero. He acts as an
arbiter in community problems and is the Tikopia spokesman
in relations with the outside. There have been three headmen
since the founding of the village. A male from any of the four
Tikopia clans, regardless of his traditional rank, is eligible for
Nukufero headship, although experience with Europeans and
Melanesians and an ability to speak Pidgin English or English
are considered important assets for those aspiring to the po-
sition. The first and third headmen, for example, worked on
ships that toured the protectorate, the first headman having
traveled as far as New Zealand. The third headman had also
worked a year as a domestic servant in a European home.
Both men speak good Pidgin English. The second headman, in
contrast, made few contacts with non-Tikopia and spoke little
Pidgin English. His charisma and close kin relationship to a
chief should have rendered him effective as a leader by tra-
ditional standards; instead he proved least competent of the
headmen who served in Nukufero.
As indicated, the headman serves as a mediator, a link be-
tween the local community and the Solomon Islands. The
headman, for example, met periodically with government offi-
cials in 1965 who, through visits to Nukufero and developing
rapport with the Tikopia, hoped to change negative attitudes
toward participation in a Russell Islands local council and
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payment of taxes to the council. The headman received his
visitors, listening to their arguments and graciously providing
them with special foods and drink, but refused to support the
government’s proposals. Such support would be irrelevant, he
contended, because of his people’s loyalty to the chiefs, their
desire to maintain Tikopia traditions in the resettlement, and
the counterarguments that would materialize if he were to try to
convert them to the government’s side. The headman met also
with government representatives on San Cristobal to discuss
representation of Tikopia Island in the local council of the
Eastern District, but he advised the chiefs present at the
meeting against participation.
The headman does cooperate with the government when
functionaries come to Nukufero to dispense innoculations,
check on the incidence of tuberculosis and other diseases, and
advise on proper methods of garden cultivation. He may act
as a host to the occasional European visitors who wish to ob-
serve Polynesian dances and ceremonies or to Lever’s managers
who consider it good policy to show token interest in the de-
velopment of Nukufero. Any Melanesian wanting to trade in the
village is expected to seek the headman’s permission first.
The headman is responsible for allocating land to those
Tikopia emigrants arriving in Nukufero or the labor compounds
who own no property in the area. The Tikopia were given 200
acres on which to develop their village, and the usual procedure
is for migrants to select the location themselves and later
inform the headman of their choice. Since land is presently
abundant, with sufficient area in the surrounding bush for ex-
pansion, the headman’s approval of a site follows, and no
Tikopia has had trouble settling where he wants.
The headman is responsible for supervising the construction
of community facilities and keeping them in good repair. Such
projects as laying footpaths with coral stones, removing over-
grown weeds in the vicinity of the church, school, and houses,
and repairing water lines are performed by volunteer labor
from Nukufero and the labor compounds. The headman blows
a conch shell each Wednesday afternoon, alerting adults and
children to their half-day obligation, and a typical turnout brings
together between twenty and forty people. The Tikopia take
pride in the appearance of Nukufero and point to the success of
their village work projects as an example of what is possible if
they are left to their own devices.
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Additional duties of the headman include the maintenance of
law and order in the community. In this capacity, he is expected
to function similarly to headmen representing local councils
throughout the protectorate. In one case, a Nukufero headman
imposed a fine on two intoxicated men who had been fighting in
the plantation. The money was not turned over to the Russell Is-
lands authorities but was given to men collecting for the Tikopia
Development Fund. Serious crimes such as murder, rape, or
assault are supposed to be reported to the police stationed
on Banika Island. No crimes of this nature were said to have
been committed in the resettlement, and jurisdiction over these
matters is claimed to extend beyond the control of the headman.
Given the detachment of the Tikopia from Russell Islands af-
fairs, however, it is not certain whether a Tikopia alleged to
have committed such a crime would have been reported to the
authorities.
A group of men known as “the committee” functions as an
additional political force in Nukufero. The committee, a loosely
structured organization with no permanent membership, holds
to no regular schedule, convening only when the need arises to
resolve community problems. Any male wishing to participate
on the committee may attend meetings, although the most
active in deliberations in 1965 were the Nukufero headman,
the foremen employed on the plantations, and individuals with
formal education. These men formed the nucleus of recognized
leadership, but none attempted to monopolize discussions, and
no person presided as formal head of the committee.
Committee issues receive a thorough analysis, occasionally
with strong rhetorical arguments backing various points of
view, but in the end a consensus on action to be taken is
generally reached. Topics coming before the group vary, but
financial considerations were very important in 1965. The com-
mittee had decided that each wage-earning Tikopia should raise
his annual contribution to the Tikopia Development Fund from
A£3 to A£4. A group of educated Tikopia created the Fund in
1962, after the idea gained the approval of the chiefs. The Fund
serves as a substitute for Russell Islands taxes. The Tikopia op-
posed taxation in 1965 but recognized the need for money to
improve and expand community facilities at home and in the
Russells. Initial expenditures from the fund would be used to
build and staff a small dispensary on Tikopia and to buy addi-
tional supplies for the school in Nukufero. Only two men were
said to have failed to pay into the fund, and the balance de-
posited in Honiara amounted to A£1,500.
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The near unanimity of Tikopia financially supporting their
own projects indicates their solidarity as an ethnic group. It
follows that enforcement of committee decisions rarely be-
comes a problem. There were times when a designated person
of the committee talked personally to dissident individuals, and
a few people refused to pay any attention to committee pro-
grams of action. These people were the objects of private
ridicule but were not subjected to overt sanctions to force them
to conform. The minor disagreements with committee policies
are insignificant since the community recognizes the legitimacy
of the present leadership and programs developed by the com-
mittee reflect closely the sentiments of the majority.
The relationship between the Lever Company and Nukufero
is both economic and social. The importance of the village to
Lever cannot be underestimated, since one of the company’s
major problems has been that of securing and maintaining a
dependable labor force on its plantations. Without the Tikopia,
Lever would have to rely almost exclusively on Malaitan la-
borers, who were rather restive during the 1960s. It was James
Spillius who influenced the Lever Company to introduce drastic
changes in its recruiting and work organization policies,
thereby shaping the company’s relationship with the villagers
(Spillius 1957).
The company has used Tikopia persons to recruit laborers
from the home island since the mid 1950s, following Spillius’
advice. The recruiters select families whom they believe can
best profit from wage work and educational opportunities and
best adapt to conditions in the Russell Islands. Recruiters in-
clude the advice and consent of Tikopia chiefs in the selection
process. Tikopia are also employed as foremen on the planta-
tions, and they organize the work of planting, clearing under-
brush, harvesting and husking coconuts, cutting the meat from
the shell, transporting copra, and running the company’s motor
launch. Much of this work is done by small groups rather than
by lone workers (formerly the company policy), and jobs are ro-
tated on a daily basis, cutting down on the boredom usually in-
herent in such work. Both men and women can be employed in
some of these tasks, thereby increasing the labor force and also
the incomes of village families.
Besides leasing 200 acres of land to the Tikopia, Lever
also supplied them with seedlings, cuttings, and several ex-
perimental varieties of food plants. The management permits
villagers to plant short-term crops in plantation groves and
has granted them unlimited use of coconuts for drinking and
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cooking. Occasionally the company has petitioned the local gov-
ernment on behalf of the villagers to get them supplies of sago
thatch and other needed items. When the villagers built their
church, the company supplied roofing material, milled timber,
and cement at cost.
The European plantation manager has taken an active, if at
times paternalistic, interest in the growth and welfare of the
village. He has encouraged the founding of the village schools
and church, and he was instrumental in forming a local soccer
team which competed in league play on several islands. While
he has not taken an active part in the internal affairs of the
village, he has expressed his concerns about village education,
economic growth, and morality to the headman. This man has
been rather sensitive to Tikopia interests in social contacts,
being careful to show deference to visiting chiefs, the headman,
and his foremen. The Tikopia, for their part, are particularly
sensitive to the behavior of Europeans in personal relationships,
and the care that the local manager takes in cultivating per-
sonal relationships with villagers is noted and appreciated (see
Larson 1966:42–47).
The relationship between Tikopia and Nukufero is rather
complex and involves a good deal of ambiguity. Tikopia char-
acterize the relationship by a deceptively simple statement:
“Tikopia and Nukufero are the same.” Tikopia regarded the col-
onization at the outset as a move to extend the home island’s
landholdings to the Russell Islands, and they still believe this
to be the case. The founding of a Tikopia village on Pavuvu
Island was, then, simply a matter of replicating Tikopia social
organization on newly acquired land. The whole colonization
scheme depended on the consent of the Tikopia chiefs for its
implementation, and the original grant of land was under their
titular ownership. This is, of course, true of land on Tikopia.
Political authority in the new colony, moreover, is conceived
to be ultimately in the hands of the chiefs, so that disputes
which cannot be settled by Nukufero villagers, for example, are
referred to the chiefs and ‘high-ranking clansmen’ on Tikopia
(for examples, see Larson 1966:65). Ideally, then, “Tikopia and
Nukufero are the same” means that Nukufero is Tikopia repli-
cated in miniature.
To even a casual observer, it is quite clear that Nukufero is
not a replica of Tikopia; the two communities are in many re-
spects quite different. The division of the Tikopia community
into districts and the various kinds of district-oriented activity
have not been replicated in Nukufero. The chiefs are titular
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owners of only some, but not all, of the land in Nukufero. Ex-
changes based on relations with chiefs are absent in Nukufero.
Political organization, and the social stratification on which it is
based, is quite different in the two communities.
To the migrants, the arrangements of plantation labor,
kinship relations, land tenure, community work, and frequent
contact with the home island are concrete manifestations of
the Tikopia culture abroad. Nukufero and the satellite plan-
tation labor compounds represent extensions of Tikopia, but
the resettlement situation being what it is, the entire Tikopia
culture cannot be fully replicated in the Russells. The reason
is, basically, that a certain measure of fluidity is necessary in
confronting problems in the developmental stages of a new
community and in responding to policies and directives of the
protectorate government and Lever’s plantations. The irrele-
vance of traditional rank in selecting headmen and the impor-
tance of overseas experience and ability to speak English or
Pidgin English are examples of the recognition by Tikopia of the
need for flexibility in the new situation.
There is, then, an implicit contradiction between the notions
of the equivalence of Tikopia and Nukufero and flexibility to
cope with contingency. This contradiction, theoretically, could
make a difference in how people regard their situation. Whether
the contradiction is important or trivial, attended to or ignored,
perceived or not perceived, depends very much on how “equiv-
alence” is perceived. If, for example, novel ways of coping with
a new situation are perceived simply as alternative means for
maintaining traditional relationships, then there need be no
contradiction at all—“equivalence” would consist in maintaining
a certain relationship rather than in how that relationship is
maintained. If “equivalence” is perceived at the level of means
(that is, specific ways of acting in a given situation), then the
differences between the two communities become more im-
portant; “equivalence” and “flexibility” can pose a contra-
diction. I shall demonstrate that the latter possibility is in fact
the case for Nukufero.
TIKOPIA ETHNICITY AND TRADITION
Tikopia have a well-developed image of themselves as a distinc-
tive, unique people. Ethnic solidarity among Tikopia has been
fully documented in the literature. The title of Firth’s book,
We, the Tikopia, deriving from the native expression tatou nga
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Tikopia, speaks to the keen sense of esprit de corps and respect
for traditions. As Firth (1936:xv) describes it, [the expression]
“is constantly on the lips of the people themselves [repre-
senting] that community of interests, that self-consciousness,
that strongly marked individuality in physical appearance,
dress, language, and custom which they prize so highly.”
Pride in being a Tikopia has been sustained over the past
four decades. At the core of present Tikopia culture is arofa
‘love’, a concept which embraces hospitality, generosity, respect
for social status, and sensitivity to the opinions and feelings of
others. ‘Love’ is a guide in social interaction wherein appro-
priate initiatives and responses in a variety of situations change
according to the temperament, kinship relationship, and rank of
individual participants. The value is expressed in one’s contri-
bution to the tasks at hand, performances seen not only as ends
in themselves but also as obligations of group living. ‘Love’, in
short, is believed to be peculiar to Tikopia life and lacking in
other cultures.
Folklore and concepts of self lend further support to the
idea of Tikopia ethnic superiority and prowess. Tikopia distin-
guish themselves from other groups as faua kiri mero ‘brown
skin people’, tau reka reka ‘handsome’, makeke ‘strong’, and
fai fekau ‘hardworking’. A number of tales describe Tikopia
courage and superiority in waging war against invaders of the
home island. One myth tells of the original ancestors emerging
from the land of Tikopia itself. Only later are immigrants said to
have arrived from elsewhere in Polynesia and Melanesia.
The Tikopia concept of themselves inheres not only in their
notion of ‘love’, the personal concern which people relate to one
another, but also in their notions of ‘tradition’ and ‘custom’. The
Tikopia have objectified their patterned ways of doing things,
their ‘customs’, in their concept of ‘tradition’. Tradition is re-
garded as the entire body of customs that characterizes Tikopia
and distinguishes it from other communities. Their concept of
‘custom’ is very much like the old anthropological concept of
“culture trait” or “culture element” (e.g., Steward 1941, 1943;
Stewart 1941). A custom may be an entire ceremony or any
of its parts—a way of making artifacts, a way of inheriting
property, and so forth. On Tikopia, for example, people peri-
odically contribute labor to community projects as the need
arises. In Nukufero, building and maintaining the village has
required a more regular schedule of communal work, usually
every Wednesday. One high-ranking man in Nukufero consis-
tently refused to participate in this endeavor on the grounds
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that a regimented work week was contrary to Tikopia custom
(Larson 1966:99). The Tikopia concept of tradition is, then, very
much like the anthropological concept of a culture trait list.
The Tikopia distinguish themselves from other ethnic groups
not only by their physiognomy and language but also in terms of
differences in custom. Thus, for example, Tikopia contrast them-
selves with Melanesians on the basis of the latter’s matrilineal
transmission of property, lack of hereditary chieftainship, low
status of women, and “unclean” personal habits. They interpret
the Melanesians’ emphasis on competitive exchange as greed
and their treatment of women as contemptible, here evaluating
customs in terms of their own concept of ‘love’. The concept of
tradition, therefore, serves the Tikopia both in defining them-
selves as a unique people and in contrasting themselves with
other ethnic groups. Physiognomy, language, and customs are,
for the Tikopia, the diacritica of ethnic identity.
The Tikopia insistence on maintaining physical and political
separateness from other ethnic groups stems from at least two
sources. One is their feeling of superiority and corresponding
depreciation of other ethnic groups. For example, when it was
suggested to the Tikopia chiefs that they join with Melanesians
in a government council, the result was the following:
In my preliminary conversation with the Ariki Tafua he expressed
himself graciously, though patronizingly, on the subject of Melane-
sian politics. When I mentioned what the Government had in mind
the atmosphere became more chilly. The chief maintained that the
black men were numerically superior, they knew nothing of the
customs of the Tikopia, and if any decisions were to be made they
would favour their own kind. I was informed that if I was a friend
of the Tikopia, I would tell the Government that it was not right to
put them with the black man. [Cochrane 1969:4]
Second, the Tikopia believe they have a body of tradition to
maintain, and such maintenance is most easily accomplished in
relative isolation from outside interference.
Given the Tikopia definition of tradition and its mainte-
nance, the statement that “Tikopia and Nukufero are the same”
must inevitably assume the status of a fiction to the Tikopia in
Nukufero. It is obvious to Tikopia adults that the list of customs
that make up their tradition is far from complete in Nukufero.
Moreover, most of the innovations that have replaced traditional
customs cannot be said to have been forced on the Tikopia by
outsiders. The Tikopia do live and work mainly in isolation from
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Melanesians and Europeans, and the latter have kept out of
the internal affairs of the village and plantation communities.
Yet the Tikopia insist that Nukufero is an extension of Tikopia
and that they are simply replicating Tikopia tradition on an
extension of Tikopia land. The contradiction between ideology
and fact, which is made inevitable by the way in which tra-
dition is defined, is not lost on the Tikopia. Their situation in
Nukufero is ambiguous, and they are aware of the ambiguity. Is
custom being maintained or is it not? This question is implicit
in the continual harangues and admonitions to maintain Tikopia
custom in Nukufero both in public and private conversations.
Adding to the ambiguity in the Tikopia social order in
Nukufero is the question of the status of certain innovations.
For example, the British colonial government has pressed the
Tikopia in Nukufero to pay head taxes to the local government
council, made up of Melanesian leaders. To avoid paying what
they considered tribute to non-Tikopia leaders, the Tikopia
created the Tikopia Development Fund as an alternative. Money
is paid into the fund by annual assessment on all Tikopia adults
in the Russell Islands. The money is used for community pro-
jects both on Tikopia and in Nukufero and is controlled by
the ‘committee’ in Nukufero. The committee and the headman
secured permission from the chiefs before starting the fund
in 1962. They regarded this innovation not only as a way of
getting around colonial government pressure but also as sat-
isfying the government demands in a manner consistent with
Tikopia identity and tradition. There is, then, a notion that one
may be consistent with Tikopia tradition in one’s innovations.
What remains ambiguous is whether or not such consistency
in innovation constitutes maintenance of tradition as does, say,
replicating particular customs. This constitutes a paradox in
which the very definition of tradition is at stake. As the question
remains unresolved in Nukufero, the ambiguities raised by it
persist.
Residents of Nukufero manage to live with the ambiguities
of their situation, though their awareness of them is often ex-
pressed in their vociferous insistence on maintaining custom.
But it is not only public harangues or the anthropologist’s
probing which makes these ambiguities apparent. They are
manifested either explicitly or implicitly in every major conflict
in Nukufero. These conflicts, some within the community and
some between the community and outsiders, are examined in
the next section.
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TRADITION, ETHNICITY, AND CONFLICT IN
NUKUFERO
The most serious conflict in Nukufero concerns the constitution
of political authority in the village as regards the headman
vis-à-vis the men of traditional high rank on Tikopia. ‘High-
ranking clan’ status is conferred on men who are closely related
by patrilineal ties to a chief. An effective ‘high-ranking man’,
by Tikopia standards, is one who articulates well at ‘council’
meetings and moves people to action. Most important, ‘high-
ranking men’ act on behalf of the chiefs. However, since chiefs
do not normally reside in the resettlement but have chosen
headmen to represent them in their absence, ‘high-ranking
men’ in the Russells have lost considerable power and prestige.
On matters related to Nukufero development and relations with
outsiders to the community, the chiefs prefer to rely on men
with knowledge of the wider affairs of the Solomons, be they
high ranking or commoners. The chiefs particularly oppose
‘high-ranking men’ who would undermine the new leadership
for apparently personal reasons. In one case, a headman of low
traditional rank had been appointed by ‘high-ranking men’ in
Nukufero and later confirmed to the position by the chiefs on
Tikopia. Following the confirmation, a ‘high-ranking man’, out
of dislike for the headman, sought to have him dismissed and re-
placed by someone of high status. The man of high rank argued
before a large gathering of the ‘committee’ that the headman
was an egotist who was trying to amass personal power. Signifi-
cantly, he buttressed his argument by stating that the headman
was consolidating his own position by ‘tearing down Tikopia tra-
dition’. Although the community took no action on the matter,
the headman felt compelled to return to Tikopia, where he was
received warmly by the chiefs and reconfirmed to his position.
The same ‘high-ranking man’ attempted a second time to oust
the headman, failing in his argument this time before the chiefs
themselves. Further animosity between this ‘high-ranking man’
and the headman led to an actual fight between the two. Most
of the community blamed the former for this outbreak of ag-
gression.
Disagreement between men of high rank and the new lead-
ership may emerge for reasons other than personality conflicts.
In one case, several ‘high-ranking men’ expressed resentment
over a group of low-ranking men collecting money for the
Tikopia Development Fund, complaining that such responsi-
bility should fall on those of high rank. One ‘high-ranking man’
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opposed the formality of community work projects instituted
by the Nukufero headman on grounds that work in the village
should be performed spontaneously, as on Tikopia where people
volunteer labor without being told. This ‘high-ranking man’ con-
tended that the headman, in recruiting help, exceeded the au-
thority invested in him by the chiefs, and the chiefs themselves
would not expect people to work on a prescribed schedule.
The question of legitimate political authority in the Russells
is less a result of conflict between factions openly competing
for power than an unresolved ambiguity in the relevance of
traditional rank to the supposed replica of Tikopia society in
Nukufero. That it is an ambiguous rather than a factional situ-
ation is demonstrated by the fact that the lines of controversy
were not clearly drawn. While there is no question that certain
‘high-ranking men’ resented having authority vested in others,
the grievances they expressed were directed only to specific
issues and then stated in private conversations with friends or
others of high rank. As a group, those of high rank did not con-
stitute a loyal opposition; outwardly, at least, they were leading
spokesmen for maintaining Tikopia identity in the resettlement.
Still, the position of high-ranking persons in the power structure
was ambiguous both to them and to the general community.3
The contingencies of resettlement have raised questions
concerning not only the internal political order but also rela-
tions with the protectorate government. The British have en-
couraged Tikopia and chiefs at home to support the traditional
authority system, recognizing that Tikopia are one of the few
people in the Solomons who have held onto their traditions.
However, in an apparent change of policy toward the migrants,
the government sought to involve Tikopia in the Russell Islands
Local Council. Local government councils, established
throughout most of the protectorate but not on Tikopia, admin-
ister communication facilities, rural health clinics, and schools.
Except for headmen, who are appointed by the high commis-
sioner, council representatives are elected by the people.
Headmen are responsible for carrying out orders laid down by
European district commissioners and ensuring compliance with
council bylaws. Council revenues derive mainly from a head
tax levied against all males residing in the protectorate (BSIP
1965:7).
The government, by 1964, had urged Tikopia in the Russells
to elect representatives to the council and had imposed the
requirement of local tax payment. The migrants, for their part,
resisted both representation and taxation, interpreting them
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as devices to alienate them from the chiefs’ authority and re-
tractions of earlier agreements reached at the outset of set-
tlement in Nukufero. As indicated above, migrants were led to
believe they would be allowed to maintain normal controls over
the internal affairs of Nukufero; in the process of village de-
velopment, they could see no immediate advantage in seeking
community welfare through a council dominated by Melane-
sians. They recalled the early days of resettlement when native
Russell Islanders refused to help clear the land and build
houses; moreover, they regarded taxation in support of coun-
cil activities as personal tribute to a Melanesian headman they
knew only by reputation, held in little respect, and would mis-
trust with funds. As one Tikopia put it: “Why should we donate
money to a government official? He is not a chief.”
A year later, however, the government had apparently de-
cided to take a harder line by imposing fines against six of
the Nukufero community leaders and threatening incarceration
for failure to meet the obligation. When the men continued to
ignore the government demand and officials came to make the
arrests, a substantial number of Tikopia submitted themselves
for charges and custody, protesting that they should be arrested
along with the leaders. At this point the authorities, seeing the
difficulties involved in transporting the large number by small
craft for arraignment on Banika Island, withdrew the charges
(Firth 1969:355).
What is significant in this conflict is the solid response of the
Tikopia community in its confrontation with the government,
which the Tikopia knew had the power to jail them. The threat
seemed somehow to foster a militant response rather than ca-
pitulation to the government’s demands. This response becomes
even more interesting when compared to another confrontation
with outside authority, in this case with the Lever Company.
In 1964, Tikopia and workers throughout the Solomons
joined in a strike against Lever’s plantations. The demand made
by the BSIP Ports and Copra Workers’ Union was a wage in-
crease for workers employed by Lever. The issue seemed clear
enough, but to Tikopia the strike created a situation of ambi-
guity. While Tikopia would have happily accepted a pay raise,
many of them who struck had been reluctant to join in the
walkout because they mistrusted Melanesian union officials re-
siding at headquarters in Honiara and, moreover, misunder-
stood the function of the union itself. Several believed that
union officials were corrupt and regularly stole union funds
to support families and friends. Others thought the strike had
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been called not to raise wages but simply to halt all copra pro-
duction because union officials and other Melanesian laborers
were either too lazy to work or simply were raising unnecessary
trouble. Although Tikopia understood the walkout was intended
to bring workers more money, the exact amount could not be
stated. The union had demanded a flat 45 percent increase
across the board—a raise, however, which no Tikopia fully com-
prehended, since they knew little of percentages. To many the
strike was less an expression of grievance against Lever than
a time out in which to carry on traditional ceremonies. During
the week of the layoff, five weddings with great feasts and gift
exchanges were held. This represents more than half the wed-
dings celebrated that year.
The ambiguities inherent in the strike, as perceived by
Tikopia, reflect also the status of the migrants as workers. The
average Tikopia earns the equivalent of around $25 a month.
Such wages do not draw him into full-time employment, since
he sees no possibility of accumulating personal savings ade-
quate for making substantial purchases (notwithstanding pay
increases through collective bargaining and the strike). A
Tikopia views plantation labor not as a permanent job but as a
periodic occupation enabling him to earn a fixed sum of money
with which to buy inexpensive commodities such as clothing,
hand tools, and tobacco. The purchases are consumed in the
Russells or brought to Tikopia upon repatriation. A worker re-
gards a return home as a welcome change from routine plan-
tation activity and a chance to enjoy the limited fruits of his
labor. A Tikopia is willing to accept a low wage because he re-
gards it not as compensation for an alternative full-time occupa-
tion but merely as a source of income supplemental to subsis-
tence activities carried out in the Russells and Tikopia.
The migrants, in other words, hardly represented a hard
core of militant strikers hoping in desperation to obtain an ad-
equate wage for survival. They did, however, support the strike
until Lever made the crucial decision to repatriate all striking
migrants to Tikopia. As the impact of this threat reached
throughout the community, the back of the Tikopia phase of the
strike was broken, and workers returned to the plantations im-
mediately. The moment of truth had arrived when the Tikopia
realized they stood to lose the land and possession of
Nukufero.4
The Tikopia, to some extent, perceived both confrontations
in terms of their own interests as an ethnic group. The con-
frontation with the government involved what Tikopia regarded
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as a threat to their ethnic and political autonomy and to the tra-
ditions that define that ethnicity. To pay tribute to a Melanesian
headman is to negate the authority of the chiefs and deny the
traditional relationship between people and chiefs—not only is
Tikopia tradition threatened, but so is the dictum that Tikopia
and Nukufero are the same. The militant solidarity of the vil-
lagers can be seen not only as a show of determination to
maintain their ethnic autonomy but also, and even more im-
portant, the integrity of the tradition that defines ethnicity. The
very militancy of the display is highly symbolic of the Tikopia sit-
uation: all at once the ambiguity of the Nukufero situation dis-
appeared in resolute action, almost ritual in its communicative
form. The chiefs rule on Tikopia; Tikopia and Nukufero are the
same; therefore the chiefs rule on Nukufero. The affirmation of
this syllogism in the face of government sanction dwarfs the
contingencies that require innovation and all its inherent am-
biguities in one dramatic moment. For that moment and af-
terward, there is no ambiguity. Tikopia and Nukufero are the
same.
The strike displays a pattern which is almost the reverse
of the confrontation with the government. The Tikopia were
aligned with other ethnic groups in a confrontation where
issues were not very clear to the Tikopia. The leaders of the
strike were Melanesians, none of whom was trusted by the
Tikopia, and a raise in wages did not affect the Tikopia interests
in the same way as that of other groups. The loss of their land,
moreover, would have threatened their autonomy, forcing those
remaining in the Russells to be totally dependent on Lever for
subsistence. The uneasy alliance with Melanesians collapsed
when the interests of Tikopia themselves were threatened.
Moreover, rather than resolving ambiguity, the outcome of the
strike served only to exacerbate it by adding a new dimension:
the ambiguity as to whether or not the Tikopia would ever hold
title to Nukufero and hence the insecurity over tenure on the
land. It is perhaps significant that the strike occurred approxi-
mately a year before the confrontation between the Tikopia and
the government.5
CONCLUSION
Tikopia define themselves in terms of distinctive physique, lan-
guage, and, most important, a body of tradition unique to them-
selves. Because their tradition is composed of customs, re-
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garded as ideal and behavioral elements, the failure to replicate
the entire body of customs in the resettled community of
Nukufero has given rise to a good deal of ambiguity concerning
the kind of community Nukufero really is and therefore the kind
of people the migrants really are. Since the migrants must deal
with contingencies of resettlement in novel ways, such failures
at replication of custom have been inevitable. The Tikopia are
aware of this inevitability, and the efforts of some to innovate in
a manner consistent with ideal Tikopia custom have introduced
the possibility of redefining custom. This possibility in itself im-
plies further ambiguity, however, in the meanings of custom and
tradition.
The ambiguities implicit in such innovations as landholding
(chiefs as opposed to others), the organization of communal ac-
tivities, and political authority in one way or another underlie
the major conflicts in the community. The internal conflict over
political authority reflects ambiguity in the relevance of tra-
ditional rank to the resettled community. Confrontations with
outside authorities have had to do with alignment of Tikopia
with other ethnic groups as opposed to independence and iso-
lation.
With the eventual departure of the British from the Solomon
Islands and the growth of Solomon Island nationalism, we might
well expect these ambiguities to be further exacerbated and the
conflicts intensified, not only in Nukufero but also on Tikopia,
as political independence for the protectorate becomes a reality.
The Nukufero experience becomes crucial to all the Tikopia in
light of this potentiality as a kind of experiment in adaptation
to the inevitable increase in relationships with outsiders. The
adaptations the Tikopia can make and the extent to which their
social order and definition of themselves are jeopardized by the
adaptations depend very much on the resolution of the present
ambiguity as to what constitutes tradition and its maintenance.
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THE EXPLOITATION OF
AMBIGUITY: A NEW
HEBRIDES CASE
Robert Tonkinson
Chapter10
INTRODUCTION
Ambrym Island lies in the center of the New Hebrides chain
about 100 miles north of the main island, Efate (map 13). To-
taling approximately 160 square miles in area, Ambrym is domi-
nated by two active volcanoes and a large surrounding ash plain
that occupy the central area and divide the island into three
habitable regions. The population (4,246 according to the 1967
census) clusters in the north (1,875), southwest (1,309), and
southeast (1,062). This separation is reflected by linguistic and
cultural differences, particularly between Southeast Ambrym
and the other two areas.1
Both volcanoes are fairly active, and serious eruptions with
lava flows have at times rendered parts of the island unsafe
for habitation. Much more common than lava flows are ash-
falls, which kill yam crops and, if prolonged, defoliate vege-
tation in affected areas. In 1950–1951, eleven months of heavy
ash-falls ravaged the island, especially the southeast where all
the vegetation was stripped bare.2 By November 1951 the con-
dominium government had evacuated the populations of both
West and Southeast Ambrym.3 The latter were hastily settled on
the nearby island of Epi, only to be victimized weeks later by a
disastrous hurricane.
Whereas most Southeast Ambrymese soon returned to their
homeland and reestablished themselves there, the members of
one village, Maat, resettled on Efate where their leaders had
found them employment and a village site, and this new Maat
village became their permanent home. Their resettlement is the
concern of this chapter.
245
Map 13. Relocation from Ambrym to Efate.
The Maat villagers have extensive landholdings in Southeast
Ambrym and abundant stands of coconuts. They have never re-
nounced their land and coconut rights, and at any given time
there are always a few of them visiting their homeland and
living in the old village of Maat. Ambrym is an extremely fertile
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island; the ash soil is very easy to till, and it is possible for
people to grow food there with little effort and to earn a cash
income by cutting copra whenever they need money. Since
the 1950–1951 eruptions, there have been no ash-falls severe
enough to affect copra production or ruin gardens (apart from
the delicate yam crops). Other Ambrymese and many outside
observers find it difficult to understand why the people of Maat
have chosen to remain on Efate, where they possess little land
of their own, have insufficient coconuts to make copra, and
must therefore work almost constantly—for European em-
ployers—while all this time their coconuts rot on Ambrym and
their land there remains unworked.
Since each village in Southeast Ambrym as a social unit is
part of a larger network of kinship, marriage, and economic
ties, it is understandable that the removal of an entire village
would disturb the network as a whole. Moreover, the fact that
Maat land, its most important resource, remains but is un-
available for occupation by the other villages exacerbates an al-
ready disturbed situation. There is subtle pressure on the Maat
people either to return to Ambrym or to make some definite
disposition of their land, and the villagers are well aware of
this. The persistence of the relocated community thus presents
a paradox.
Given the apparent permanence of Maat Efate and the prob-
lems it engenders for both the villagers and their congeners,
it is the persistence of the relocated community that demands
explanation, both for the observer and for those involved. One
possible explanation is that their successful adjustment to a new
environment constitutes what the villagers regard as a major
investment, a stake to be maintained. An alternative expla-
nation is an economic one, of the kind usually suggested by gov-
ernment officials, which states that the relatively affluent life-
style of the Maat Efate people is so attractive that they are un-
willing to give it up. A third possibility is that there are crucial
contrasts in the social orders of relocated and home villages,
contrasts of sufficient significance to warrant a commitment by
the villagers to their maintenance. The latter alternative as-
sumes both sociocultural change and continuity whereas the
others assume only change as an explanation of the persistence
of the relocated community.
In this chapter each of the three alternative explanations
is examined. It will be shown that the first alternative is not
supported by available data, that the second involves faulty as-
sumptions, and that only the third allows for an adequate ex-
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planation. In addition, it accounts for the nature of the paradox
presented by the community’s persistence and suggests resolu-
tions of the paradox.
MOBILITY, ETHNICITY, AND ADAPTATION
It is assumed that a major factor influencing the manner in
which people cope with resettlement is their previous history of
movement, particularly in terms of the perceptions and adaptive
strategies that prior experience affords them. An examination of
the history of mobility of the Maat community in relation to an
account of their adaptation to Efate leads to three conclusions:
1. Maat people arrived on Efate with a set of
adaptive strategies fully adequate to cope with
the new physical and social environment.
2. Adaptation to Efate entailed no drastic
changes.
3. Not only were Maat people able to replicate
major features of their social order on Efate, but
they were also able to replicate mobility patterns
analogous to those they had practiced in South-
east Ambrym.
Maat, with a population of about 140 in 1950, was one of
fourteen villages in Southeast Ambrym, a culture area in which
there is a common language and a complex web of kinship-
friendship ties linking members of different villages. Like the
other villages, Maat was composed of a number of residentially
contiguous patrilineages, united under a “big name’. Residence
was strongly patrivirilocal with a considerable amount of
hamlet-village exogamy. The tendency for several hamlets to
amalgamate was accelerated after the coming of Christianity,
whose first influences date from about the early 1890s.4 Tradi-
tionally, changes in the location of hamlets were common, oc-
curring most often as a response to shifting patterns of slash
and burn agriculture, intra-and interhamlet conflicts, problems
with ancestral spirits, and sorcery scares.
There were well-established intervillage visiting patterns,
since villagers had kinship and friendship links with some of
the people in most other villages. Individuals or families some-
times made spontaneous, short-term visits to other villages, but
these were rarely for more than two or three days at a time.
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Longer stays, exceeding a month, were rare and were most
often prompted by some kind of conflict in the home village
or when a family fled after a village sorcery scare.5 The local
schoolteacher-catechists who operated in every village, and to
a lesser extent the village chiefs and their assistants, were the
most mobile of the inhabitants. Any intervillage visiting that
was other than purposeful was infrequent (with the exception of
groups of young men who sometimes combined for hunting and
sports) since anyone who wandered about aimlessly was likely
to be suspected of having ulterior (sorcery) motives.
Traditionally, contacts with the rest of Ambrym and with
neighboring islands were probably not strongly developed.
There was some contact with Paama, a nearby island inhabited
by people who speak a language related to that of Southeast
Ambrym. However, Ambrym’s notoriety as the home of the most
powerful sorcery in the Group rule it out as a favored port of
call for all but a few courageous Hebrideans from neighboring
islands; besides, the perpetually rough seas and lack of an-
chorages in the southeast did not attract visitors.6
Contact with Europeans and resultant movements of
Southeast Ambrymese outside their home area date from about
the 1870s when recruiting vessels first called at Southeast
Ambrym. During the following thirty or so years they took large
numbers of able-bodied men to Queensland to work on sugar
plantations as laborers, on contracts of at least three years.7
The nine Maat men who are remembered as having gone were
all repatriated safely to their homeland, complete with rifles,
axes, cloth, and other trade goods.
The conversion of Southeast Ambrymese to Christianity, ac-
complished largely through the efforts of Hebridean evange-
lists, led to new kinds of movement by a small proportion of
the local population. No European missionary ever lived in the
southeast, but Maurice Frater, who was in charge of the nearby
mission in North Paama, supervised both areas for nearly forty
years after his arrival in 1900.8 He trained schoolteacher-cat-
echists (mostly Paamese at first) to teach in the schools he
founded in both areas; then he began educating the most
promising young Ambrymese at the mission boarding school
in North Paama. Most of the brightest boys were later sent
to Santo to attend a theological college (Tangoa Training In-
stitute), which took students from all Presbyterian areas of the
New Hebrides and gave them four years of general and reli-
gious education. After their return home, most of the eighteen
Southeast Ambrymese men who attended the institute between
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1913 and 1951 became the best teachers and most devoted
evangelists in the southeast, where they exerted considerable
influence and introduced important cultural innovations.
The kind of movement that involved the largest number
of Southeast Ambrymese since the early 1900s was that of
able-bodied men who were regularly recruited for plantation
work on other islands—mostly Malekula, Santo, Efate, and Epi
(map 13). For the Ambrymese this movement was prompted
less by economic motives (except when volcanic activity or
hurricanes destroyed their coconut crops) than by curiosity, a
desire for a change of scene, or escape from conflicts or sorcery
threats. Women and children rarely went, as the men were
housed in large dormitories on plantations. They had little in-
tercourse with non-Ambrymese coworkers or with villagers in
surrounding areas—especially on Epi, which had a reputation
for sorcery that was alleged to be even more virulent than their
own.
During World War II, almost all able-bodied Southeast Am-
brymese men were recruited to work at least one three-month
contract for the Allied forces based on Efate. During this time
they lived with Hebrideans from all over the Group and worked
either in the town of Vila or in the surrounding Southwest Efate
area. Some men served as many as five contracts. They were
attracted by the wages, which were higher than those for plan-
tation labor, and by the generosity of their Allied employers,
who with their vast materiel were an exciting novelty.9
Another kind of movement was that of relocation, usually
prompted by severe volcanic activity. An eruption in 1888 led to
the abandonment of nine villages, and another in 1913 resulted
in the evacuation of the people of Southeast Ambrym to Paama
Island where they were billeted by the Paamese. As a result of
this temporary resettlement, Southeast Ambrymese developed
close ties of friendship and reciprocity that are still maintained
with the Paamese. It is clear from available records and from in-
formants’ recall that hurricanes and ash-falls and the resultant
destruction of food and crops and coconuts were sufficiently
common to be an accepted part of life in Ambrym.10
The 1951 relocation differed from previous ones in several
important ways. First, the prolonged ash-falls that precipitated
the decision to evacuate the area were viewed as a crisis by the
condominium government, not by the Ambrymese, who were
accustomed to such phenomena and regarded them as incon-
veniences. Second, the decision to relocate was made by the
administration, not by the Ambrymese. Third, the places se-
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lected for refuge were chosen because of their convenience for
the administration, not the preferences and needs of the Am-
brymese. The Ambrymese were reluctant to leave their homes,
especially if this meant relocating on the allegedly sorcery-
ridden island of Epi. The misgivings of the Ambrymese were
confirmed when a hurricane struck Epi six weeks after the re-
settlement, killing forty-eight people and leveling the shelters
of the refugees. Completely unsettled by the experience, the
Ambrymese resolved to leave Epi as soon as possible, either
by securing passage back to Ambrym (where the ash-falls had
ceased) or by finding work on plantations elsewhere.
The fortunes of the Maat people diverged from those of their
fellow Ambrymese shortly after the hurricane. Several of the
village leaders, their most influential men, had been arrested on
Ambrym the year before and sent to jail in Vila on fabricated
charges of inciting Cargo Cult activity in their homeland. After
their release from prison, the four men stayed on in the Vila
area to work for local planters and later sent for their families
from Ambrym, partly because of the difficulties caused there by
the ash-falls.11
A local planter, already known to the villagers because he
had operated trading vessels in the Ambrym area and had re-
cruited laborers there, approached the village leaders with a
proposal that would be mutually beneficial: he would give them
land for a village site and some building materials if they would
become his labor force and work exclusively for him on the
several plantations he maintained in Southwest Efate. Knowing
the deteriorating situation back on Ambrym and being aware
that it would be at least three years before they could again
earn cash from their coconuts there, the leaders agreed. They
sent a messenger on a planter’s boat with a letter instructing
the Maat people to proceed en masse to Vila. On receipt of
this message, the villagers were apparently unanimous in sup-
porting the move: they could see the advantages of steady em-
ployment on Efate at a time when their homeland was unable
to provide a source of cash; in addition, they were anxious to
escape from the place they now associated with destruction.
Thus the new settlement of Maat, 7 miles from the main town of
Vila, came into being in mid-1952.12
For the men of the village, Southwest Efate was familiar
territory, since they had previously worked there for the Allied
forces and on several of the plantations in the area. The twenty-
six Maat men who were born before 1935 had averaged almost
three trips each to Efate before relocation, but only two of the
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women in this age category had been there before 1950. For
the women, then, relocation involved movement to an area they
had heard much about but had never seen. With a few excep-
tions, the only time women had left Ambrym previously was in
response to some kind of crisis, such as the 1913 evacuation, or
for the treatment of serious illness. So in this regard the relo-
cations to Epi and then to Efate were no different because they
too were prompted by crisis.
Their mobility before relocation inevitably brought
Southeast Ambrymese into contact with other ethnic groups,
with alien economic institutions, and, to a lesser extent, with
officialdom. Because of the relative isolation of Southeast
Ambrym, with its poor anchorages and its inhabitants’ rep-
utation as sorcerers, there has been little contact between
Southeast Ambrym and the outside world. Apart from the oc-
casional appearance of trading vessels seeking to recruit or
repatriate laborers, periodic visits by missionaries and, rarely,
district administrators were virtually the only other contacts
with outsiders. Most interethnic contacts have occurred outside
Ambrym.
The interaction between Southeast Ambrymese and
members of other ethnic groups, with the exception of some
Paamese, has been characterized by limited, highly context-
specific contact involving narrowly defined roles and behavior.
Roles such as those of employer-employee, clerk-customer,
administrator-subject, coworker, and coreligionist define the
entire range of contact before relocation.
Since men were the more mobile sex and women moved with
the men only during temporary crises, it was mainly men who
learned and assumed these roles. Their subsequent use of these
roles provided the Southeast Ambrymese with the strategies
necessary to cope outside their homeland. Thus, by the time of
their relocation to Efate, the migrants already had the prerequi-
sites for adaptation to their new social environment. Moreover,
the families who were already living on Efate in 1951 consti-
tuted the leadership of the original Maat community. These
people had already established contacts with plantation owners,
the government, and coreligionists in order to provide the mi-
grants with land, food, building materials, employment, and
educational opportunities for their children by the time they ar-
rived. Their adjustment to a peri-urban environment, in other
words, required little of the migrants that was not already fa-
miliar to them.
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Interethnic contacts since relocation reveal a strong con-
tinuity with those characterizing the period before the Maat
people moved to Efate. Outside contacts still involve men much
more than women, since the latter mostly stay in the village—as
do the men when they are not working. Although outside con-
tacts are certainly more frequent now, they are still fairly cir-
cumscribed and are limited to interaction that takes place away
from the village, with the exception of coreligionist contacts
described below. Contact with the administration remains
minimal, and the Maat people are left to run their own internal
affairs much as they were on Ambrym.
The relations between Southeast Ambrymese and other
ethnic groups on Efate range from highly superficial to cordial.
Maat people evince neither particular hostility nor enthusiasm
toward any group other than the Paama people, with whom they
have many friendship links. Maat people prefer to socialize with
and marry other Southeast Ambrymese, but they do not appear
to dwell on ethnic stereotypes. Their closest contacts have been
with their neighbors, the inhabitants of Mele Village, which is
the largest in the New Hebrides and is situated only a half-
mile from Maat. Both villages are Presbyterian and share the
same pastor and school facilities, located in Mele. Inhabitants of
the two villages exchange visits for certain church services and
social events such as dances and marriage feasts.
Apart from activities connected with the church, which
sometimes take them to Vila and other peri-urban villages, Maat
people are mainly interested in their own village relationships
and in interaction with Southeast Ambrymese friends and rel-
atives in the southwest Efate area and their homeland. In-
terethnic relations are neither stressed nor denounced, simply
because they are not considered by the Maat people to be im-
portant.
The foregoing discussion should make clear that the pat-
terns of mobility of the Maat people before relocation have been
replicated in large part on Efate. Movement out of the village
mainly involves males, and they leave for the same reason they
did before relocation: to work. While in town they often shop,
and they sometimes visit friends or relatives there. Women tend
to remain at Maat, except for trips to the hospital and occa-
sional shopping or visiting outings. Movement into the village
by outsiders other than Southeast Ambrymese is rare and
mainly involves vendors or coreligionists.
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Only mobility connected with the homeland has undergone
major change since relocation. Instead of spending temporary
periods outside Ambrym, as was the case before relocation,
Maat villagers now reside permanently on Efate and spend only
temporary periods back on Ambrym, an average visit lasting a
little more than seven months.13 At any given time, then, Maat
Ambrym has about ten to twenty inhabitants, and although
the village population is small and fluctuating, it continues to
function.
From the viewpoint of most remaining Southeast Am-
brymese, the existence of Maat Efate makes visits to Vila a
much more attractive proposition than in earlier times. People
wanting to visit the town can expect to be accepted at Maat and
to be offered lodging and hospitality there. Thus the population
of Maat Efate always includes a small proportion of Southeast
Ambrymese who are visiting from the homeland. They come
for a variety of reasons and stay for periods ranging from a
few weeks to a few years. Whether they choose to stay at
Maat or with relatives who live closer to Vila, visiting Southeast
Ambrymese generally spend some of their leisure time in the
village, especially on weekends and for celebrations.
Friends and relatives from Southeast Ambrym form the
largest category of outside visitors to Maat.14 Maat villagers
who visit Vila outside working hours interact mainly with other
Southeast Ambrymese; women and children who visit town gen-
erally have informal contacts only with Southeast Ambrymese
there. Friendships and visiting patterns indicate a strong pref-
erence among Southeast Ambrymese for one another’s
company. The marked preference of Southeast Ambrymese for
marriage with others who speak the same language has con-
tinued at Maat, and although the frequency of intermarriage
with non-Southeast Ambrymese has increased since relocation,
it is still not high. Despite a marked shortage of women in the
village, very few Maat men have married girls from neighboring
Efate villages.15
Adjustment of the Maat people to Efate does not appear to
have been a difficult process. They have been able to replicate
their village social structure with a minimum of ecological ob-
stacles or interference from the outside. Back on Ambrym, the
important boundaries beyond the family were the ‘small name’
(a named residential area of the village, most of whose male
inhabitants claim membership in the same patrilineage), the
village, and the culture area. Since relocation, the individual nu-
clear family boundary has grown more distinct as the unit be-
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